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■f' Chapter I‘I' TBIE mTURALISTIO PAIIAGY
As The Nature of the FaHaoy
%e oritlGlm wtilch has since been labelled the naturalistic fallacy 
first described by the 18th# Century empirisist David Hume, in a 
small but celebrated paragraph In his Treatise of Human Nature. This 
passage reads as follows:
"In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have 
always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary 
way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a god, or makes observa** 
tions concerning h m m  affairs j when of a sudden I am surpris M  to find, 
that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is and is not. I 
meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought 
not. This change is imperceptible| but it is however, of the last conse­
quence. For as this ought or ought not, eatresses some new relation or 
f j ' affirmation, ’tie necessary that it should be observed and explained; and 
at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether 
inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others,
. J Tdiich are entirely different from it# But as authors do not commonly use
Î this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to #e reader; and am
 ^' persuaded that this small attention would subvert #11 the vulge^  systems 
of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is 
not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by
•i . Ii; reason."
' Ï
standard Interpretation of Hume* s point is that nonsaOral 
premises cannot logically entail a moral conclusion. It is a cmmn 
procedure in many moral systems to begin with statements of fact concern­
ing God*s commands, human behavior, or the natwal world. Then it is 
maintained that because of these facts men ou#t to act in a particular 
way; because smething is the case certain consequences follow for human 
conduct. NoweU-Smltà, in outlining this faHaoy, says that the answers
to practical questions are deduced or derived frcm statements about Wiat
2men are and in fact do. This is judged to be illegitimate reasoning 
since the conclusion of the syllogism contains something which is not in 
the pr«alsee, namely, a moral prescription. The introduction of an 
’ought* in the conclusion is invalid unless ’oughts’ (rather than facts) 
appear in #ie premises.
How A* C. MacIntyre holds that Hume pronounced this fallacy with 
tongue-inM5heek| that he never intended it to be considered seriously.
In support of this view he states, "...if the current interpretation of 
Hume’s views on ’is* and ’ought’ is correct, then the first breach of 
Hume’s law was committed by Hume; that is, the developient of Hume’s own 
moral theory does not square with Wiat he is taken to assert about ’is’ 
and ’ou#t’." He argues further that "it would be very odd if Hume did 
affirm the logical irrelevance of facts to moral judgments for the whole 
difference in atmosphere and it is very marked between his discus­
sions of morality and those of, for eacai^ le. Hare and Nowell-Smith 
springs from his interest in the facts of morality. His work is full of
qanthropological and sociological remarks..
r,
I am Inclined to the view that Hume was sincere In his belief that 
the passage from ’Is’ to ’ought* is logically barricaded, but that this 
did not prevent him from oooasionally committing the blunder idiioh he 
himself described. However, that is neither here nor #;ere. For our 
present purposes, I think we can adopt the following position; %ether 
or not Hume was sincere in claiming to unearth a basic fallacy and 
v/hether or not, assuming it to be valid, he stands charged with it, the 
very fact that numeroue others have seis^ upon it as the disclosure of 
an authentic fallacy is sufficient justification for regarding, it 
serioucly# Thus wo omi take Hume’s statement as a prototype of the view 
vAiich countless others maintain even if Hume did not.
However, let us now return to the main stream of our inquiry. Un- 
fortunately for our task, Hume was not the only philosopher who is 
historically attributed with presenting this fallacy. A finding similar 
to that of Hume and actually coining the phrase ’the naturalistic fallacy*, 
was repeatedly mentioned by G. E# Hoore in Friaolpla Ethica. in his po­
lemical passages against naturalistic and meta$^ ysioal systems of ethics* 
Witness the following csxtraote?
"The naturalistic fallacy consists in the contention that good means 
nothing but some single or cos^ lsoc notion that can be defined in terns of 
natural qualities.**^
In another section of the book he states the fallacy in greater 
detail; "A mistake of this simple kiM has commonly been made about 
’good*,. It may be true that all things Wiich are good are also something 
else, just as it is true that all things which are yellow produce a cer­
tain kind of vibration in the light. And it is a fact, that Ethics aims
. i
at discovering #at are those other properties belonging to a3|L things
lAich are good. But far too many philosophers have thought that when
they named those other properties, they were actually delining good; that
these properties In fact were singly not 'other* but absolutely and
entirely the same with goodness* This view 1 propose to call the
5’naturalistic fallacy’."
There can be little doubt that a certain similarity exists between 
these "fallacies," both of >^ ilchbear the label the "naturalistic fallacy", 
but some writers have supposed that Üiey are identical. That is to say# 
it has been maintained that Moore’s naturalistic fallacy is the same as 
that to #%ich Hume pointed of attesting to derive or deduce m- ’ou#»t’ 
from an ’is’# (Iris Murdoch seems to make this mistake in The Nature of 
^taphysics) # This Is a confusion# althou# of a forgivable sort since 
it is encouraged by Moore’s misnomer of the fallacy Wiich he elucidated. 
Moore# in fact# admits this point# that his title is inappropriate# but 
replies "1 do not care about the names what I do care about is the 
fallacy*" This reply# however# is not sufficient justification for lÀat 
is in effect a highly misleading label.
Moore’s version actually has both a broader application and an 0. 
Henry twist* The point it makes is not against naturalists per se* but 
against any theory which equates or syncretises any two notions logically 
distinct* As A. R. White points out# "If following Moore# we divide aH 
notions into natural and non-natural, there are mathematically four 
varieties of this failure to distinguish two notions, namely# by identi­
fying (1 ) a natural witA another natural notion# (2) a non-natural with
another non-natural notion, (3) a *iatwal with a non-natural notion, (4)
a non-natural id.th a natural notion. Since Moore did consider good to
be a non-natural notion# case (1 ) could not aria© for gpod; and since
case (2) la the identification of two non-natural notions# it would be
misleading to give a fallacy committed her© the nmm ’naturalistic’. In
this way he would have to liait the name ’naturalistic fallacy about
good’ to (3) and (4)* Thia la the fallacy %ibloh Hume thought of as the
confusion of ’is’ and ’ought’ or vice versa. «**But to narrow the
fallacy (3) and (4) gives a misleading picture of Moore’s method,"
Moore bears out this point ifhen he statest "It should be observed that
the fallacy by rcforenoe to which I deflml Hotaphyaical Ethics is the
same in kind; and I give it but one nme# the mturaliaiic fallacy,"
And at another polht# "Even if (goodness) were a natural object# that
would not alter the mture of the fallacy nor diminish its in^ brtanoe 
0one whit*"
In this worl€ we shall concentrate upon îtee’e version of the 
fallacy# i.e. the alleged impossibility of deriving value jud^nts from 
natural facts*
B; The Application of the fallacy
If the naturalistic fallacy Is# in fact# a genuine fallacy in moral 
theory# then mi extrmely powerfltl and damaging idea must be confronted* 
For if moral philosophers are logically precluded from deriving mioral 
values from naturalistic sources# that is deriving m  ’ought’ frau an 
’Is’f values from facts# or evaluative conclusions frm descriptive prm- 
ises# then ethical theories cannot rest upon the descriptive facts of 
experienc#; they must be in some sense autonomous*
Il
il
Moral judgments and prescriptions are certainly on firmer footing
when some aspect of public eoqjerienc© cmi be brought forward to serve as
L-justification. For example# if a moralist can say that ’X’ is desirable 
because it is desired, he seems in a better position than the Individual 
who declares that mankind possesses an intuitive assurance that ’X’ is a 
moral end# The naturalistic hedonist, for example, can point to such 
things as the catholicity of pleasure —  seeking behavior among men and 
the lower animals, the identification of the pleasurable and the good in 
nmerous contexts, the oustomar^  ^presupposition of the legislator that
pleasure should be fostered, etc* When challenged to siq>port his conten­
tion that pleasure ought to be valued, the naturalistic hedonist can 
point to any or all of these facts#
The non-naturalist seems in a feeble position by comparism because 
he is confined to appeals to m  arid rationalism or a vaguely^efined 
intuitive apprehension of goodness# Hot only is üie descriptive warrant 
more persuasive to what dames calls the "ingrained naturalism ^d materi­
alism of mind," but it places ethics on a scientific footing# ft may not
be possible to achieve the certainty of the geometrician that Descartes
 ^ desired, or the exactitude and precision of the physical solenqeB that :
II
Bentham sought, but at least the premises of moral syllogisms cbuld be 
|^| : established by scimtific means# AH moral principles muld discover 
their natural roots in data about the universe#
However, if the naturalistic fallacy is a legitimate and universally 
applicable criticism then all of these stable foundations are shattered* 
The naturalists are logically prevented from drawing upon the principal 
source of their strength#
4!
Let US look briefly at the varieties of mturalistlo ethiWal 
theories which are directly affected by this difficulty#
a. In the first place the naturalistic hedonist is severely 
affected for he declares that because it is an undeniable fact of 
rience that men do pursue pleasure and seek to avoid pain# m  are 
justified in concluding that human beings should pursue pleasure and 
avoid physical or psychological pain#
To numerous hedonists as well as non-hedonists it appeared obvious 
that the chief concern of mankind is the securing of pleasure, satisfac­
tion, or happiness. Since mm  seek only that which they value# and value
/only that v*dch they seek# it could be inferred that men do in fact 
regard the pleasurable as the good. The hedonist could say further that 
they are fUHy warranted! in this assumption; what is directly and gener­
ally regarded as good jLs good. Unless we embrace a doctrine of the 
inherent depravity of man# the position that our normal tendencies can 
be assumed to rightly direct our steps appears very persuasive*
To the Oyrenslcs the momentary# intense pleasures tdiich men pursued 
were to be prefei^ ed. The inward flow of particular sensual .^ easuree 
should remain untn^ peded by paltry oonsideratlons such as dishonour or 
discomfort# because the good life was ccnçjosed of just these intense 
moments;
"Happy the man Wio grasps hie need#
The ruby wine# the loved one’s tress#
And sprawls# to crown his happiness#9On the soft margin of the mead."
To the Epicureans the pursuit of pleasure ie both natural mâ 
inevitable —  two facts which provide a base for the doctrine that the 
attaiwmnt of maximum pleasure is the moral end of life. Althbu#i 
eachmdng the Cyrenaic insistence upon the desirability of intense 
sensual pleasures, and positing ataraxla or tranquil happiness as the 
aupmae good, nevertheless they retained the central hedonistic values,
A correct moral inference seemed possible and eminently sensible from
the fact that all living, creatures have a natural liiqsulBe to take delight
Iin pleasure to the proposition that pleasure ought to be pmpued. %
call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life* For we recog-
10niae pleasure as the first good innate in us," Or again: "every
pleasure because of its natural kinship to us is good even as every pain
1 Î  ■ ?also is an evil*" |
The Utilitarians in turn althoiu^  eliminating the objectionably 
egoistic features of Greek hedonism by universalizing their ethical 
principles# nevertheless based their ethical hedonism on psychological 
hedonism* dermy Bentham clearly states this relationship in his intro­
duction to the Principles of Marais and Lejaslslation;
"Nature has placed mankind under the guidance of two sovereign mas­
ters, pain and pleasure* It is for thorn alone to point out xdiat we ought 
to do, as well as to determine #at we shall do# On the one hand the
standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects,
12ore fastened to their throne#"
Will’s bald statement of this connection is as follows: :
"***t2ie sole evidence it is possible to produce that aj^ hiiag is 
desirable, is that people do desire it* ##*Ho reason can be given why
1 ■% 1
the general happineao Is desirable except that each person, so far as he 
believes it to be attainable, desires hie own happineae* %ie, however, 
being a fact, we have not only all the proof xiiich the case admits of,
13but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good# .#*" 
Both Bentham and Mill therefore can be eem to embrace the principle 
that human behaviour is always motivated by pleasure and they employ this 
as the logical basis for their Utilitarian prescriptions# Like Gallicles 
in Plato’s Ooraias# the pleasureablo and the good are thought to be 
identical#
b# In a similar manner the Stoics, \é.o were the arch intellectual 
rivals of the Epicureans, claimed to discover their values full blown in 
certain mtural facts# gene, Seneca, Epictetus and the Emperor Marcus 
Aurelius Antoninus all claimed that man could achieve the good by discov­
ering xdiat nature sou#t and ordering his life in accordance vdth it.
The natural was thought equivalent to the good# "’life In agreement x-dth 
nature* (or living agreeably to nature)" was the end of life; .living
virtuously is equivalent to living jüi accordance xdth experience of the
14 ’actual course of nattxre*" v
And mturo was not regarded as a vast purposeless limbo but rather 
a harmonious order, shot throughout with rational principles and moving 
intelligently toward a destiny# Therefore conformity to nature meant 
agreement and active cooperation with an that life presented. The 
virtuous man recognized this fact and rationally controlled his conduct, 
subordinated his passions and aspirations in order to live in tune with 
nature# He didn’t flail against the apparent viciasitudes of life 
because he recognized a larger providence transforming ordinary existence,
10
Like Plata aiid Aristotle, the Stoics exalted the rational life #ioh 
would master mi'uly desiros and lead to self-possession and tranquility* 
However* when the Stoic’s argument i® logically dlseected* here 
again the iaiplicit and central moral argument violâtes the naturalistic 
fallacy. Stripped of all rhetorical asibelHshmente the argument appears 
to be that "X" is good because "X" coiiibms to Nature #
0. A kindred nature theory* Evolutionary ethics* displays tiie same 
type of reasoning. Here in fact occurs the most blatant derivation of an 
etiiical cyetem from descriptive information about mture.
Although Herbert Spencer is most closely associated with this theory* 
Gharles Darwin implicitly and explicitly provided tho background for 
Spencer’s speculations in hi© writings. Darwin xvrote* "The term* general 
good* may be defined as the rearing of the greatest mmber of Individuals 
in full vigour and health* tflth all their faculties perfect* under the 
conditions to which they are eubjeotod. * .it would be advisable... to take 
as the standard of morality* the general good or xmlfare of the oœmunlty
Furthermore in the chapters on the Mental Powers and on the Moral 
Sense* Darwin declares that this evolutionary end* of rearing and pre­
serving healthy vigorous individuals* could be brought about,by mutual 
justice and oonsidoration among men. Since human beings possessed a 
capacity for sympathy and were able to retain past experiences* social 
justice was thereby enabled to flourish*
To Herbert Spencer the concept of evolution adequately ejq^ lained the 
nature of the mlverse and provided the foundation for morality. Change 
in the universe was always from a state of hmogeneity to a state of
>■ ;
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heterogeneity; Evolution meant continual tranefomation toward greater 
and greater differentiation* The highest evolutionary state ms the one 
of greatest heterogeneity and complexity* On the basis of this evolu­
tionary concept Spencer declared that "the conduct to which we apply the 
name good is relatively more evolved conduct; and that bad is the 
name we apply to conduct which is relatively less evolved*"^  ^ In short* 
human conduct had to imitate #ie cosmic process; the dynamic movmwt of 
nature displayed to mankind a model for isthieal conduct* dust as the 
Stoics maintained that human behaviour should conform to the rational 
will of the cosmos* so Spencer declared that men should pattern their 
lives upon the Inexorable evolutionary process.
Strangely enough# Nietssche inferred a very different ethical theory 
from the same facts of evolution. D#tead of extracting the notion of 
progressively greater differentiation among organims or mutual assis­
tance* herd instinct and i&rental care present in the evolutionary strem% 
Nietzsche concentrated upon the self-assertive bdiaviour of animals in 
their struggle for existence. On the basis of this evidence Nietzsche
• iprescribed a "transvaluation of all values *« The Hebraic-Ohristlan 
morality of cooperation* humility and love had to be abandoned and 
nature’s values of ruthless aggression* combat and domination substituted 
in their place. These values were in accord with the evolutionary law 
of survival of the fittest and natural selection. By cultivating this 
«master-morality" rather than "slave-morality" humanity could re-enter 
the evolutionary flux.
(1 mi^t mention in passing that if the same evolutionary evidence 
can be used to justify a variety of ethical theories* it can be assumed
12
, / that the inference is speolous* As one philosopher put it we pannot 
rj, construct a moral theory on the strength of Wiich way the frog will leap.) 
' : All of these mm* Darwin* Spencer* and Nietzsche as well as such
r I figures as Peter Kropotkin* Olaf Btapledm* U# B* S. HaldanO* and juHan 
Huxley* have adopted the evolutionary process as the touchstone for 
morality. An act is judged good only in so far as it conforms to certain
, facts of cosmic or organic evolution. And in this essential linkage■ r
’ between ethics and evolution a scientific account of moral behaviour is 
provided.
d* I might mention briefly in this category the social approval 
theory Wiich also interprets goodness in strictly naturalistic terms.
V Acoordin^ i to its two major exponents* Emile Durkheim and Lucien îiévy- 
K' Bruhl* a factual science of morals can be established by studying the 
formal and informal rules idiich actually prevail in society. %e disap-
probation of the casmunlty is indicative of the standards of morality 
ontortalned by its members. Society disapproves of actions Wiich are not 
consonant with its sentiments (codified in «^ eclfic rules)* and conse­
quently amasses a body of "moral facts" which the moral scientist can 
exmine* iCvy-Bruhl and Durkheim are in thorough agreement on this
1?point; "...all mwal facts consist in a rule of sanctioned conduct." 
Ethical reality consists of "ethical rules* obligati<xis* laws* what­
ever generally is contained, in the consoience."^ ^
Moral science does not then prescribe changes in the moral rules in 
accordance with some transcendental a priori ("a pre-established general 
formula")* but it can correct deviations in a given society by a compara­
tive study of cultural morality# "...only by coi#aring the results of
■i
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these special studies shall we be able to extract the common citaracteris-
tics of all moral rules* the constitutive properties of the law of 
19 ;ethics#" Abnomalities will give way before evidence of the rules 
prevalent in "normal"societies*
%e function of the moral soiantiot then is to engage in a cross- 
cultural study of moral facts in order to discover the values vhioh ought 
to be incorporated ivithin a social structure (i.e# those displaying 
greatest frequency of occurrence)* and those wliich need to be eliminated# 
In this theory again we can discern a violation of the fact/value 
bifurcation* Goodness and ri#%tmss are uablushingly analyzed into the 
prevailing* socially approved rules of behaviour*
e* Host ifiu>ortantly for the purposes of this book* there is an
20ethical theory which 0* D# Broad has called "theological naturalism."
Host theologians would endorse this theory in one form or another for it 
defines right strictly in terns of an omniscient* omni-good deity’s 
commands. Broad cites Paley as an historical representative of this view*I'
I should imagine because of Palsy’s statments in the Frlncioles of Moral
apjd Political Philoaoohy (p. 63ff)* although the examples are endless#
The outstanding theologian Emil Brunner has quite typically stressèd
man’s inability to construct an ethical system without recourse to deity*
Man is iiAerently depraved and consequently produces a distorted* cmfused
and fra^ asnted moral code when he attm^ts m  independent analysis of
ethical behaviour. All man-contered* sin-tainted ethical syst&s are
destined to fail precisely because of their terminus a q u o* S^orallty must
originate vdth the all-pervading will and purpose of God* "t#iat God does
21and wills is good; all that opposes the wiH of God is bad." "The
14
22Good is simply what iGrod wills that we should do* Somd ethical
principles can only he achieved by discovering the genuine revelation of 
deity’s purposes— the divinely sanctioned rules of human conduct.
Karl Barth likewise has given vigorous expression to a theological 
naturalism or a theological approbation theory* like Brunner, Barth 
disparages the notion that man, unaided, is able to discover moral truth* 
Neither secular conscience or religious consciousness can be trusted to 
discern moral direction. What’s more the vagaries of man’s desires, his 
siiort-sightedness, selfishness and instinct of self-preservation, lailitste 
against a tenacious pursuit of moral purposes. Blhical Imowledge and 
achlévemmit are only possible through individual revelations of deity’s 
sovereign will.
The revelation of God’s will, cannot be abstracted and fixed In a
body of prinoiplsB or unlversalised for mankind. However, morality wholly
depends upon these revelations, most particularly the revelation in the
person of Jesus. "Throu^ we are summoned to obedience and set in
motion, and limt does not mean the beginning of a new eelf-righteousnese
but the end of all aelf-righteousness. It does not mean that we are
invited to have a now confidence in Him that m  shall be able to render
the obedience required of us# %  trusting in ourselves we could only
23becctae disobedient."
In this connection we might also mention Calvinism. Perhaps no 
other theological system so vehemently and persistently mphasizes the 
disabling force of original sin in man’s life or the utter dependence of 
man on God for his salvation. John Calvin repeatedly states that man’s 
fallen spirit can only be raised again to goodness by an omnipotent act
13
of divine grace* Nothing shcrt of "efficacious grace," regenerating 
_jy' m n ’e spirit, will bring about right action. Man has the power (Initidiiy) 
- to resist the infime of grace pressixxg upon his natural will, but he can­
not win a state of grace by good works— he cannot perform rifjut actions 
. : ■ apart from Ood* acts are in fact the result of divine grace clean-
I . sing and renewing man’s soul,
% NeitWr can man in his finitude and sinful condition comprehend the
mind of God, the perfectly moral cmmandments of deity, the principle at
; work in the forewilled election or damnation of men. ' However,; we car* 
rest assured in the fai#* that deity’s sovereign ^ 11 is Wrolly moral, no 
matter how arbitrary it a;:^ ear»* "For the Will of God is the hipest 
 ^ rule of ri#%teousness, so that whatsoever He willeth, even for (undeserv­
ing predestination to eternal death) that He willeth^  it, ought to be
taken for righteousness * " " (parenthesis mine ) #
Further examples are readily accessible but stjqperfluotts. %# theo- 
? logions cited, althougi dissimilar in numerous respects, are uJüted in
i| / their belief that morality is ultimately derived from the divine will.
V
1 Behaving morally means recognizing that God’s will is the criterion of 
■ righteousness and, more importantly, conforming to His laws. ,
i- i; This theory con be seen to be naturalistic (and, strangely enough,
metaphysical as well), precisely because the commande v^ ich are in fact
Î ; issued by deity are regarded as constituting the moral good for man. As
' .1 a naturalistic ethical theory like hedonism, evolutionima, stoicism,
- i
social approbation and several others not discussed, it stands charged 
vdth David Hume’s naturalistic fallacy. To reason that loving one’s 
neWibor, for example, is right because it is approved by God, does 
violate the description/evaluation distinctim.
16
Let UB now turn to a consideration of the general background out of 
which Hume’a troublesome orltiolem arose#
17
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A: jHiaae|8 FhÜoeot?hical Fogltlon
The philosophy Hume espoused has been variously labelled sceptiqisaa, 
empirieiem, phencsaenalism, naturalism# and has even been called a type 
of theism# This heterogeneous gro%%> of titles testifies both to the 
scope and diversity of the subjects to Wiich Hume addressed himself and 
the self-*C0tttradictory character of various facets of his views* They 
are also indicative of the dissimilar interests which Humans philosophy 
can be shaped into serving# Sir Alfred Lyalins remark about anthropology
is applicable to Hume*s philosophical works as well? "it has provided a
} • repertory out of which one may make arbitrary selections of examples and
precedents to suit any theory#"
That Hume was a sceptic can be ascertained by the representative
case of his attitude toward causation* Ihe credtdoue soul is hardly the
one to doubt a necessary commotion between cause and effect or to coj>#
fine causal necessity to mental ideas erroneously transferred to objects
Tdien customarily viewing one to precede and be contiguous to the other#
If that is not enough# we have Hume advising care in going beyond the
most "cautious observation of h m m  life" and the plainest sens© ^ eri**
ence; dismissing the external existence of perceived objects as delusive;
declaring (with almost Freudian foreshadowing) that "reason is and ot#t
only to be the slave of the passions" and can never alone influence th©
will; and declaring the notion of a *self* as cocmionly understood to be
î { 21
a fiction# actually consisting of "a bundle or collection of different 
perceptions# Wiioh succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity and 
are in a perpetual flux and movement*" In Hume*© ahmst cynical asser*« 
tion that even «knowledge* eventually degenerated into •probability* we 
hear the echo of the alleged «Socratic doubt» (shared by Democritus# 
Anaxagoras# Bigpedocles and Oicero Academic Question^) that noljiing can 
be ascertained, perceived or known with indefectible certainty# Of his 
four philosophic harangues published in 1?42, »The Stoic#» »The. Epicurean, • 
»%e Platonist# » and »The Sceptic# » the last-named is the best and loagest* 
"But his scepticism was peculiar* It had well-defined limits* It 
extended only to the theory of knowledge# metaphysics or common life,
#at he doubted was the power of humm reason to pronounce judgments on 
the highest themes* %#at he never doubted was the power of human instinct 
*—  or imagination as he often called it •—  to conduct and regulate our 
everyday affairs*"^
Tot neither imagination# which includes the instincts# natural dis­
positions and propensities of the mind# nor reason# which is of a mathe­
matical or analytic stripe# can operate beyond the range of human experi­
ence* (In fact the attempt to bring matter of fact vdthln the jurisdicfcaon 
of reason inevitably ends in confusion and absurdity)* For this approach 
Hume can be justly labelled an empiricist*
iîmt the label of phenomenallst is defensible can be detemlned by 
the fact that Hume hold all our knowledge# belief and conjecture to begin 
and end with appearances* We cannot travel behind or beyond these 
appearances and to attempt to do so engenders muddle-headed and misleading
thinking* IVhether he attempted a •pure# sencory phenomenalism» a© john




3v/as «njalçe-believ©» as Whitehead maintains#-^  does not call into question 
the assuEg>tlon that a basic phenmwmlima is present in his philosophy* 
Hox^ ver# wo examine the label imtmmlist# an ineidloue ambig­
uity in the referent of this term must be dredged to the surface. Host 
people who %muld roundly pronounce, or denounce, Hume as a naturalist 
ifould not mean an ethical mturalist —  that is# one of those moral 
philosophers Wiose theories of value are of an enQ)irloal nature# being 
centred in pleasure# approval# fitness# integration# evolutionary sur­
vival# etc* They would not Intend in modem amchronistio jargon that 
he speoifloally and ©implicitly held that judgments about rightness# 
wrongness# goodness and badness are utterances about the natural world# 
totally within the jurisdiction of science. The^  imuld mean that Hvsae 
is a lim believer in the essential terrestrial character of all things 
vdnatever# from miind to values; that he refused admission to a super­
natural deity for justification or explanation of human affairs# holding 
fast to the dictum; Bee Deus intersit * nisi diznis* vindioi no^us. (And 
for Hume the dlffieulty-was never worthy of such intervention*)
For Hume, contradictory directives Issued by the imagination and the 
reason are perpetually in a state of war within human beings. , ,%he imag­
ination dictated practical belief in such matters as the external world# 
independent of perceiving minds; the neoessarj’^ cormeetlon between cause 
and effect; the motivating powers of reason and the mind# etc. Reason 
could not demonstrate any of these things. It could never reach a world 
independent of our perception# never locate a necessary causal link In 
successive contiguous events and never capture that elusive# postulated 
entity called mind. However# this dilemma has natural roots# Reason
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itself is A elne cm non of being buman, a neceesity of being human* 
"Mature, by m% absolute and uneontrollable necessity# has detei%ined uo 
to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nw can we any more forbear 
vievdng certain objects in a stronger and fuller light# upon account of 
their customary connection with a present iiT^ r^ession# than we can hinder 
ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake# or seeing the surround­
ing bodies Wien we turn our eyes to%rd them in broad sunsliine,"^  And 
the imagimtiozi too has its natural watershed from \^ ich our animalistic 
instincts# dispositions and mental propensities pour forth#
ZAieldly for man, nature both produces this antinmy and indicates 
the escape hatch. In the final analysis we must inevitably rely upon 
the Imagination for guidance in all practical affairs# otherwise despon­
dency# 'bapotence of action and Izitelleotual sohigopliroenia vdll result, 
"Most fortunately it happens# that since reason is incapable of dispelUng 
these clouds# nature herself suffices to that purpose# and curbs me of 
this philosophical melancholy and delirium# either by relaxing this bent 
of mird# or by some avocation# and lively impression of my senses# Wiich 
obliterates all these chimeras. ...Here then I find myself absolutely 
and necessarily determined to live# and talk# and act like other people
in the common affairs of life ... I may# nay X must yield to the currcW#
5of nature# in suWiitting to mF" senses and understanding * « **' "The 
great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of scepticism 
is action and employment# and the oooupations of ooaiaon life*"^
Here incidentally lies the resolution of the apparent conflict in 
Hume»s philosophy between naturalim and scepticism. Although "a small 
tincture of Pyrrhonism" is useful in order not to think and act in an
I'
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ultimately **noB-oogltative" way# if man reflected or judged tdo search- 
ingly and thereby became a thorough-going sceptic, the balance, of hie 
being was restored by the forces of bis sensitive nature excusing their 
practical# casmon^ sensical demands# For example# Hume intellectually 
rejected the notions of an efficacious reason# idie self and causes, but 
in his ordimry sensitive beliefs became a «plebeian» as Cleanthes says, 
and positivlstically assented to them. This bifurcation is certainly 
not an odd one* The Btoio sages in their exaltation "might adiieve a 
condition of universal doubt for short, intense periods," but only the 
arch-sceptic Pyrrho of Bile had to be protected from disregarding gallop­
ing horses in the street*
In the sense that Hum© trusts the natural inclinations of his 
imagination and indeed regards mture as compelling him to do so, he is 
assuredly a naturalist in perhaps the same way as are Henry David Thoreau, 
jean Jacques Rousseau, jams FmWwe Gooper and even Frank HcSrrls, Bail© 
Zola and Erskine OaXdwell# And if Qellner is correct in regarding th© 
Reliance upon ccanaon usage of Oxford linguistic analysts to be a modem 
©agression of the «noble savage» tradition, then Hume could alsp be 
classed among their number In that respect#^  Ih© subordination of reason 
to feeling and instinct may not be "the determining factor in Hume*©
ill philosophy,"^  but it assuredly occupied an important position#Hit 'i.i
Hume»© position on the subject of religion requires greater eluci-i: ;•
dation than th© labels es^ irieist, phenomenallst, naturalist or scejptic 
which have been affixed to him. For the significance to theology, 
particularly to th© moral ties between Ood and man, of the naturalistic 
fallacy idiich h© depicted, has a definite place in this thesis* After a
i
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r, discussion of his religious views, we will be in a much better- position 
J to uîïierstand and relate this fallacy to his overall convictions.
%' To begin vfith, Hume»s feelings toward the coiiteKqporary Galvlnism
J can be aHiteratively described as disgust, doubt and déploration# 
AltJiough he was raised within a cage of Calvinietic theology, he grate-
' fully liberated hirsself from its oppressive constraints at an early age,
■n 9' ; even before he formulated the general outlines of his philosophy# This
conventionally respectable religion of the masses was found by Hume to
be mere vulgar superstition which stultified society —  "a species of
daemonism." He came to regard the stringent Oalvinistic tenets of the
election of a few to glory and the rmiainder to reprobation, as exerting1a needlessly baleful influence upon the people, terrorizing thm with the 
fear that they would surely be the recipients of 0od»s "cruel and implac- 
able vongeanco*” Wien its basic prest^ positions underwent rigorous 
philosophic scrutiny the sword of Dqwoolos under idiioh the people quaked 
in abject dread was found to be a chimera —  an imaginary and vicious
15I invention thrown up by a bogus systmi#
I!u ' Hume extended bis refined Pyrrhonism, or «mitigated sceptibim, « to
Ghristiardty at large, although here he proceeded against his 'Wotlonal 
inclinations rather than with them# (Previously his personal dd.staste 
and humanistic al^ orrence of the more brutiah features of Galviniwn 
y I precipitated his logical investigation of its articles of faith#) Hover- 
tholess, it is seldom disputed that Hume squarely rejected the Christian 
doctrine# Those few dogged souls who have attempted to make Hume out a 
Christian have had to resort to such gambits as claiming that his witipgs 
are not expositions of his own religious faith, or that he held a
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variant Christianity, substantially diffeirent fron that professed by the 
average believer, or that we can glimpse Htime*© true position in a few 
significant passages in the Dialogues*
The first is highly doubtful, as a cursory glance at Hume^»:S biog­
raphy adequately reveals s no private practice of Christianity can be 
anywhere discerned* Furthemore, Hume was not affected or braggadocio 
in his writings, and even hesitated to publish works which drew out the 
implications of his thou#its to the detriment of Christianity* He cer­
tainly would not sacrifice sincerity to the achievement of a pleasurably 
blocking technique even for the sake of the literary fame he so greatly 
coveted; his personal Integrity precluded this possibility*
As for the second, this assumption can only be justified by such 
paradigm utterances as, "the particle of the dove" in human nature must 
eventually vanquish "the elments of the wolf and the serpent" whl<^ , if 
we magnify in a Platonic manner to the unit of society, is analogous to 
the dictum, "the meek shall inherit the earth#" let this sort of 
Ohristian confidence is far from the heart of the church*© doctrine. It 
is a peripheral pronouncement echoed in other religions; assent to the 
articulated hope hardly constitutes a necessary condition (let alone a 
sufficient condition) of being a fbllower of Christ. We would surely be 
straining the bonds of Christianity to place Hume within its cmfines on 
the basis of such en passant remarks.
As for justification solely by reference to the Dialogues* we have 
already spoken of the unreliability of this procedure. Both the procedure 
and the claim are rendered increasingly absurd by the discovmry that Hume 
contradicted these significant passages elseitdieri»* Thus we can assume, 
as A* E. Taylor, J. 1* T. Grelg and John Laird do, that Philo is either
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I, inalïider© or non-representative of Htme*s opinions when he saÿs such
things as "To he a philosophic Sceptic is, in a man of letters, the first
V ItJ and most essential step towards being a sound, believing Ohristian*"
[ Die *sign!,ficance» of such utterances seems to lie more in the fact that
they buttress Incorrect inductions of this sort, than that they express
Htmie»s true feelings*
' i  ' Hume in fact specifically attacked Christianity in his writings on 
12Miracles. As Orr points out, "Since, however, in that age, belief in
revelation was supposed to be supported chiefly by the evidence of
miracles, it remained for Hume * * * to subvert effectually that reputed
13foundation of the Christian religion." This is;borne out by Hume when 
.. he states, "The Christian Religion not only was at first attended with
.. 4X, miracle B, but m m  at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable? '■* * I; : person without ono*" ^  Since by a miracle Hume means "a violation of 
the of nature" —  those laws idiich "film and unalterable ejqjerience" 
has shmm to be regular and uniform, he would indlude in the class such 
f ■ specifically Ohristian occurrences as water being turned into wine,
stones becoming bread, lepers and blind men being cured of their respec­
tive afflictions, no less than such Old Testament events as the Red Sea 
parting, the sun standing still in the valley of A jalon, and the walls 
of Jericho collapsing at Joshua»© tru%et blast# In arguing against th© 
possibility of miracles he would also be attacking such fundamental 
Christian notions as the logos made flesh, the resurrection, the ascen­
sion, the second coming, and the immortality of the soul.
In substance, Hume's professedly «decisive» argument against miracks 
is that a complet© induction based on all previously experienced instances
Iïi
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of the kiiîd can never be overturned by testimony (itaolf a mode of
experience) to what, m  mlracuXoua, lis ex hvnotheal* oootrary to thio
induction —  i.e* "a wealter evidence /liumerieally ooneidoredj?; can never
1 5destroy a stronger." Although this argment has come In for much 
needed criticism, it cannot be doubted that Himie regarded it a© "entire", 
valid and decisive proof against this aspect of roHgiou© belief — . «an 
everlasting check to all kind© of superstitious delusion»" If it did not • 
subsequently prove an "everlasting check", eroding the foundations of 
belief in miracles, it certainly served to dissuade Homo from giving 
credence to such accounts and to the Christian edifice erected with 
miracles as its cornerstone* "For Hmae recognises no uniqueness in 
Christianity such as would render it unseemly to place it, in discussion,
1 6on a level with the pagan religions of Greece and Homo*"
It will be observed that Hume's opposition to Christianity takes a 
circumlocutory form# He does not attack orthodox Christianity directly, 
any more than ho strikes down religion directly# Yet one should not be 
deceived into thinldlng, as seme have done (o*g*, Amelia H* Stirling), 
that he is only attacking religion's popular, superstitious and/or fanat­
ical (zealous) forms. 8 0 much is encompassed within the Vemt^ like 
circles of those terms that, as Km^namith remarks, "it is far from clear 
what it is that remain© when these are discounted»"^
B( Hume's Theologlc&l Position
In regard to Hume's general theological position, James O0r rightly 
remarks, "It is significant that nearly every modern theorist on the 




a limited God, and believer in no Ood at all ean find hie d^ are in
10Hume, and fortify himself by hie reasonlnge#" However, this le not to 
mj that Hume, aeting inconeietently, buttreeeed oontracliotory positions 
at varioue etagee of hie public and private va^ itlnge (although a philo­
sophic development liiich out acroeo entrenched poaitione wuld be more 
desirable In the intereot of academic honesty than an egotistical insis­
tence upon cpnoletonoy), but that various factions have extracted pass­
ages favourable to them frma the multitudinous array of Hume's uttcirancea,
>•
and erroneously (alwet entirely) canonized lîwm In tholr respective
denoiüiîmtlons#
That Hum is thou^ jit to be so elastic and malleable W  religious 
matters is due in large part to hie Dialogues Ooncemina Natural Religion 
in idiieh the pi'ioie opponents, Philo and Qleanthoo, are made vehicles for 
the expression of various types of views, Some of thèse view©; are of a 
classical form, some give utterance to the arguments of contemporary 
delm, and some embody Hme's peculiar brand of «Enllghtemaent « soeptMm 
toward religion. These writings at once provide a virtual cornucopia of 
theological argumenta to which diverse sects can lay claim, and seriously 
confuse the search for Hume's own position#
At first glance it would seem that Philo would be the mouthpiece for' ^
Hme's beliefs. His metliod of approaching questions is compatible with 
Hume's modus pnerandis the type of sceptlcim at Wiieh he arrives smacks 
of Hume's own omolusione; and many of his utterances can find their 
counterparts in Hwm's other writings, takes Philo's state­
ment at the close of the final section of the Dialogues as being the sole 
passage in all of Hume's writings in which he outspokenly declares "the
1
. ! .. !
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19 ^ only knowledge of God that he le prepared to allow*" Moreover, her ; 20
11 roundly contends that "Philo, from start to flnl^, represents Hume;"*
l\] Yet Gle&nthes also appears to have a ah^e of Mme's opinions and
ml^t be said to express the positive side of his nature* In a letter
to Gilbert Elliot# Hume states# "You would perceive by the sample I have
J ; given you #at I made Oleanthee the hero of the dialogue i %atever you
can think of to strengthen that side of the argument will be mdst accept- 
21able to me#" Furthermore# the three protagonists are characterized in 
the introduction with the r^arks "the accurate philosophical turn of
Oleanthee#" "the careless scepticlm of Philo#" and "the rig#InfLmdLble
22 ' orthodoxy of Demea*" Paa^ hilus's summation of the relative merits of
J/ the disputants' arguments reads# "upon a serious view of the lAole# I -
£" ' r
cannot but think# that Philo's principles are more probable than Demea's; ^
K 23but that those of Ole&nthes approach still nearer to the truth."
In the light of this contradictory evidence It seems prudential to 
resort to Hume's other# more direct works before attributing to one or 
, the other of the characters the dramatic presentation of Hume's ideas#
When we do# we find that Philo and Oleanthes irregularly alternate in 
playing the role of Hume; they both represent phases of his mental devel­
opment, some of which are transient and seme of which are permanent*
Thus to assume that either one alone carries the full burden of Hume's 
theological conclusions is to adopt a superficial and distorted view*^
This difficulty need not concern us in ferreting out Humels thoughts 
on the ontological arguaient for the existence of God* %#en Dsmea puts 
forward"that sio^ le and sublime argument a priori#" (propounded by Anselm, 
Bonaventure# Descartes# Leibnls# Wolff and Hegel) of "a necessarily
P:? ï.
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existent wîio carries the vemm o£ his existence in himself; and
\ 25who cannot be supposed not to exist without an express contradiction,"
Philo and Oleanthes are united in peremptorily rejecting it* The criti­
cism of this fallacious argument which is then offered has its roots in 
the Enquiry, idiere the fundamental distinction is made between "Matters 
of Fact" and! "Relatlonm of Ideas" (See. IV, Part In this section
Hume claims that "Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a con­
tradiction, * Those things which are ooncei^ble as existent entities are 
also wnceivable as non-exietent entities* Diere isn't any hé&g# there­
fore, the non-existence of which ln^ lles a contradiction* Anselm's 
fomulation of God as id quo maius cogltari neouit thus has no meaning;
. neither does Descartes' argument that the very notion of God, tjie most _ Vj
perfect Being, carries existence with it as necessarily as the analytic
concept of triangularity includes the equality of %he aim of its angles '
to two right angles* For necessity is attributable to valid judgments
27) only; it is not attributable to things* "Matters of fact (or Relations 
of Ideas) are not ascertained in the aame manner} nor is our evidence of
their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing* Die
. 1: 20 contrary of every matter of fact is still possible*"' I' This point is echoed in slightly softer tones by Berkeley in his 
y ##iasis upon the arbitrariness of natural conneoticms. It fourni its
L most profound expression, however, in Kant, mid has not been put forward
: seriously in its Cartesian form ©ime the publication of the Critique of
Pure Iteason* To the affirmation that the highest perfection in one's
mind must necessarily include real existence, Kant retorted that the
. V  S






lacks real ajcletence in the outside world; existence ia not an addition 
to the content of any idea* To attmqpt to add reality to a concept would 
be like trying to «improve* the v^ue of a hundred imaginary dcàlar» by
.'Iadding a real one from my pocket* It is an Impossible feat* "Being is 
evidently not a real predicate, that is, a conception of something that 
is capable of being added to the conception of a thing « « « p. add 
notiling to my conception, idiich expresses merely the IposSSility of the
object, by simply placing its object befope m  in thought, and saying
oothat it i©*"
. I ■Let me ccmcXude this topic ifith Gilbert Ryle's recent remark that
"one of the biggest advances in logic that has been made since Aristotle
(is) Hume's and Kant's discovery that pa%|ticular matters of fact cannot
be the Implicates of general propositions, and so cannot be demonstrated
30from a priori prmiises." On this basis, a demonstrative knoiQ.edge of 
God and rational apologetics are undemined*
To Kant, the ontological argument for the existence of God was at 
the heart of the 'dcgmtic' position of traditional theolq^i td Hume, 
the teleoioglcal argument or the argument from design was the 4chief or 
sole argument for a divine existence#" let Hume and Kant are one in
disparaging the ontological proof (as did Aquinas and Guanilo Jailer) 
and admitting a great deal of esteem for the argument from design* Kant, 
although repudiating the teleoioglcal argument, nevertheless pays it the 
following high tribute? "Dtls proof always deserves to be mentioned with 
respect* It is the oldest, the clearest and the most accorda#, with the 
camion reason of mankind * * * It suggests ends and purposes, where our 







knowledge of nature by moaW© of the guiding-concept of a special unity, 
the principle of Which is outside nature* This knowledge # • *; so 
strengthens the belief in a mprme Author of nature that the belief 
acquires the ibroe of an irresistible conviotion."^ ^
In the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion# Hume seems to be 
endorsing th© argument from design In an important and formal sense# In 
saying this I am disagreeing with the authoritative oommentator Kemp- !
Smith and adopting the view that in the concluding portion of the 
Di&lo&ues Hume "seems to lay aside bis sceptical mask and let us see for • 
a £m moments his individual belief on the great question in debate;" 
tliat his conclusion is "neither due to the literary art of the dialogue ■ ’
/ 3 2nor is it an insincere concession to public opinion*"
In the concluding section (Part III) Philo abandons his fomer scep­
ticism and declares his "unfeigned sentiments#" "A purpose, an intention,
\ ' ' a design strikes everywhere the most careless, the most stupid thinker;
and no men can be so hardened in absurd ^ stemm, as at all time to reject 
33it." This statement comes smeWiat as a surprise in regard to the 
previous debate ia the Bialoi^s* but it is perfectly consistent vdtb 
Hi»'s utterances in other works, e\g. thé opening paragraph of his 
Natural History of Religion# Her© the existence of God as established by 
the teleoioglcal proof goes unquestioned; it is presupposed iu Wxamini% 
the origin of religion* "The Wiole frame of nature bespeaks Intelli- 
gent Author; and no rational inquirer can, after serious reflection, 
suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of 
genuine theism and Religion# Also in a note appended to the Treatise 
he says 8 "The order of the universe proves an omnipotent mind* Nothing 
more is requisite to give a foundation to all the articles of religion#'*
Y  ’
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Hume «a final révision of the Dialogues in 1776 contains the following 
remarks by Philo, marked for insertion? Philo declare© that disputes 
over this subject do not concern meaning but are "merely verbal*" %e 
basic analogy is never at issue, merely the de&ree to which the "original 
intelligence" is analogous to human reaaon*^ ^
However# after granting the existence of the deity on teleoioglcal 
grounds# Hume goes on to sap his admission of all strength and practical 
utility* In the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Hume briefly 
assumes the olrcumspact dialogue form to argue forcibly that if the argu­
ment from design is valid it only establishes the existence of a deity or 
deities possessing the "precise degree of power# Intelligence# and benev- 
olenos# Wilch appears in their worlmanship . * * The supposition of 
furtWr attributes is mere hypothesis| . ♦ * The knowledge of the cause 
being derived solely from the effect# they must be exactly adjusted to
each others and the one can never refer to any thing farWier# or be the
37foundation of any new inference and conclusion#” In other words# if 
God can be demonstrated as sufficiently powerful to create the world# we 
cannot on these grounds suppose that he also created the universe or its 
mmipotent; if we declare that God's earthly productions display a 
benevolent or wise nature# we cannot by "exaggeration and flattery" prove 
further that he is all good and mmisclemt* Arguing in this specious %#y# 
a mischievous sophist could just as readily magnify God's defects in îiafcaæ 
into an all-ignorant being# or by the same process infer Him to be 
totally malevolent* He cannot be proven to possess more or less power 
than He displays# more or leas benevolence# more or less knowledge# And 
a deity constructed on this skeletal framework is hardly an acceptable
i'-’
object of worship, veneration and obedienoe; Hume'e rational piety and
,•"genuine Theism." with the argument from design as its logical baeie Is
seen to be a hollow vessel indeed*
Furthermore, in the Dialogues. Hume draws the line of human knowl­
edge of God as deduced from the order and design in nature, a 'physlco- 
theological* proof, to use Kant's term* The works of nature irresistibly 
suggest a Being "tdio bestowed existence and order" on the universe 
according to a "regular plan" or "connected system," but when one contem­
plates "the conduct of events, or we may call the plan of a particu­
lar providence," one cannot Infer the will or moral attributes of God, a 
moral government or order of the universe, the moral responsibility of 
man toimrds his creator, or in fact anything vhicb affects human life. 
There is a supreme being in the universe, but we cannot say what the 
nature of this being is except that it is like hmmn intelligence» We 
haven't any basis, in the light of this, for behaving other than we do 
under the inspiration of our common morality, and we should not imagine 
that Wiat is pleasing to us, moves ua, influences us, etc*, holds true 
for God as well# "« * # tlio whole of Natural Thdology resolves itself," 
in Philo's concluding wards, "into om simple, thou^ i somewhat ambiguous, 
or at least undefined proposition, that the causes of order in the uni­
verse probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligences If this 
proposition be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular 
explications If it affords no inference that affects human life, or can 
bo the source of any action or forbearance; And if the analogy, imperfect 
as it is, can be carried no farther than to the hmmn inbelligence; and 
cannot be transferred with any appearance of probability, to the other
il
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qualities of the mind; If this really be the case, t^ hat can the most 
inquisitive, oontm^lative, and religious man do more than give a plain,
philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs; and be-
; ilieve that the arguments, on which it is established, exceed the objec­
tions idiich lie against itt"^ ^
This conclusion is surely not Wiat those who have contended for the 
existence of God have meant hy that doctrine* Thelma in its proper sense 
is a doctrine which affects our whole view of the universe and man's 
conduct in it* Hume's finite God, of bare, physic#! proportions iqion 
whom we are neither morally nor ^ ysically dependent, is devoid of any 
significance and ideological utility# The parable called to mind by 
Huxley, of the ass laden with salt who took to the water, is particularly 
apt to illustrate the nature of Hume's theim; it *Jdissolves away in the 
dialectic river, until nothing is left but the verbal sack in which it 
was contained*" It becomes in fact a deism of the most trivial and impo­
tent sort, as Warburton (to Hume's anm^ance) claimed* Hiilo's admission 
of this sort of 'theism' is hardly inconsistent with the previous tmor 
of his argument Wien we examine the barren nature of this attenuated 
theim to Wiich he adheres*
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Chapter III 
Divim ccamms, oooDmss A# om)imoB
A; Hume's Fallacy md Theolofiical Naturallem
Hume's theological position thus implicitly denies Qod's providence# 
#ie concept of deity in the universe is an isolated and totally detached 
fragment of knowledge which does not exert any force upon the affairs of 
man* Althou^ we must take God's power {as precisely displayed in his 
works) seriously into account idien formulating metaj^ iysical conceptions 
as to the origin and nature of the universe, his being does not, in fact, 
by virtue of his finitude cannot, influence us in judgments on moral 
matters* We do not have to do Wiat is expedient to secure his blessing 
or avoid his wrath, or perform epistemological acrobatics to determine 
his will* Indeed, he is negatively characterised as not being of such a 
nature as to will or govern man's conduct* Unlike the traditional Ohris­
tian view of God, Hume's deity does not issue moral eadiortations, assign 
praise or blame, administer reproof, dmand sacrifices or indicate moral 
pathways* If this deity is not a blind force, he is surely a seriously 
handicapped one*
Hume's conclusions on the relationship between deity and morality
are strikingly duplicated in his treatment of the relationship between
'is' and 'ought** That the theological io^ llcationi, of the absence of
a necessary connection between the ihysically or spiritually existent and
the morally advisable or obligatory, are identical with the position just
described, need hardly surprise us* However, it is an interesting 
parallel to notice*
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Tho theologlaal of the *is/ou^t^ bifurcation are ae
foUowes %o information about the nature of reality* or knowledge that 
there ie a God and that He issues commande*^  will by itself tell us what 
is good or what we ought to do* The statment# G^od wills X#* Is not a 
moral pronomoment. Before we know idiether we ought to do X, we must 
know that %diat God wills is good* And in order to know what God wills Is 
good* we dhould have to judge independently that it is good# lhat some­
thing is good is not entailed by God *8 willing it* for otherwAs it would 
be redundant to ask* <ls what God wlHe good?» But this question is not 
redundant* »God wills X* or *God oomands X» is not equivalent to »X is 
good*» as »X is a male parent» is equivalent to »X is a father*» »God 
wills it but is it good?* is not a senseless self-answering question like
•Fred is a male parent* but is he a father?* The moral agent must iade-2pendently decide that whatever God wills or commands is good.*»
%e alert reader will ask at this point Whether the writer of the 
above quotation is actually making a different point than the one to whMi 
Hume draws our attention in the now celebrated * is/ought* paragrajh. The 
two points which such an objector would want to distinguish are (1 ) that 
human judgment* man*a moral understanding of #at is right* is an ines­
capable* prior condition of judging God benevolent and consequently 
worthy of obedience in moral matters* and (2) that we cannot logically or 
intelligibly determine any judgments of value from the nature of entities 
(such as God) which constitute the universe* Upon closer examination 





lat m  take the sentence cited above* Nielsen»s objection to 
deriving »X is good» ‘God wills X* » is that one must first judge 
whatever God wills to be good* In other wôrdsm »God vdlls X* therefore 
*Z is good* is an enthymme of the first order* which Is logically defect 
tive until it is supplied with the major premise* *Bverything tjiat God 
wills is good*» The argument turns upon the assumption th§t (Aj* the 
major premise #ich req\iires to be inserted la a moral judgment* and (B) 
that according to rules of logical inference* the syllogism is a non 
#quitur without this ir^se. Supplying the unstated value judgment as 
the major prmise is a necessary condition for deducing a practical con­
clusion frcm the minor (»religious »() prmlse# the viability a#; .validity 
of the argument hinges upon this insertion. And the fact that it is a 
yalue judgment vhioh renders the argument explicable* %Moh is the prime 
operative* is sufficient grounds for establishing the importance and 
priority of moral judgment to religious assent.
But isn»t this Hume»s point as we^ llt Aren»t the Jmplicatibns of 
Hume»8 position that it is illegitimate to reason from »God wills X» 
(which is here functioning primarily as a descriptive sentence) to »X is 
good»? Merely knowing that there is a God and that He issues ^ ral 
injunctions is inadequate grounds for determining that these injunctions 
are 1pm, fapto right. We have invalidly leaped from the descriptive to 
the evaluative. When we round out the abbreviated reasoning by supplying 
the major (moral) prWLse* we have changed the very nature of the syllo­
gism - or rather laid bare its true nature# We can oifly avoid coEiuittiijg 
the » Naturalistic Fallacy» at #ie expense of exposing the argument as 
basically moral in character.
S'
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In the light of these con Biderations it oan be aaid that if there 
is any difference between the point made by Nielsen (and others anidlous 
to establish the priority of moral judgment to religious assent) and 
Hume* it is a trivial one of emphasis, Nielsen would have us notice 
that the minor premise* explicable by moans of a value judgment as the 
major premise* is a religious one* and Hume wuld e%aha8ime that it is a 
descriptive one# It is* of course* both; it is a descriptive '‘statement» 
of a religious claim, Hume would see in the fact that the argument is 
rendered moral in nature %éim the emitted pmdee is set in place* m  
iK^ortmit vindication of his contention that the passage fixm *lG# to 
» ought» is logically barricaded; to Nielsen this apodeiotie insertion 
points %%) the logical priority of moral dlscormant to obedience to God* 
Nielsen’s position is in fact representative of the theological expres­
sion of the is/ought implications.
Let us now examine this theological point. The first recorded 
discussion of this issue occurs in the Bukhvnhro. Here the combatants*ISocrates and Eutliyphro* are aaid to meet immediately prior to the convo­
cation of the Athenian court, Socrates is soon to defend himself there 
against various nebulous diarges brought against hiia by Meletus (as 
reported in the Apolomr) » vhile Buthyphro is prosecuting his father in 
the court for the crime of murder, Bocrates inquires of the self-confi­
dent Buthyphro* if he is so certain of the nature of piety as to entertain 
no doubts concerning the general propriety of his own conduct* i#% for a 
son to bring his father to justice. After Buthyphro assures him that he 
is so convinced* Socrates begins to question him in what is (ironically) 
an atteint to learn this extraordinary knowledge. Socrates professes to
' I
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be motivated by ignorance and teaediate self-interest in doing so* for 
once having learned the nature of piety he will be adequately ;^ med 
against the charges if iB#.ety facing him.
In the subsequent discussion Buthyphro flounders about attempting 
to define what piety is (definition being then regarded as a quasi-imgiml 
doorway to essence) and Socrates iconoclasticalXy shows what piety isn’t*
%  means of the usual pointed questions* more and more definite answers 
are educed from Buthy^ro* until the following crucial dilemma is posed? 
«The point which I should first wish to understand is idiether the pious 
or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy* or holy because it isqbeloved Of the gods*” '
ibis is a key question for the discussion of the nature of piety and 
an especially decisive one for the issues with which we are concerned.
For as Heidel puts it* «if holiness were holiness because the gods loved
it* then the fact of the gods’ loving an act would be the first essential
-Ipoint to determine in deciding idtether the act was or was not holy; but
• 1 '■if the gods loved holiness because it was holy* then its being holy would 
be a fact without the gods’ loving it* and hence their loving it would 
not affect its nature”*»#^  «the one becomes lovable from the Act that
§it is loved* whereas the other is loved because it is in itself lovable*” 
Buthyphro declares or rather acquiesces to his adversary’s forced 
conclusion* üiat piety «is loved because it is holy* not holy because it 
is loved*”
Although the argument concerning piety can and does proceed beyond 
this point* at this juncture Buthyphro is excluded from ultimately charac* 
terising the nature of piety in terms of that #ich God loves. In defining
!
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piety ill this way* Buthyphro has merely drawn attention to an apoidental 
attribute of piety rather than to it® eaeential character; the fact that 
the gods love piety doe® not inorease our knowledge of the nature of the 
concept (9 1-11 B),
this time-worn issue dealt with by Plato* and later Kant* Hume* and 
a number of modern writers including K, Nielsen# R, M- Hare* G, E# M# 
Anscombe* W* D» Falk* Wm# E, Demos* 1, N, Bmmrt* etc** is simply the 
permanent problem confronting the establishment of norms of value on a 
theory of deity ^  of claiming the nature of goodness to be ultimately 
determined by God* If we judge that religious evidence* written or 
revealed* has sufficiently established the truth or probability of the 
theory that an omniscient* omnipotent* omnipresent deity governs the 
universe* we are still not in a position to judge that whatever this God 
commands is therefwe right* William E* Dermes expresses this point 
well Wien he states that «the idea of good is prior to* and is not deriv­
ative from* the idea of deity” «If it were true* and knoièi to be 
true* that an all powerful intelligence controls the universe; if Wsides 
we knew his commands and knew also that disobedience to them (even 
including His command to slay one’s son on an altar) would lead to our 
destruction* It might indeed follow that obedience was expedient* but it
would certainly not follow that obedience was right. In order that that
-  't V 'should follow we require the further premise that deity is benevolent?
that is* that deity wills not just whatever deity wills* but wills %Aiat 
7is right,” Human jW#ent is thus regarded as an inescapable and prior 
condition of asserting God benevolent.
' I ;
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In a recent book* A,# Victor Murray uses the myths of Prometheus and 
Faust to ilXustrste attenipts at self-realisation or self-assertion over 
an established order towards which a certain adolescent sense of helpless­
ness is felt, The Prometheus myth as dealt with by Aeschylus is an 
object lesson in the sin of hubris - vain attempts to usurp the power or 
invade the sacred domain of deity, Goethe’s Faust is a similar example 
of the sinful attee^ t to extend the frontiers of human knowledge beyond 
their appointed limits» proud Xerxes in The Persians, the boastful 
NebuchadneKXar (Daniel 7529)# the arrogant King of Assyria (Isaiali 10) 
and* of course* the restless Oedipus relentlessly pursuing truth* are 
additional mcmaplee of individuals so intent upon controlling their 
destii^  that they failed to perceive that the sword of Damocles has been 
set quivering. Hurray makes the point that the didactic theme running 
throughout Is that man must «see into the abyss and yet believe in God’s 
mercy md grace" and "that self-surrender is in fact i;tself self-realis­
ation"*^
Althou^ i these arc major themes present in the above mentioned 
stories* there are also profound strains of a slightly different timbre. 
All of these individuals experience the human dilmma of believing that 
tlie universe esdiaustively provides for their well-being and yet withholds 
a portion of the salutary; they doubt the former although it seems indub­
itable and believe the latter although it appears incredible, Han 
desires desperately to convince himself with Leibnia that the pre-estab­
lished harmony of the universe* dbosen by God in perfect knowledge and 
goodness* is the best of all possible worlds; however* reflections upon 
Uiis established order load him to judge differently, Prometheus stole
I$0
fire from the heavens when this gift was arbltrari3.y denied to man.
Surely m  must judge that Prometheus acted rightly* out of moral, humani­
tarian motives when he assumed the initiative and brought fire down to 
man, And what can we think of Zeus wîio denied a life-sustaining or 
comforting power to man* sent Pandora to earth with her box of evil to 
counterbalance this wrested blessing, and then tortured mankind’s bene­
factor tamercifuXlsr? Is Prometheus blameworthy for presuming to judge 
and revolt against the supreme deity* or praiseworthy in relylhg upon hie 
moral assesment of the situation? Surely we must affirm the latter.
And was Prcmietheue justified in teaching man the art of arcliitecture# 
writing, mathematics, navigation, medicine and astronomy, yet %t justi­
fied in countermanding the orders of Zeus concerning the equally obvious 
boon of fire? Surely we must affim that his questioning of Zeus’s
cmmands justified, his judgmnt as to its wrongness was correct, andU, •that he was morally right (if not prudential) in acting upon it.
In a similar act reported in Virgil’s Aene;ls. the Trojan priest 
iaocoon warned his compatriots against admitting into the city the gigan­
tic horse in #ich Greek soldiers were hiding. The gods who desired the 
destruction of Troy silenced laocoon by .sendi% two powerful sea snakes 
to suffocate the priest and his two sons* Here an innocent, moral patriot 
is made to suffer for speaking the truth* Surely we must praise Laoooon 
for his humanitarian motives and condemn the goda for their cruelty.
However, hero we are treading upon dangerous ground. For we are 
opening up the door to the poasibility that there are occasions in lAich 
it is right to disobey deity; that hubris is not categorically evil but 
on occasions a positively desirable attitude* This rests upon the further
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msmption that dlety doe® not will only that >üich is good but sometimes 
easuaande that which io not good# Wo are hereby establishing a precedent 
by reference to tdiich Satan might be declared right in revolting against 
God in ftiradlse lost. Eve justified in partaking of the forbidden fruit 
(assisting she was motivated by a quest for knowledge rather than acting 
in consequence of a morally weak character), and Faust right in %'eaching 
beyond the province of knowledge assigned to man. At the very least vm 
cannot unconditionally condemn their actions by saying that they violated 
the %411 of God or opposed Mia jud^ont#
Moreover we cannot continue to comend traditionally praiseworthy
figures such as St# Paul, Abrahara and Job strictly on the grounds of theirn-'absolute, unquestioning obedience to God# Having last this criterion we 
might well conclude that Abraham was wong in Intending to saorifioe bio 
son on God’s instruction# Once obedience to God Is no longer the absolute 
standard for conduct, m  individual my be praiseworthy for not obevim
God’s commmd as wen as praiseworthy in disobeying God’s commahd.
Bs Iierte:aard»Q ’Paradox of Faith’ ,..iK — —  ------ — --------  _ i-r-
•' Soren Kierkegaard* in an illustration v&ich typifie» his %)oetic
technique and indirect method of coiamunication* uses the story of Abraham 
to exemplify the meaning of absolute faith in deity# Kierkegaard sees in 
Abraham the classic case of a man whose belief in God is exposed to 
supreme stress and tension when he receives an authoritarian li^ eratlve 
in direct contradiction to his reason* conscience and instincts of paren­
tal love* i#e# a command to sacrifice his son# Ahraham’s individual 
faith was exemplary because he suspended his rational judgnent and denied
jfe-
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the ascendancy of his eldiical sense altogether* in order to act in strict 
accordance with a creature’s absolute duty to his I'laker* In various 
parts of the Gospels it is implied that the essential failing of the Jews 
was moral pride; they were more concerned with personal importance than 
with obeying God’s will (e*g# St* Jdin* 5*44)# However* Abraham had the 
spiritual courage to resolve the ‘Paradox of Faith’ - to believe that the 
’Individual’ Is superior to the ’Universal*’ the faith to believe that 
his relationship with the ’Universal’ was determined by his relationship 
with the ’Absolute’ (to use Hegeli^ -Kierkegaardian terms) rather than 
vice versa* As Abraham remained unfaltering in his intention to obey the 
will of God and sacrifice Isaac, he transcended the terrestrial categories 
of moral actions; he placed absolute faith in the superiority of God’s 
directives over relativistia human conceptions of reasonableness and 
rightness* Abraham’s individual obedience transformed conduct ordinarily 
conceived as demonical* absurd or morally repugnant* into a suprmely 
commendable act of absolute faith in God* This idea of faith as a leap 
beyond immediate perception* moral judgment and^  knowledge* or a refuge 
into idilch man is driven by the "latent melancholy of unendurable despair” 
is a constantly recurring theme in Kierkegaard’s writings* And this 
Biblical story furnishes the crowning proof of the irrational,* improbable 
nature offaith. ^
Kierkegaard’s position is perfectly consistent if he maintains that 
the dictates of the human conscience are necessarily relative and fallible 
in relation to God’s perfect directives* It is pre-eminently self-coher­
ent and ultimately moral to trust the commands of an infinitely wise and 
benevolent being idio has either complete knowledge of the good or is
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Himself identical with the absolute* eternal good* In the former case* 
man’s unwavering obedience to God as the infallible perceiver and trans­
mitter of the good is his best guarantee of r«mining in touch with
* ^perfect goodness* In the latter metaphysical structure* man’s absolute 
creaturely duty to God is one with an absolute moral duty to do tlie good* 
In both cases an Individual’s consistent adherence to God’s commands 
assures him of unerriig moral insists* We m y  grumble about the meta­
physics of either system but we cannot question the internal coherence 
wlïich results in the above consequences*
However* does Kierkegaard hold this view which has been imputed to 
him? Although he does seem at times to be maintaining this type of 
position* e*g# when he speaks of Abrahmi’s confidence that Isaac would 
be returned to him unharmed* I would want to say that the main tenor of 
his thou^t is significantly different* Hîls difference can be pointed 
up by noticing a distinction which Kierkegaard meplicitly defines* In 
an attempt to further characterise Abraham’s situation Kierkegaard 
contrasts it with a purported incident of the Trojan War in which
Agamemnon is told by the seer Galchas that the goddess demands his
daughter Iphigenia as a saorifloo of expiation before the Greek fleet 
will be allotted to sail* Agamemnon coR^ tlies with the demand and is 
described by Kierkegaard as a ’tragic hero’ whereas Abraham is regarded
as a ’knight of faith*’ "The differewe between the tragic hero and
Abraham is clearly evident* Ihe tragic hero still remains within the 
ethical* He lets one oîqpression of the ethical find its ÿelos in & 
higher expression of the ethical; «*» With Abraham the situation was 
different* By his act he over-stepped the ethical entirely and possessed
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à higher teles outside of it* in relation to which he suspended %e 
former ««« It was not for the sake of saving a people, not to maintain 
the idea of the state, that Abraham did this, and not in order to recon­
cile angry deities ... the story of Abraham contains a teleological
9suspension of the ethical.”
Her© we see that the justification for Abraham’s action is not faith
in the ultimate moral wisdcxa and goodness of God’s jud^imt but the
Individual’s personal relationship to God - a relationship of broaturo to
Creator, of abgjolute obedience to the authoritative pronouncement of God.
IMs relationship of faith in which the individual ‘stands naked before
his Maker’ furnishes the grounds for Abraham’s dogmatic decision despite
the fact that God’s will is abstruse to the point of opaqueness, in^ rob-
able to the poj|nt of irrationality and morally objectionable to the point
of depravity* His decision is not just a strangling of temporal reason
in the hope of grasping an eternal ethic, but a transcendence of ethics
altogether. The absolute acceptance of the will of God is self-justifyk^
and does not depend for its rightness upon second order assumptions
concemiqg the relationship between God and morality, i.e. that God is
identical with or possesses infinite knowledge of the good. "This posttto
cannot be mediated, for all mediation ccaaea about precisely by virtue of
the universal; it is and rmmins to all eternity a paradox, inaccessible 
10to thought.” This frequently reiterated point affirms that we are 
utterly precluded from bringing Abraham’s action into relation idth the 
universal.
Now #en there is a conflict between the moral human
conscience and the commands of God it is one thing to obey God’s will in 
the faith that thereby one is electing the ultimately moral course of
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action, but quite another to elect obedience on the assumption that
duty to God supersedes or supplants moral considerations altogether.
The latter is a much wealcer position, for to resolve a contradiction by
claiming that Clod’s moral perception Is superior to man’s is on much
firmer footing than maintaining that God’s idLjA overrides reason and
ethics* In the one case we are plunged into a supra-rational, in #ie
other m  irrational ; in the one caso we are told that our decision has
d^eep moral roots, in the other that moral considerations are irrelevant*
Furthomoro, in the latter case (let us call it B) one has not any
check on the validity of this metapl^ sical system other than the direct 
11word of God because It cannot be judged by criteria of reasonableness, 
moral appropriateness or any mediations of the universal, whereas in the 
former case (let m  label it A) reason is a decidedly pertinent factor 
in our decision, in addition to the apprehension of God’s wishes*
Totally irrationallstlc theories are self-defeating; however 
Kierkegaard *s position (B) involves some rational assumptions and for 
this reason cannot be demolished on logical grounds * Although rationally 
deciding that we are justified in suspending a totally rational decision 
is a more rational procedure than deciding to proceed without any rational 
backing (or in the face of rational considerations), both contain an 
elemoiit of the rational in the primary quaei-methodological decision, 
l^ iis is not Kiari^ egaard’e point but a logical point. We have rationally 
decided upon the reference-ground for our decision even though tlis decisto 
itself may be irrational* M-isa logically sound process to rationally
' 4
decide to be irrational just as it is logically permissible to consistertlly 
decide in favour of inconsistent action* Difficulties may be encountered
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at the level of presenting reasons for being rational in the first 
instance but not in the second* It would be Incumbent upon an individual 
adopting position (B) to find reasons for being rational in the first 
instance and irrational :ln the second, whereas a person embracing positiai 
(A) would have the relatively easier task of finding reasons for being 
rational in the first case and proceeding beyond the rational in the 
Asecond. An attempt could be made to justify the apparent difficulties 
in both position (A) and (B) by reference to the revelation of God’s vdH 
tdiieh made the Irrational or si^ ra-ratlonal leap mandator^ .^ For 
Kierkegaard doesn’t maintain that God specifically instructed man to 
completely hold reason in abeyance, but he does claim that God tells us 
to perfom an unreasonable act, e.g. "Take now thy son, thine only son 
Isaac, Wiom thou lovost, and get thee into the land of Moriah; and offer 
him there for a burnt-offering upon one of the mountains which I will 
tell thee of.”
However, Kierkegaai'd’s position, (B), is not only weaker than (A) by 
relying extremely heavily upon rovolation for its sanctions but la, I 
maintain, untenable for epistemoXogicaX conaiderationa concerning this 
supporting revelation.
To begin vdth, when we epealc of an Individual standing immediately 
before God and receiving a divine revelation of His will, particularly 
Wien we claim that deity has availed himself of human speech to make His 
commande known as in the case of Abraham and other instances of verbal 
inspiration mentioned in the Bible, we must always remember that those 
perceptions have necessarily been channelled through one or more of our 
senses. Whether we say that the individual concerned has received a
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revelation which is publia and general or private and esoteric, this 
revelation occurs to finite individuals located in space and taka; it is 
legitimate, therefore, to regard it m  a ‘massage’ mediated thikugb our 
sense of hearing or seeing.
It has been argued that exceptions to this general rule are revela­
tions of God’s purpose in nature and history, e.g. thK Hebrew conceptions
of divine providence arising from contemplation of nature and a sense of
12divine protection* Althou^ it rai^ t be strongly argued that these are 
revelations of God’s will in the sense of signs by means of tiildi God has 
hietorloally indicated righteous pathways or 3.eft conspicuous traces of 
his handiwoxic (as cosmological and teleological ‘proofs‘ maintain) they 
are not revelations in Kierkegamxi’s sense of direct, divinely inspired 
messages. Therefore, altlioug^  it might prove interesting to analyse the 
way in which historical events or the construction of the world are 
‘perceived’ revelations, \m need not concern ourselves to do so.
Since all ’Immediacy’ of the sort Kierkegaard deals with is filtered 
through our senses, the belief that we have an absolute duty to obey the 
voice of God must also mean that we have an absolute duty to trust 
dictates transmitted through our faculties - to have complete faith in 
the infallibility of our oenees to transmit authentic revelsMons* 
Kierkegaard would prevent us from questioning the validity of a claim 
mediated through relatively unreliable senses on the grounds that the 
claim. God’s will, must bs unquestionably accepted on faith. %e stress 
Kierkegaard places upon the absolute duty man owes to hie Creator imuld 
exclude the assessing of one’s perception (and understanding) of the 
Absolute voice, on the supposition that we are doubting the tdedàn of
5Ô
GkKi*s commande# But surely this need not be so# Doubting tliat a commnd 
was issued by God on epistemoXoglcal grounds does not mean doubting the 
omniscience of deity or the absolute duty which man owes to God# Although 
we must entertain a high degree of confidence concerning the reliability 
of our faculties as a presupposition of knowledge, it is precisely at a 
moment of paradox Such as that to which Kierkegaard alludes that the 
witness of our senses must be rigorously examined - when one believes to 
have heard the voice of God saying, ’Kill your son#’ Surely this is not 
the moment for absolute obedience but for extrme caution* It is at this 
moment that the dangerous subjectivity of private revelation becomes 
apparent, and in order to avoid a misguided dogmatism or an insulatedteccentricity we must question our ability to reliably discern a revela­
tion of God’s will# It is only after we are thoroughly convinced of the 
authenticity of a revelation, i.e. that a particular revelation has in 
fact been made by God, that we are (perhaps) justified in acting upon it# 
(#ether this is a sufficient condition for action or at least a necessaiy 
condition is a crucial dilema as we shall see#)
I said, above, that to doubt on epistemological grounds that a 
command was issued by God does not entail doubting the supreme wisdom of 
deity* I should like to elaborate upon this sentence and say that it Is 
quite the contrary in our experience of revelation* Our belief in the 
s%erlative nature of God forces us to doubt the validity of the evidence 
transmitted by our senses. This is my second point* l%en we doubt that 
God issued a coismand we usually do so on moral and/or theological grounds 
as well as epistemological grounds - the sort of touchstone which 
Kierkegaard would also disallow by his definition of faith# %#ien
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individuals reject the authenticity of a revelation it is as mqch on the 
grounds that God would not issue such a command as it is that our sense 
perception has mal-ihnctioned* In most oases, in fact, the reliability 
of our senses and the authenticity of a revelation would be disputed in 
the first instance on moral/theological grounds* We would usually say, 
’Our knowledge of God’s nature achieved, for example, through the teach­
ings of Jesus, indicates that "kill thy neighbour” cannot be a true 
revelation of His %&11# Therefore, it did not proceed from God and our 
senses have proved unreliable in persuading us that it did#’ Althou#% 
the direction from Wiich our knowledge of God issues remains that of 
GreatoaS'to-creature, a salutary moral, theological and epistmologioal 
check is maintained on the authenticity of utterances attributed to God. 
Kierkegaard’s system would not exert any controls over a self-convinced 
bigot# deviant# or fanatic*
In ec^ haslaiag that revelations must be judged in the light of moral 
Judgments# theological doctrine and epistmological considerations# we 
need not go as far as Catholicism does and proclaim that our revelation 
"should be submitted to tlie opinion of a prudent priest” before we allow 
it "pious credence#” but at the same time we cannot carry Protestant 
individuality to the point of absurdity as Kierkegaard wcuCld have us do* 
And Kierkegaard’s individualism cannot evade the charge of idiosyncratic 
subjectivism by saying It is ’the Individual naked before God’ or the 
Individual in relation to the Absolute rather than privately mmufactming 
truths# if he will not cm elder public interpretations of God’s will or 
the judgments of conscience or reason itself to count against his concep­
tion of the divine voice
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I might add in this connection that Kierkegaard uses a Biblical 
example to epitomise his point; however# the primary function of BiblicalI .I criticism (particularly Higher Criticism) is to apply critical, scientific 
tests of philology, archaeology and history to each of the books coi%)oWng 
the Bible in order to separate true revelations of God’s will from the 
; .myths, legends and strictly human productions deeply rooted in the time 
; and circumstances of their compilation* In addition to these scientific 
criteria of authenticity, if man’s conscimco condemns the acts reported 
and justified in the nmm of God’s revelation, then these passages are 
dismissed as apocry^al on moral grounds* Occasionally interpretation 
occurs in accordance with oontcK^ orary conceptions of the moral nature of 
deity. (VJhether one judges an individual reprehensible for ccmmittiiig 
unjust or ciniel actions with the unselfish motives of obeying God’s will 
depends upon one’s moral viewpoint# Intmtionalists ivould absolve him 
of blame, teleologists %#uld condemn him.)
A more philosophically interesting dilemma which Kierkegaard doesn’t 
pose is one In which a private revelation is received which is morally 
abhorrent yet the epistemological understructure of which survives strin­
gent scrutiny»-» That is to say, a thorough questioniïig of the sense 
perception involved in the reception of a divine revelation fails to 
reveal significant doubts as to its validity and hence the genuine nature 
of the sense data# Kierkegaard’s paradox centres upon a creature’s 
absolute obedience to God’s commands even when these commands are morally 
repugnant* Me can slip through the horns of this dilemma by questioning 
the reliability of our auditory and visual senses - by lowing that our 
absolute duty may be to obey the true voice of (W but it surely is not
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to place absolute faith in the witness of our senses. However# when 
doubt as to the validity of our senses has been satisfied and we unre­
servedly declare that a bad command issued by God is a genuine command 
of Gkxi# then we are thrown into a neat dilemm indeed. Mhen a real or
I ■
theoretical schism of this basic sort occurs we cannot straddle it byI
saying that we are morally right in doing what our conscience dictates 
and religiously justified in obf^ ing deity* This ‘solution’ doesn’t 
resolve the issue but renders it all the more tortuous when we are 
eventually faced with deciding #ich course of action man ou#t to 
follow* It seems a sound assumption to many that if God in fact wills
hWiat is wrong we ought to disobey the will of God. This position opts 
for the svpremacy of moral judgaent to religious obedience; it proceeds 
on the assunption that God’s commands must be judged worthy of obedience# 
i.e. morally right# before obedience is justified.
«t!
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D m r  AND MORAIZTY ,
kt Mediaeval Attitudes
A number of different objections^ both ancient and modern,, have
been made against the validity of this point. #en theologians of the
Kiddle Ages were obliged to discuss certain j^iXosophlcal problems
originating in theological controversies, e.g., problems of free will,
the Mfirst^ * movement of sensibility (primus motus) and the notions of
1substance, person and hypostasis, they were also faced, as Burnet |>ointe
out, vdLth this problem of * Whether an act is right because God loves it,
or whether God loves it because it is ri#t.* Since a conclusion in
favour of the latter alternative would entail the sij^rm&cy of the ïnoral
order and human judgnmt, the Ohristian apologists of the day approached
it as a foreign, insidious disease to be quickly stan^d out# This was
not because they were, by current standards, closed-minded, dogmatic and
arrogant, but because of their unquestioned, inherited oonviction that
2lêàtm reason and faith conflicted, reason was necessarily in error*
Reason seemed to lead to the irresistible conclusion that morality held 
the primary position in the universe, but we knew from knowledge of 
Scripture that God was sovereign*
The reason for this extraordinary set of attitudes has its roots 
deep in the soil of Scholaetic thinking. For Medieval theologians (which 
class includes all the great Medieval minds prior to the Henalssance) 
regarded tAe dogmatic teaching of the Ghurch as permanent and inelastic*
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Human reason, corrupted in the sin of Adam, must abdicate when its judg#* 
mente, or worse etiH, the results of its investigations, conflicted with 
Revelation,* Han*s intellect being in a state of permanent corruption was
ifI unable to fathom the purity and depth of Ood*s being* Therefore unrea^
j ; soned acceptance of the literal accuracy of Scriptures, ^nd synthesis ofI; ' various, sacred writings (through grace and faith) was #ie only means
f 3; towardcaohieving accurate knowledge of God#
Drawing upon Paul*» advice to the Colossians, "Beware lest any man
4spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit," the Medieval theologian
remained secure in an impregnable citadel, Tertulllan is not a repre- 
sentative Schoolman, but his attitude is typical of that of the day when 
he states, "We want no curious disputation after possessing Jesus Christ, 
no inquisition after enjoying the Gospel* When we believe (credimus), we 
desire noising beyond it to believe (credere)*"^ Verbal paradoxes such 
as the one with which we are concerned were therefore of no substantive 
relevance to the esoteric, self-sustaining theology. Reason has here led 
to a cul de sac* ani affirmation of the primacy of human assessment and 
the moral order over God*s supr^ae power# What better proof was there 
that philosophy readily turns Into sophistry when unchecked by faith?
This widely held viewpoint should now be nothing more than a histor-* 
leal curiosity, a showpiece of archaic thought* Unfortunat^y, it is 
still quite prevalent, notably among Barthlan Protestants* However, the 
alnmlng question did arise at that time among theologians as to how one 
can select from among the divergent interpretations of the Christian 
Revelation, which account possessed God*» truth, except by human judgment 
of the insiÿits claimed by each protagonist. It helped little to say God 
pointed the way because it still remained for human being® to discern the
4,;
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direction in whioh He was pointing. Personal insight was nltiriately 
required to disoern truth not "authoritative declarations as to biblical 
inspiratims and unless theological md religious tru^ is thus found, 
personally discerned and appropriated, it scarcely is trutii for ,us. i.e. 
of spiritual value to us* So the Refcrmtlon and the Mlghtement 
taught us for all time; and had the discovery been made and assimilated 
in the early days of dogmatic theology, the history, and much of the
structure, of ecclesiastical doctrine, as also the institutional embôdi-6 . ^ment of doctrine, would doubtless have been different*"
The conspicuous (and increasing) lack of unanimity in the Medieval 
Christian world as to the direction served to i^ust home the ^ tal mtws 
of the issue* And an even more embarrassing question for Christendom was 
how one could choose justifiably from amcmg the revelations embodied in 
the sacred witings of various religions of the world which account of
HGod*a nature and duties we ou^t to accept, except by a human assessment 
of tWir respective merits* #tat would have happened to the dynamic 
evolution of mm*s conception of God if mankind had frozen its under­
standing at a lower level than that •aenith* achieved in the Middle Agee? 
By adopting the same sort of blind loyalty to * revelation, * the develop- 
laent of religious truth migjht weH have progressed no further than a 
deification of the skj»* or some large and remote object like the sun, or 
an animistic personification of the mysteries or forces of nature, or the 
worship of a mythical ancestor. Sin would have consisted only in the 
neglect of some rite or cermiony, acts of prayer would have functioned 
only to appease the ifrath of malicious spirits, religious objects would 
be possessed of magical properties, and the deity would be sought in the
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moaxmy or mysterious happenings of life. %e very fact that manklW has 
progressed beyond these infantile conceptions of religion, ëiows that 
human beings have assessed their * revelation#* In the light of reason, 
and judged certain of them to be the "llspings of infantile humanity*"
The mptmmj of human judgment camot be usurped in ccsitroversies 
among Ohristian believer© or between Oliristians and others, by saying that 
if we, or the sanctified fathers of our religion, wore oven^elmingly 
convinced by a revelatiomiy experience, then we cannot retrospectively 
question its validity* For various uncivilised peoples in such locations 
as Fiji, Australia, Siberia and Africa, m m  m  less convinced of the 
truth of their revelation© than tlie Ohristian Schoolmen were of theirs* 
This i© very like the argument from *conceivability* all over again# To 
make matters ©till vforse, some of the most hideous and reprehensible 
human actions have been performed by individuals idio were ©inoerely 
convinced that an overwhelming revelation of Ood*s will directed their 
steps# Witness the witch hunts in Salem, #ssa#u8etts, the Spanish 
Inquisition, the mit of stranglers in Bcmbsy, the human sacrifices 
offered by Guatamalan native©, the murders of the Reformation, etc*
Numerous atrocities can also bo ©aid to result from human judgment 
(unlee© one holds that, by definition, whenever terribly cruel actions 
are performed deliberative judgment has been held in abeyaxxce) but it 
seems a more reliable method of gaining knowledge and avoiding the pit­
falls associated with fanaticism* It has the meritorious characteristic 
of being theoretically open to criticism from any quarter# In addition, 
it can claim to its credit that every position can be examined' for logi­
cal difficulties, the value of different viewpoints can be reasonably
:I!
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weighed in the li^t of oomaon criteria, and mpirioal foundatipus or 
reference© can be dhiecked for accuracy. Hone of this can be said for 
argument© conducted in the ëiadow of an incontestable revelation - 
usually' ifJith the disputante quaking under the tyranny of heresy indict- 
monte. Too often a thorough-going reliance upon revelation is an inviol­
able metliod of guaranteeing tiie truth of some otherwise undwonstrabl# 
point. Since by tlie very nature of its epistemological position it is 
private and wxconfimable by ordinary empirical standards, appeals to 
revelatim readily degenerate into a desperate expedient*
There is one counter-argment lAlbh Apologists might put forward 
wliich seems to me to have seme merit. The person In possession of a 
revelation su<ix as those major pronouncements of Scripture, or even that 
Wiich is contained in Scripture is indubitable, mi#%t defend his claims 
as follows; After epistemological objections have failed to render his 
claim untenable (Of. Kierkegaard discussion. Ch. 4), he might declare 
tl^ t the nature of the meperience wlxich he has undergone is simply not 
amenable to conüjcmtion by ordimry methods, and then go on to bmioan 
tîiis fact, possessing such certainty of the trutli of his revelation that 
he ardently desires to present proof to the leagues of doubters on tJxeir 
own grounds. However, assuming he is sincere and thoroughly corivinced 
of the exclusive character of his revelation, he will refuse to be untms 
to. hie eaqporienco by saying it is rationalistic rather than legalietio 
and therefore open to ordinary confimation* He would make the same 
claims whether this position was favourable or unfavourable to the credi­
bility of his conclusions* In tliis case tbe consequences of the nature 
of the experience happen in one sense to be favourable, for it is iixereby
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placed beyond conventional criticiaa# and at the same time #%ey are 
unfavourable^  in that public proof cannot be «applied*
As a comparable case one mi#t cite the philosopher %  objection to 
concluding the actual existence of God from human desjlres that He exist. 
•The results of a Christian God possessing ontological status w u M  
pm*tainiy be miotionally satisfying^  e*g* #s would have an omnipotent 
being to intervene on our behalf in answer to prayers, wo would, upon 
commitment to various tenets, be guaranteed eternal life, we would have 
firmly codified laws of moral conduct, we would be assured of just 
deserts being meted out in the next world to the unscrupulous but power^  
ful entrepreneurs, politicians, and opportunists of this world. But the 
existence of God is not a fact for these desirable consequences; the wi# 
does not imply an objective reality, as every writer will tell you whose 
hopes for publication have remained unfulfilled, and every psychologist 
will tell you who is acquainted with the twisted thinking arising from 
wish’^fulfillment desires#
Similarly, althou^ the man In possession of a self-*c<uivincing 
revelation may wish that the accuracy of his experience was testable b;^ 
the usual empiricàl validating methods, he cannot claim that It is* fetIlike the poet, painter and cos#oser, he uses a particular medium because 
the special reality which he is pursuing is best captured in this form. 
Perhaps the artists* insists are scmewhat translatable into conceptual 
language as the critic attmgpts to do, but his theme is best expressed, 
that is most fully and adequately expressed, in the forms which the 
artists have chosen for them* It is far more probable #at artists do 




because they find this form unsuitable or inadequate, than that!, they are 
illiterate, inarticulate or even unadept at reasonable expression. A 
sequence of notes, a poetic imago, or a brush stroke is found to be more
deeply eloquent to express the profundities which the artist feels he hasn.-glicQjsed, than any syllogistic formulation*
In the same wpy the revelationist will bo convinced tliat the essence 
of his subject matter, God in this instance, is most fully grasped (or 
perhaps can only be grasped), by mans of the medium of revelation. îlo
imatter how mudi pressure is exerted upon him in the form of stressing the 
episteaological an^  methodological difficulties Inherent in his stand, he 
will not claim that the cmcept of God or His attributes bears fomulatim 
in straightforward, ordinary terms* To assert this mode of reality to
•• V  •
his revelation would be to perjure himself before the Holy Spjtfit* What 
he will insist upon however is #iat his experience be given space along#' 
||i side of other types of experience that happen (ex hyoothesl) more
I easily verifiable* He will argue that it is philosophically i&isound to 
be prag^ satically prejudiced in favour of, for example, the more *scien* 
tifically* desirable experiences ^  i*e* those that can be scrutinised in 
test tubes, analysed in truth tables, dissected under jaicroscopcs,
( inscribed in historical documents or recorded on statistical charts* He
: i will fume and rant about revelation being of such a private nature that 
f : it often nourishes an obscurantist dogmatisa or infallibilism, thkt it 
( ! sanctifies the utterances of the crank or bigot no less than the prophet 
and offers spurious justification for atrocities even after eplstwaolog^
I leal considerations have eliminated certain undesirables; but he will 
' demand with equal vehemence that his revelation not be discredited out of
I
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hand because it fails to eadiibit oharacterlstics #ioh it necessarily 
does not possess. This wuld be the negative version of the hdturalistic 
fallacy in reverse* It is derying a claim as to What $is* on the basis 
of What the consequences *ought* not to be!
A good deal can be said for the validity of this point of view. To 
my mind every objection against it merely eEçjhasises the utility and 
facllity--of«handling of the mderpinnings of other t;^ es of theories and 
the tremendous risks of self«deoeption or deliberate falsification Inher-# 
ent in reveXationary claims* Admittedly these are important considerations 
in themselves, but the utmost efficacy Wiich such criticisme can have is 
to caution us to be more charjr of revelation as a means of gaining knowl-# 
edge than we need to be about human experiences which are open to public 
verification! they cannot entirely dispense with this way of knowledge or 
the claims arising therefrom# Because the process is fallible it does 
not follow that the conclusion is necessarily untrue, any more tWn we 
cm conclude ocmplete human ignorance from our liability to eiror. We 
cannot pontificate that revelation is so unreliable that. In the inter­
ests of scimce, it ou^t to be excluded from serious consideration or 
relegated to a subservient position, for thereby we may be eliminating a 
mode of reality Wiich does not lend itself to expression in aiiy other 
form# However deep our personal distaste for this >tour de force*, it 
might well be something for idiich we should perhaps be thankful some 
would say, thankful to God.
72
Bt Oontemporarr Thought
To return to our main point, since the power of the SchopJmen*s 
objection to Plato** conclusion that *God loves an act because it i* 
right* emanated from their belief in the infinite eplstemological superi­
ority of the revelations of Scripture, once this belief was seriously 
doubted, the piincipal argument against the *uprema<%r of human judgment 
and the »moral order* was likewise undeminded. If the accuracy of the 
method of revelation had remained unquestionable, so would the utter 
sovereignty of God; however, as suspicion* about the former grew in the 
Medieval mind, distrust of the latter also developed» A one to one 
correspondence does not logically exist between the cause and its effect 
(or rather the reason and its oonsequences), but doubt concerning the
infallibility of revelationary *evidenoe* was a sufficient reason in this
8context for doubting God** s^reme authority*
Another avenue of attack is that of regarding this issue as but 
another example of the staggering difficulties which have been thrust in 
the path of modern theological discourse*
It was a great blow to man** religious security for Copernicus to 
prove the universe heliocentric rather than geocentric, and for nineteenth- 
century Darwinism to interpret human life as having evolved, by a gradual 
yet continual process, from the earliest forms of living organisms—  
amoebic specks of protoplamic jeHy in the scum of tide*» (It was also 
a deadly blow to man** spiritual pride, for until these revolutionary 
finding* became known, the Hebraic notion of the * chosen people* has not 
been abandoned, but merely enlarged to include all of mankind). However,
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these ooBfliota arose out of head-on oontradiotdons between the dogmatic 
beliefs of religion and the pronouncements of soienoe#
Recently the assertions of religion have been weathering an oblique 
attack as new oriticiems held them to be not false but Intrinsically 
meaningless# More specifically, since the heyday of the Verification 
Principle when a thorough-going empiricism shook the foundations of that 
bulk of theological and metaphysical assertions %&ich could not be con­
firmed (or'discredited) by e%irical evidence,* religious language has 
been plagued idth linguistic difficulties of one sort or another* Even 
after the Vienna Circle had abandoned its youthfully exuberant and brut­
ish deification of verifiability and confimability, reoognl&% thet
they were excluding by empirical presuppositions (fmotioning as * defini­
te)tlonal jokers*) an extravagant number of meaningful utterances mid
propositions, theologians remained justifiably self-conscious and chary
about their utterances*
For example, questions such as *Doae there exist a God?* and *Is
there a God?* have replaced the formulations of the same central issue in
terms of 'Does God exist?* and *Is God a real existent?* For *Does God
exist? * was found to apply existence to a proper name, and *Is God a real
11existent? * confused *«3dLst* and *real* * psing similar methods of cr3.t- 
ioism, the sentence, * There is a God* was carefully serutini%ed in order 
to determine if *TWre is #*•* was being used in a literal, straightfor^  
ward sense, as in *'Ihere are kangaroos** If on® concluded that it was 
being used as an empirical assertion, all sorts of problems concerning 
the *caSh value* of this sentence immediately presented themselves*
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A goodly cor© of théologien© have answered the above question in 
the negative, saying that this vital component of religious discourse is 
significantly unlike any statement referring to objecta of eaq^ erlence# 
Since God is a unique, transcendant being, sentences containing the xford 
♦God, ♦ whether they function as moral exhortation, an ##reesion of wor­
ship, dedication, or an alleged historical fact, are necessari% excluded 
from being placed on equal footing with sentences of a * terrestrial*
nature, much less sentences that can readily be given appropriate *cash 
12value* * Although we must predicate of God, %&o ex hypothesi transceMs 
the finite and temporal, qualities Wiich are derived from finite and 
temporal experience, we must avoid characterising him in sentences offer­
ing a literal identification with sud% experience. In fact, if sentences 
containing the word *God* were essentially like such m^irical assertions, 
then we would be justified in regarding the deity to which they ref«r as 
an unfit object of worship and veneration.^ ^
Judging that the same sort of problem in theological discourse is 
present in discussing divine ccmmnde, the theologian will respond to 
the dilemma described therein in an identical manner . H© will hold that 
•God wills X* is essentially different from *X^  wills Wien • is 
anything but a strict synonym for God. This becomes abundantly clear 
when we appreciate the full logic of the word •God.*
It is argued •Uiat we cannot legitimately place •Ohrlstopher Wren 
wills X* and *God wills X* in the same class} the former is an architect, 
the latter the •%ater Architect.* We cannot place *John Osborne wills 
X* and *God wills X* on equal footing, despite their syntactical simil­
arity, for the one is an author, the other the *$%reme Author* •
Similarly although Hercules is reputedly powerful and Aristotle admitte%
Ij: a unique being, separate and distinct from the created order# l#en John
II
*• g 'i Ï-
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wise, we cannot treat » Hercules tvills X* or * Aristotle wills X,* as being 
on all fours with *God wills X,* because of the essential difference that 
God is *Chinipotent* and *Omiscient#* God Is not just another being or 
bit of metaphysical furniture, but a traditionally unique entity of the' I
universe* To treat Him in the imnner described above is to fail to do 
justice to this uniqueness* The analogical argument collapses because 
the comparative coKponents are not alike W  all essential respects*
If m  glance backwards into ecclesiastical history, particularly 
into the theological positions of the Schoolmen, the dignity of this 
theme is enhanced by the discovexy that God is traditionally regarded as
Scotus Erigena in peJDivisione Naturae classifies «Nature” into four 
aspects or stages of one world process, he never makes the panthéistes
and modern philosopher*© mistake of confusing God with these aspects of\beings .pod remains the ultimate grounds of nature, a part of the univwse 
yet underlying its essence, in all things yet transcending all things* 
Dionysius the Areopagite makes the paradoxical assertion that "God is 
nothing” only because Re defies and transcends all formulations and hence 
is inexpressible I so great is the gap between His nature and ours that 
even Scripture can only offer metaphor, analogy, and symbol - ï|ever 
direct insight* (See Divine Names*) In the metaphor of Duns Scotus 
which ccmQiares the universe to a magnificent tree, whose root is matter 
and whose trunk is split into two great physical and spiritual branches, 
God is not the bark, sap, fruit or flowers of the tree, but its planter 
and tender* (Bee De ^ erum Principio* ) Although William of Ockham 
favoures an iconoclastic nominalism, nevertheless he clearly regards God
76
as independent of aH minds, orders and laws of reality, with the moral 
and phyeioal fibre of the universe determined solely by the deoislone of 
His external tdlX« (See Quodlibeta.) The central doctrine of %t.
Anselm* e Frpeloitiwa and MonoloRlum is that God is the exemplary, effi­
cient and final cause of the sensible and intelligible world, necessarily 
lying wholly beyond and above it# St. Thomas*o concept (with heavy debts 
to Aristotle*© De Anima) of a scale of existence, places God at the 
summit of the chain of being, and in a totally unique position as the 
only "purely spiritual Being#" All of these thinkers relegate man to an 
inferior, separate and significantly different position than that occu­
pied by God,
Now the modern theologian*© pathway out of the tmm constructed by
logical considerations as to the strict necessity of human judgment prior 
to religious obedience is actually through a modem restatement of the 
same point# He will claim that since God occupies a wholly unique posi­
tion in the metaphysical achema, the standards of logic which are usually 
applied to mandates of a conventional order, are rendered Inoperative 
Wien focused upon Him, It is like discounting the corollary of plane 
geometry that parallel lines never meet by applying the proof of solid 
gemetry to it# Or to borrow Karl Hoiza*© simile, it would be like switch­
ing on a light to see the nature of darkness#
Canon Ramsey fully dressed this point in contemporary* clotliing vàen 
he suggested to me in conversation that we cannot speak of God x-ziHing X 
and let us say the Prime Minister willing X In the same breath. For to 
do so would be to anthropomorphize God in a highly unacceptable way; it 
would be to place God, or rather demote Him to the same level as that
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oooupled by any executive official* Once God le thus reduced in etature, 
30 as to be one with the Prime Minister, (%andl, Stalin or what have you, 
it is a relatively simple task to demonstrate that a human jw#n#%t as to 
the rightness of His orders is requisite for obedience to them* What we 
have done in order to depose God frm his position of supremacy and erect 
Mammon in his place. Is, in Ryle’s famous phrase, to commit a ’category- 
mistake*’
•; However, the point is not so easily won# For once we have demon­
strated that God is traditionally placed in a unique position in the 
metaphysical scheme, and also shown that as the |iolder of this position 
we have done Him the injustice of applying inappropriate ’foreign logic* 
to His Commands, it still rmains for us to describe the sort of logical 
structure that is peculiarly suited to His being. If this is another 
' case/ of attempting to dissect a delicate biologipal organism withImechanic’s tools, the onus is upon us to provide infomation about this 
unfamiliar specimen and to prescribe the kind of instrument to |be 
employed in dealing with it. If our claim is that God is the only
ip
j I : mmber of a superior and different class, in Wiat way is this class or 
category unique? We have elliptically indicated the sort of entity that 
God is not; we must now declare idiat sort of creature He is add in a 
sense prove what He isn’t* Otherwise, we haven’t refuted Plato’s point 
that the acceptability of God’s authority rests upon human judgment of 
the rightness of the action which He cmmands* Ihe burden of proof being 
squarely placed on the affirmative in argumentation, we must show why it 
is that such criticisms are drained of relevance when applied to God, or 
else concede our point to be a vague hope, or worse, an insincere evasion.
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I For oxaznpXo, Professor %le first applied the label ’category
i tI ' mistake* to treating ’mind’ as a ’thing’ —  word, then proceeded to ' * \ '; present an argmedb as to why a Msolassification has occurred when one
ë
does 8 0* He states that if the word ’mind’ is regarded as a ’#iing’- 
word, it must refer, presumably to some recondit# ghost-like ’thing,’ 
occupying and cmtrolling bodily machinery* Then minds, if they cudated 
at aH, wuld be conç^ letely mysterious and unknown entities. Statments
pu*porting to give infomation about people’s minds would be ’unoashable’
\and ccnsequently meaningless* Therefore, to place the word ’mj#d’ on all
, f r
fours with the word ’body’ would constitute a ’oategory-mistalie, ’ giving
rise to unnecessary, bogus problems*
Now presumably, theologians Wio are concerned i&th establishing the
nature of the category inhabited by God, would want to separate it from
the realm of things - that Is, the familiar, straightforward category of
15objects which have an mplrical frame of reference. Otherwise one 
would be hard put to determine His colour, size, dhape, texture and 
spatio-temporal position as one can readily do with, say, an automobile. 
If we attempted to squeeze ’God’ into seme straightforward empirical 
category. He would also be judged #  a recondite, mysterious entity, in 
fact the sort of creature that Flaw’s explorers set traps for around a 
jungle garden. (With such an ampirica^  model as a gardener being emplqged 
for an analogical argument, it comes as no shook that God is disparag­
ingly characterized as invisible, intangible, and eternally elusive by
16ordinary sense data*)
It is also usually denied #at God properly belongs in the category 
of necessary truths; that is to say, that theological propositions
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-:f 17] * purporting to offer information about God are not of an analytical 
sort* For example, the proposition ’All fathers have diildren’ is
i '
'A analytic because its truth or falsity is discoverable through an analy-
%  ■■ YI sis of the subject ’fathers,’ The predicate is actually superAuous to 
anyone who possesses a thorough understanding of the subject, for the 
i ^ idea made eaqilicit in the predicate was implicit (a priori) in the 
f ■ subject. However in tho ease of theological propositions such as ’God 
is good’ two independent ideas are being linked together. Since God’s 
attributes are established a posteriori by independent means, it is
’logically possible’ in the full technical sense of the phrase, that





I contradictory to declare that all (or even some) fathers do not have
Children, (If we were unable to think of God without thinking bf his
dxli ' ' ' :goodness, would we be giving testimony to a conditioned respdr(^, or
'if making a metaphysical point?)
'  -
• "ih ’U f K a 4 * .  4  4  ^ m ^  . 1" —    —   -# —  — -I4= apply to it if its truth depended \spon its empirical claims or ItsThen Wiat sort of category is deity in? What sort of catj^ gory doestheological language (as distinct frc»a general religious langimge) in-! *habit that it is legitimately enable to transcend criticisms tHat wo#d
:|S logical necessity* As I* H* Crombic states, fit is said, the (theolog- m  leal) statements purport to be about a quasi-personal subject,) %nd in
m  '\ 11 that way to be parallel to statements about, say, Julius Caesar| and
. 12 ' tyet if we proceed to draw conclusions frcm thm, to bring arg#ents
I against them, in general to test thm as if they were parallel to state-
I- ) fI ments about Julius Caesar, we are told #at we have failed to grasp
their function. They have, apparently, soae kind of special exen^ tlon
frmi empirical/ testing; and yet if one attempts# for this reason# to
assimilate them to other kinds of utterances (moral judgments ^ dr e*am**
pie# or mtiiematical formulae) which enjoy similar exemption# is at





daWulf# M#, History of Hediaevnl Phllosooliy. trans* by B, 0*
Messenger# London# Thomas Nelson and Sons# Ltd## Î951# VoL#I# p#28t#I *• ’
2* Medieval theologians also refused to look through Galileo^  ^telom
scope for fear that they might be convinced by the unreli^e /1
evidence of their senses of something which they *^knevr* fKcm 
Revelation was untrue#
3# Some theologians of the period thought that cofsplete reliWhce vq^ n 
Scripture was sufficient# philosophical dmmetratiom actually 
dimini Wiing the merit of faith# Others regarded * ration^ : faith* 
as possessing greater value thaxi unsupported belief# And la third 
faction weighed * simple faith* and philosophical »rationali»ation* 
equally. All groups were agreed# however# that since Revelation 
through Scripture was infallible# at no moment could reason contra*» 
diet faith* If reason and faith collided# so much the woi%e for 
reason.
Col*
5* Wolf son# H. A*# The PhiXosoohy of the Church Fathers# Cambridge#
Mass.# Harvard University Press# 1956# p. 102#
6* Tennant# lU R*# Philosonhical Theology. Cmbridge# 1956# Vol. II#
p# 2 2 6 #
7* For a sound discussion of this point consult Hontefiore# A## A , j
Modem Introduction to Moral Philosophy. loadon# Eoutledge & Kegan i




8# This is a logical point not an hlstorloal one# althou# historical 
knowledge is necessary for its comprehension* I might add that 
the converse is also true but for different reasons*
9# For outstanding studies of the historical development of this move­
ment consult Morris# 0# Vf*# logical Positivism* Fragmatism and 
Scientific Emoiriciam* Paris# Herman et Oie*# 1937s Nagel# E*# 
'^ Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in lurope'* in 
Logic Without MetaiAvsics# Olenooe# Illinois# The Free Pmss# 1956; 
Heurath# 0*# Le Developipement dii Qerole de Vienne* Paris#^  Hermann 
et Oie*# 1935*
10* Bee Flew# A* 0. H*# ''The Justification of Punishment#" BiiXoSûphy* 
Vol* XXIX# Mo* 111# October 1954# p. 292.
11 * For an examination of this last point consult Austin# J* L## "Other 
Minds#" Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume XX# 1946# p*159ff* 
12# Professor Bamsey*s broad conolusion (in his book Rell^ jous Lmaguage. 
London# A*C*H* Press# 1957# p. 49) is '%at if a rather strange 
discernmeat^ c^oMaitment is the kind of situation characteristic of 
religion# we must expect religious language to be appropriately odd# 
and to have a distinctive logical behaviour*"
13* This dilmma# witli apologies to Archibald MaoLeish# might be phrased; 
If God is God He is not known# if God is known He is not God; take 
the even# take the odd*
14. Ryle F.# The Oonoeot of Mind* London# Hutchinson, 1949# Oh* I*
15* Although H. D* Lewis seems at times to be saying that God must stand 
the test of truth or falsity in the normal sens© of these words# 
his main characterisation of religious experience implicitly denies
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this claim* He states at one point that religious experiences have 
this peculiarity "that %&lle they rwain in themselves finite 
throu^out# that is have a content only appropriate to finite 
beings like ourselves# yet they can be seen to have also a refer­
ence beycni that; and# in their patterns and ramifications in 
expexdenee as a whole# they afford us the clue we need to the way 
the unconditioned reality on Wiich we are dependent enters into 
special relations with us (Lewis# H, D*# Our Bxpsrienee of
pod* London# Allen & Unwin Ltd*# 1959)* The * reference beyond 
that* and *clue* Wiitdi ordinary experience offers us is the relig­
iously io^ ortant part of sqch experience# and clearly indicates 
that as a means to the achievement of other knowledge spiritually 
transcending itself# it is not one with ordinary sense data as it 
is usually handled in, for example# inductive generalisations#
16# Flew# A*# "Theology and Falsification#" in New Sssavs in Philosooh** 
i,ca^ _Theology* sd# by A* Flew and A* Macintyrs# Lmdon# S#p,#M* 
press# Ltd*# 1955# p# 96.
17* I shall argue later that *God is good* is an analytic proposition# 
At this point I m  concerned to present the customary view*
10* Ormbis# I* M*# "The Possibility of Theological Statements#" in 
ip faith and Logic* ed* by Basil Mitchell# London# Allen & Unwin Ltd*# 
1957# p* 33*
%O h a \o t© r  V
THE DOOTEDm OF IMEFPABILITZ
il Knowledge
One way in which the ©asential nature of religious utterances has 
been characterised is in terms of an attempted expression of the inex­
pressible# Religious discourse, it is maintained, is absurd and non­
sensical precisely because theologians have mistakenly and misguidedly 
sought to translate religious experimce into rational terms* Divine 
fiats such as *God wills X* or other theological formulations belong in 
the class of *the unutterable# * and as mmbers of this class# necessar­
ily cannot be equated with any meaningful utterance# let alone one 
possessing literal meaning such as *Mamillan wills X.# These proposi­
tions cannot be understood by a penetrating analysis of their deeper 
meaning# for by the very nature of their exalted reference, they are 
necessarily precluded from making sense on any linguistic level* Neither 
can we redeem the meaningfulness of religious assertions by reference to 
more sophisticated standards than those applied to straightforward 
SB^ irical assertions# for# by definition# there istt*t any p^hilosopheras 
stone* Wiich can transform expressions referring to an inexpressible 
reality into a meaningful form*
Many mystics seem to be maintaining a position of this sort. With 
this standpoint in mind we have Butler saying# "Some nystlcs are of a 
metaphysical turn of mind and have endeavoured to give utterance to the 
thoughts their experiences have inspired «** But such speculations are
(not) guaranteed by the laystlo state In vfeieh they were oonceiVed# are
1(not) to be identified with aysticism David Snowies In defining
traditional mystical theology states as a cÆiaracteristic of the mystical 
experience that it "is wholly incommunicable, save as a bare %tat«ment, 
and in this respect all the utterances of the mystics are entirely 
inadequate as representations of the mystical experience, but it brings 
absolute certainty to the mind of the recipient*" And finally, William 
James declares ineffability to be the handiest of his four marks in 
classifying the mystical state* "The subject of it immediateiy says 
that it defies expression, that no adequate report of its contents can 
be given in words * « • its quality must be directly experienced; it can- 
not be iiîçjarted or transferred to others*"
How although mystics frequently assert that their experiences anai^ t 
linguistically translatable, this claim is hardly consistent with theirh
behaviour. Most mystics are, InAot, noted for their exuberant verbal 
effusion; they continually present prolix descriptions of their indes­
cribable, unutterable experience* And at every turn we find mystice 
employing expressions like "deep yet daeWLing darkness," the ,"|mbrace of 
-!:& the Beloved," the "Gloud of Unknowing," a "Divine Da%^ etc*, Mo charac- 
| |l teriae the transcendent experiences of mystical contemplation* In short,
‘ | j they translate that which they say is untranslatable, describq the indes- 
c%d.bable, and mq>ress the inexpressible (albeit in m  odd way),,
A typical example of this type of mystical olaia not in keeping 
with mystical practice occurs in the writings of Tennyson* In the life 
of Tennyson (Vol. I, p, 320), the poet speaks of a "kind of waking 





intensity of the consciousness of individuaXity# the individual; itself 
seemed to dissolve and fade away into boundless beings and this is not 
a confused state, but the clearest of the clearest# and the surest of
the surest, the weirdest of the weirdest# utterly beyond words !>•#"t ’However# this mystical monim in which the unity and solidarity of the 
universe is deeply felt but is "beyond words” is not only well described 
in this autobiographical fragment# but also in the poem "The Ancient 
Sage*" Witness the following extracti
"And more# my aw* for more than once when %
Sat all alone# revolving in myself
the word that is the symbol of myself
the mortal limit of the Self was loosed
And past into tho Nameless as a cloM
Melts into Heaven* t touched my limbs# the limbs
Were strange not mine - and yet no shade of doubt#
But utter olearnese# and thro* lose of Self 
The gain of such large life as matched with ours 
Were Sun to spark - uaehadowable in words#
Lthemselves but shadows of a shadovMiorld*"
And although we are acquainted with the aphorieme of Oonfuoius from 
the reports of his disciples in the li-kji and he is said to have person­
ally written the Ch*un-ts*in* nevertheless he professes to be silent 
about the divine# preferring to imitate lAat he called the silence of 
God* When pressed to speak he said# "Does heaven speak? îhe fpur 
seasons pursue their courses# and all things are continually being pro­
duced# but does Heaven say anything?"
.y ÿv
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■ i From these apparently flagrant Inconsistenoies wo can gathW that 
& ! -i most mystic 8 ^do not literally mean that the beatific state tdiich has
; 5' overvAielmed them cannot be es^ rossed* Their real meaning se«mq to be \ I '
;; that it cannot be directly ©xprosoed In a purely rational way# or that
i' I"4 1 it cannot be understood on the ordinary linguistic level# Since mystics 
cannot directly describe their experiences yet desperately desire to
. cownicate them, they mploy symbolic language to suggest the' exalted
?■ vision which they have witnessed# Numerous misconceptions have arisen 
from a failure on the part of critics to fully c^rehend that mystical
Iutterances are symbolic# allusive and oblique; that they can oiÿLy hint 
at an abstruse jnystery because this mystery# qua mystery# is not amen-
' able to straightfonmrd# detailed descr##K^##Ap'- '1. M# Orcwbie once
& ;|; remarked# it is foolish to demand the detailed anatomy of a mystery.)
]l All religion# of course# insofar as it lays *Barthian* stress i#on
2* ' '41 the transcendence of deity# is forced to use symbols and figurative
|v terms, B^bolim provides partial knowledge of a reality which eludes
4. direct verbal expression and exposition* However# to î^ stici^ |# s;pibols
are absolutely basic and essential as representations of a deeper real%
directly ehcouatered at privileged moments# as well as being a vehicle
* : for rendering mystical experience partially intelligible to less fortun-
ate outsiders* Btutfield is so conscious of Kystioism's pre-occupation
. with the "Vast Unknown, " the tremendous depth of reality beyond our
apprehension and only amenable to symbolic expression# that he believes
"a splendid md fundamental agnostioism" lies at the centre of all 
5, I mysticism. Host writers on mystioima# in fact, have recognlaed the 
iïmnensely iapjrtaht role of embolism althou^ few have drawn Btutfield *s
ooncluslons* Evelyn Underhill devotes a chapter of her book to the
6 y .  ^various symbols employed by mystics# lAile Reoejae spends neai'ly half
7of his book Oil this topic. Miss E* Gregory regards symbolism as a
A ■)principal feature of laysticisia while E* L. Nettleship defines mysticieaa
as "the belief that everything in being what it is, is symbolic of some- 
9thing more." %ere is a certain ambiguity# of course# in the meaning 
of •symbol* being used by these writers# In one sense it Is m  indirectilinguistic vehicle for the expression of a transcendent reality; in the 
other it means that the objects of experience thanselves# even Sublime 
visions# are symbolic of a reality lying behind them. However#: mystics 
either employ the term • symbol* in both of Its senses or achieve a 
synoretimtion of them. For example# when Francisco de Osuna .rpfers to 
the body as a box tightly enclosing the soul# *box* is used metaphori­
cally in both senses Wills body is only a physical not a verbal symbol.
In the light of this analysis of the usual mystic • s meaning of 
inexpressible# i.e. as Incapable of straightforward# ordinary expression, 
we can see jihe point of I%cintyre*s observation tliat for the mystic 
"such expresBiona as the unutterable take on an idiomatic sense in Wildx
they are of great use in deeoribing and naming what they have j^ qjeri- 
10enced." Surely this is Tennyson*s rhetorical meaning ^ en he uses 
the phrase "beyond words" alongside of superlatives# like "weirdest#" 
"surest#" mid "clearest." "Beyond words" is used to describe ^ n operi- 
eace just as "nothingness" might do, even thou# the latter is' usually 
taken as the absence of sensation# thought or experience.
Thus we see that most mystios cannot really do idtiiout sytabols, 
images, rhythmic language and metaphors even though this mode of
iexpression Is disclaimed by rational theologians and deemed inadequate 
to convey transcendental vision. For if the mystic is to ccsnmunicate 
his experience at all# if he is to stimulate the latent intuition of
the uninitiated to divine heights# he must employ poetic language #ich /. I
" /■by symbolism and imagery hints at something beyond a surface sense* 'i
Fundamentally then# a mystic *s mqmrience is unformulable in the sense
that in order to communicate it he is confined to poetic metaphor. We
needn’t concern ourselves at lâîis point over #ether mystical expressions
such as "the Incomprehensible Light# enfolding us and penetrating us"
have any cognitive content or whether they merely conjure up vague# > I I
visual Images* What is pertinent here is the characterisation of mysti-
cal utterances as logically akin to indirect# affective repressions*
This rendering of religious language can then be subsumed under poetic 
language# Wien we examine the relationship betwen poetic and religious 
utterances*
Some mystics# of course# do claim that their experiences are Inex­
pressible without employing this phrase in an idiomatic sense*', They 
actually criticise other mystics for attempting expression even in 
symbolic# poetic terms and fall silent Wien aWced to describe their own \
experience* For example# the Baisa-Veda asserts the ’unknoimblW* and ^
Herbert Spencer speaks of substance as unknowable. Obviously What is 
uuknwabl© is unutterable. Zen Buddhists continually stress the
futility of verbal truth and the Zen master teaches by devices (eudh as
Î2.slaps designed to prcmote a sudden awakening. For them discourse J




ineffable. We mi^t twiet Wittgenstein’s utterance (Tractatus 6*522) 
and say that there Is indeed the mystical; it is the ineaqiress&le. ?
As far as I can determine, the notion of an unutterable experience
? ■of mystical contemplation has its root in one or all of three sources*
First, there is its derivation from that aspect of mystical practicef
commonly called Quietism* This fundamentally means an immense spiritual 
quiescence cultivated as a condition of intense receptivity to (or recol-
t'lection of, as in Bemacrdino de Laredo), the divine voice. Underhill 
pejoratively calls this "the danger son© of introversion," and Euysbroeck 
denounces it as "treason towards God, " however both fail to ftMy appre­
ciate the nature of Quietism, For it is an active, ai*dent searching for 
God, a "busy rest" rather than a sterile, passive relaxation cff effort, 
and as such, forms an integral part of all mystical life. Like 
Aristotle’s contemplative life it is far from soporific*
However, all to easily it drifts into a doctrine of silence con­
cerning? the knowledge achieved by this method* The Spanish mystic 
Francisco de Opuna demonstrates this tendency when he writes of his 
"second way of silence" that the quiet hearer is "silent to all around."
It can remain an untainted receptive Quietim as in Juan de Angbles 
and the silent corporate fellowship of the Society of Friends;; however 
the eplstemological necessity for silence in receiving a message, easily
slides into the metaphysical impossibility of tranmltting a message*
I : . ' t ^
I  :  A second apparent source for the inexpressibility of divine mystdcal i j
 ^; experience lies in the strcmg mystical tendency towards anti-inteHectu- " ;
i:
; I
alism. It seems a recurrent strain in many thinkers such as Hocking,





Leuba and pfelderer to depreciate the ability of rational thoi^ ht to 
reach reality. The intellect# we are reminded, classifies, siiAs# 
unifies, constructs, co-ordinates, tabulates and explains the experience 
furnished to it; this "careful mosaic of neatly-fitted conceptions which 
those intellects will offer us in return will have none of the peculiar
qualities of life: It i&ll be but a ’practical simplification of1reality, • made by the well-trained sorting*#achine in the inte^sts of 
18our daily needs#" It is through action of the ivill and emotional 
experience (particularly mystical impressions) that man is able to 
achieve life insights, to come In contact with naked reality# Miss 
éndeihill repeatedly contrasts tho "static helplessness" of thbught with 
the "life movment" of intuitional experience# Reflective reason is for 
her (as for Lotse, Sartre, and perhaps even Bergson) a clmsy and remote 
instrument necessarily consigned to second-order issues# To "fe^ the 
pulsations of (life’s) mi#ity rhythm," to gain intuitive insists we 
need the help of artists, poets, prophets and seers are the "happy 
owners of unspoilt perceptions," those Wio have "vanquished the crystal­
lising tendencies of thou#it and attained an immediate if in^ erfect
19communion with reality#"
It is readily seen how a doctrine Wiioh dismisses the ability of 
rational thou#ts (presumably in the sense of ’pure reason’) to touch 
reality, can easily degenerate still further into the position that 
rational expression of mystical reality is impossible; and the theolog­
ical climate of today is such that apologists do not conclude that there 
may not be any God from the impossibility of evidential or rational 
confirmation, but that logic or rational language is an inadequate tool 




The third pï^ bable source of this notion sterne from the oloee
affinity tetwetn iiyetioism and myatery* There is first of all a strong
etymological coimeotion between the term ’mysticism’ and ’tJie mysteries; ’
according to Flming, Fie and Bouysr they spring frcsa #%e same root.
"The mrà j^T^(^TLt<é5 Qdmn trm the verb^z/w# vliich means ’to close,’ and
more particularly, to close the eyes. The earliest use we find of it
in pre-Christian tiçies is in connection with the t^tery religions, that
is, with those cults Wiose essential rites were kept hidden from all but 
20the initiated." And Fleming states, "A mystic (in St*
Paul’s era #en mystery cults flourished) was one initiated into Divinei -
things: he must keep his mouth shut (uveiv) about them, because the
21initiation was secret," In this ago the mystic was one initiated into 
the EleusWLan, Bacchic or Mithraic mysteries, not in the sense that he 
was introduced to private religious knowledge, but that he was conducted 
through a secret sacramental ritual# It was the details of this ritual 
idaich could not be disclosed to the uninitiated#
Bouyer has argued quite porsuasively that althougïi a line of his­
torians from iWnack to Fere Festugiere have assumed that Christian 
mysticism has been infused with this Hellenistic sense of mystery, this 
could not be the case because the subject of Christian mystery is knowl­
edge not ritual - a portion of reality inaccessible to reason or the 
senses, Hellenistic mystery was not expressed because it was legisla­
tively forbidden for the religious ritual to be disclosed; Christian
mystery was inexpressible because of its ineffable nature, that is,
22because It could not be verbally expressed* However, Bouyer does not 
deny the connection between Christian mystery and mysticism - the fact
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that the element of mystery (in the Ohristlan seme) within m^ticiim 
has resulted in a doctrine of the inexpressibillty of mystical reality* 
Having outlined this position and its probable origins leli us now 
pay some critical attention to it*
If we say that the stat^ents of theology are significantly unlike 
other statements in that they are rationally attempting to express what 
is by its metaphysical nature inexpressible, we have established the 
uniqueness of divine commands; we have established that ’nonsensical* 
statments such as *0od wills X* are exempt from crlticim directed 
toward meaningful utterances * In general this position has the merit of 
removing the sting of positivist sneers that theological statements are 
nonsense by thorou^ ily agreeing with this claim* The atheist and the 
theist here join hands* However, it offers a live alternative to th» 
conclusion that religious matters can therefore be categorically dis­
missed by asserting the reality of the reference of nonsensical theolog­
ical propositions*
Let m  first make a few general remarks* To begin with, #is 
position sacrifices too much for the sake of Immunity from present day 
criticism* It retreats into an i#enetrable tiiicket of mystery gaining 
ontological assurance solely from God’s private revelation* knà this 
divine disclosure is by it® nature incommunicable and unconfimable* 
Huesell’s remarks are relevant here, that "insl#t untested and uns#- 
ported, is an insufficient guarantee of truth, in spite of the fact that 
Bxuch of the most important truth is first suggested by its means * * * 
Instinct, intuition or insight is what first leads to the beliefs liiich 
subsequent reason confirms or confute®*" It is in fact quite iqpCGsiW,©
to dlffere&tl&to illurdon from inspiration at the pre**lingnistie levels
And as ve said about Kierkegaard# if this position is not selMefeating#
- ^ '%re are at least forced to rely entirely upon unreliable senses for our 
knowledge of divine reality# without the benefit of public experience 
and di^utation to question Its authenticity#
; IAnd the hmy of sllenee* osmnot remain a category within the ranks 
of theology# although it may claim space as a religious catogopy In a 
sociological classification# for silence is compatible i&th ever;^ dihing. 
This Attempted inclusion is reminiscent of Ingeb nomative redéfinition 
of ^reason* for similar purposes of making mysticism more retpectabl©* 
Witness the follovdng extract $ mystic# then# is not# as such# a
visionary; nor has he any interest in appealing to a faculty ♦above 
reason# ♦ if réaeon is used in its proper sense as the logic of' the whole 
personality*”^  (It is curious further that ‘reason* here is for Inge# 
what is for Reardon#
When we realise that a self«#imposed silence not only sacrifices 
epistemological strength but also inclusion in the market-^ place of 
theological claims# it la firther apparent that assertion and denial are 
also logically forbidden to those advocating an incpcpressibillty (Wains*
U -,If a retreat Into silence cannot be broken for dieoursivo reasoning
■concerning the reality or nature of the object of silent contmplation;
I might add as à psychological adjunct# that the natural# exploratory 
instincts of the human imagination would demand answers to ♦peripheral* 
religious questions which revelation failed to provide# thus driving 




Another objection is this: It ie highly doubtful whether there
are any ineffable revealed truths# I say this neit)ier because mi allege 
edly inaxpresGlble truth cannot bo validated (altliougiit seems to m  
that this position is someviiat persuasive)# nor because of metaphysical 
presuppositions concerning the relationship between language and object# 
but simply because tlie revelatlone received by m^ s^tlca are never n m  
truths but beliefs lAich wei'o previously known and derived from ordinary# 
highly verbalised sources* Pratt says# for example# that the caamunica-
ted truths of tW mystics ”are always old truths vAich tWy knew (though
26 'in a mudi less living form) before". "Possibly all the mystical
♦revelations* may be accounted for ae being first carried into the 
ecstasy by the mystic# and derived originally from social education# and 
all except this sense of presence may possibly be mere conclualone which 
the mystic comes to after reflecting upon ^ is experience by a process ofi
ordinary discursive thought; a number of mystics will be found to admit 
27this *,#" Pratt states elsewhere that the "mass of theological mater- 
ial which fills (the Kystie‘s) mind" determines the cont&nt of mystical 
vision# and he cites Ooe as saying that the mystic "brings his theology 
leal beliefs to the mystical experience; he does not derive them from 
it#" Just one of many exm^les illustrating the truth of this point 
is that Santa Teresa and Saint Ignatius loyola mystically perceived the 
deep mystery of the holy Trinity only after reflecting upon this notion* 
I believe we have at work here a psychological device of self-assuranceÎ ' ;closely aldn to that ihioh enables the Catholic mystic to receive 
visions of Mary meditating rather than Shiva dancing*
I
- I1
I , tn general we can eowlW# that if the content of the myetlc*e
; revelation Is a ‘truth* tdîich has been stated elseWiere# his vision 
can hardly be called either original or# what is important to us#
 ^ unutterable*1 A further point is this a When a mystic claims that an eM#rlence 
; ; cannot be ^ ^ressed# he may not be bearing witness to a pmfundity#
‘IJ beyond the domain of language# but pleading his own inability ^
;) I communicate an unusually moving eaq^ erience# It is perfectly credible 
# I that the nature of an object of experience could be exceedingly reeon*
I dit# 6 0 that a person such as Machiavelll would not possess the aestheticn'
I nature needed to seise and comunicate it# and an artist like l^ oust 
I would describe even its inner character to perfection* Intensely emo-
(I' ' -I tional experiences are difficult to describe and to seme inadequately
; articulate souls# prohibitively difficult*
V In specific circumstances such a view may even be an expression 
, of exasperation at a tou^ minded listener# #ich means that to this 
unsympathetic person or such insensitive people the mystical vision is
' k, 1 incommunicable* Obviously in any of these forms this position is not a 
serious philosophical threat*
! However the doctrine of ineffability may not mean either an inabil­
ity to convey profound ejqperience or the impossibility of a reiéityIbeing expressed* It sd#t well mem% that a believer is unwilling to 
< reduce the holy# uncaar^  or myeterious to a Unguistlo level# feeling 
that to place it beside other descri^ able objects defiles it and robs it 
of holy feeling* It is a recurrent view that the mere naming of a divine 




inappropriate# familiar catogorioo* Homo the Hebrew notion that God 
mnoW*t be named oxoept on infrequent aimemio oocaslono*
However wo cannot claim that we have knowledge of an experience (or 
an object)# that io m  eamot be consciously aware of having undergone a 
eerWln pactional eaqserlcnce# unless we have verballs&ed It* For the 
e^rlmco itself imuld remain an undifferentiated series of sensations 
imles# it w<^ a separated and plucked from this opaque stream by a lin- 
gulstio designation* It Is quite similar to states of foelin^ i %hlch 
cannot truly be known unless they are verbally qpjbollsed* The state­
ment "I am despondent" functions not only to describe one*e fe^ings to 
others but enables the Individual to become aware of his own feeling#* 
state*
Flnall^ r# I ml^t offer the linguistic criticism that there cannot 
logically be an ♦unutterable* because one Item of knowledge tliich can 
be uttered about it is that it Is unutterable# Paradoxioaily# the name 
itself provides a descriptive fact #ich necessarily allows of linguistic 
egression* And it does not help to label an ineffable reality by 
another name such as the ‘Divine Dark#* for once this ‘reality* is 
expressly characterised as unutterable it is thereby given the character­
istic Wiich can be uttered of it. Thus Whether ‘unutterable* functions
' i  '1 ■primarily as a noun standing for an ultlmte reality# or soleiy as an 
adjective describing this reality called by another name# it is, analyt- 
ically self-defeating. It is actually in #e same logical boat' as that 
sister tern in negative theology ‘unknowable#! of #ioh at least we 
know that it cannot be known. However there are two i%ortant differerocsc 
In the first place the criticism against the ‘unknowable ♦ can be rebutted
/■ I
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by reforenc© bo the distinction between ‘loiowledge of* and ‘knowledge 
about.* If ‘unknmmblo* Is defined in terns of the fomer# then the 
oharactenlstlo of ‘iwdksiORaaldLIjLtgr* cm conveniently be relegated to the 
latter category* Secondly, whereas an object or experience described 
as unutterable serves to delineate the area in which it can be non#it, 
i.e. the pro-liîignlstic level, the ascription of imknowability logically 
cornels us to terminate our search.
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B: Rudolf Otto *6 ‘Numinoué*
Rudolf Otto* s position seems to b© a stronger on© in that it
stresses the non-rational elment at the heart of religion* He claims
that the experience of the ‘numinous*, a mysterium tremendum* awa-inspir*
ittg, holy and sacred at the core of religion, eludes conceptualisation,
hence the attempt to place it in propositlmal form necessarily results
in nonsense* Otto does not want to say that religion in a broad sense
cannot be coneptualiséd at all, as evidenced by remarks such as "in
religion there is very much than can be taught that is handed down in
29concepts and passed on in school instruction*" And theological
explanation is an admissible rational and linguistic procedure, otherwise
Otto*s efforts ^ uld be pointless* His book actually attempts a further
analysis of that portion of religious feeling able to be ©sqjreesed in
concepts and that more essential part which is # t  - "this numinous basis
and background to religion, which can only be induced, incited, and 
30aroused."
%ether God*s comands are exempt from the crltlciams applicable to 
human commands depends in part upon the class of statements #iqh .remain 
utteratle after statements purporting to refer to the experience of the 
numinous have been discarded* If *is* statements expressing God*» will 
are groiqsed with expressions of the numinous, then we avoid certain moral 
judgments being applicable to them at the expense of affiming the impos­
sibility of conceptualising Ck>d«s commands. And since the derivation of 
*X is good* depends upon the possibility of translating the experience 
of 0od*s C(xamands into a meaningful verbal concept, we are also precluded 
from legitimately deriving this evaluative proposition. (We may derive
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a meaningful conclusion when the prmiaee of a ayllogima are irredeemable 
nonsense# just as a true cckclusion can be derived from false premises,I
however this is a freak occurrence allowed by the formal schane of 
logic*) If, on the other hand, Ood*s will is not inexpressible thep like 
FitsBgerald*s »Omr" we "Game out by the same door wberein (we) went*"; it 
is incumbent upon ns to sh6w in what logically significant way proposl- 
tions expressing God‘s will differ from propositions expressing man*s 
win*
Actually, when we atteint to rigorously analyse Otto*s coinage,
#en we attenpt to chart the limits of the ‘unutterable* to ascertain 
Wiether expressions of Qod‘s cmmnds fall within the boundary, we reach 
some curious conclusions* We find that according to the remains which 
Otto specifically makes on the means of expression of the nminous, 
nothing is truly unutterable! We find that the line of dcmarcatim does 
not fall between the expressible and the inexpressible as Otto‘e earlier 
remarks might lead one to believe, but between the expressible %jhich can 
be publicly understood and the expressible #lch possesses an exclusively 
esoteric meaningfulness* The latter category contains utterances (as 
well as reverent gestures, attitudes, etc#) idiich can only be received 
and understood by those with "an inborn capacity to receive and under­
stand," he who has "the spirit in the heart;” "Wiere the Wind of the 
spirit blows, there the mere ‘rational* terms themselves are imbued with 
power to arouse the feeling of the *non^ rational**” *#. "He who in the 
spirit reads the written word lives in the numinous#" In other words one 
way of receiving knowledge of the non-ratlonal numinous is via the 
rational expression correctly approached; another method of gaining
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knowledge of this same numinoua is by a direct non-rabional apprehension# 
(Otto often men ‘non-^ rational* to stand for both an epistemologioal 
channel and a metaphysical category which makes Interpretation difficult#) 
Otto*s views then resolve into a Protestantim reminiscent of 
Schleiermaoher*© position that theological expressions refer to the 
inner experiences of a select few and must be ‘decided* to gain universal 
meaning# or sommdiat similar to Barth *s beliefs that a special jairacle 
of grace is needed to render Biblical assertions meaningful#
However, before we conclude from this that ‘0od wills X* can be 
meaningfully articulated either as an utterance xfhich has meaning for the 
initiated or one Wiich makes sense on an ordinary level# it is wéH to 
point out that an ‘utterance* and a ‘concept* are not synonyms. Although 
Otto often uses thw interchangealOLy so that one might be led to equate 
them (as McPherson does in Hew Essays in Philosophical Theology). not 
everything which can be rationally uttered can be conoeptualissed# The 
numinous experience in fact cannot be packed into concepts although it 
can be expressed in osoterically meaningful words. %us our question 
actually reduces to the following: Are utterances of the sort *God wills 
X*, that is# divine commands# utterances which have public or private 
meaning# or an attempt to conceptualise that which is incapable of being 
Qônceptualiàod? (Short of making this distinction X cannot see any way 
of saving Otto from a charge of grossly inconsistent and muddled thinking.) 
The answer to this question surely must be that it can be either depend­
ing Upon what is substituted for *X* #
If God is said to command things such as "make haste" (2 Chr# 35*21 )# 
"Stretch out thine hand" (Ex# 10*12)# "sit down" (Hqrk 6;39)# or "Gome
I Iii
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thou and all thy house into the ark" (Gen* 7:1), then we can hardly 
call these expressions of concepts. However if we take the following 
examples# "Honour thy father and thy mother" (Mat. 15*4)# "Thou ©halt 
not kill" (Bac# 20*13)# "love one another# aa.X have loved you" (Jn, 15* 
12)# or "Thou Shalt have no other gode before me" (Ex* 20*3)# in this 
sense commandments are concepts* And without engaging in a detailed 
classification of all divine commands I believe it will be allowed that 
we are exclusively concerned with the latter class of utterances# the 
latter meaning of divine imperative in our present inquiry* That is to 
say# the type of commid issued by deity that exhorts or demands 
obedience to a principle# rather than satisfaction of a particular wish.
Having analysed Dtto*s position in this way we can conclude that 
God‘8 commands# as concepts# are ineffable. This aspect of Otto‘a ideas 
surely is untenable for several of the reasons (mutatis mutandis) out­
lined in the previous section. And as for that portion of Otto‘s 
position Wiich resembles Bchleiemacher ‘ s thought in affirming the 
private nature of a considerable portion of religious discourse# let me 
put forward the following objection - an objection contained in 
Wittgenstein*© Philosophical Invèstimtions. The point is simply that 
logically speaking there cannot be m private language referring to 
unique inner experience any more than there can be utterances so logi­
cally idiosyncratic that they are jo inso precluded from becoming 
meaningful outside of an esoteric realm of discourse. For language# 
insofar as it functions to identify^  transmit# name# etc*, experience# 
by its very nature is not a private thing no matter how private the 
experience to Wiich it refers. In fact# one learns how to use language
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by learning the eesentlally public rules governing the ue© of words#
Then we flM the application of these words in our private experience
rather than first inventing words to describe personal happenings#
Wittgenstein uses the examples of ‘pain* and ‘sensation* to point up
the fact that even these terms referring to intensely private esq^ erience
are words which are taught and learned publicly* "Mow# %diat about the
language which describes my inner experiences and idiioh only I myself
can understand? How do I us© wrds to stand for my sensations? As we
ordinarily do? Then are my words for sensations tied up with my
natural expressions of sensation? In that case my language is not a 
31private one#"
It follows, therefore, that if those professing that theological 
utterances gain their meaningfulness by referHng to the unique inner 
experience of a fortunate few, or can only be rendered meaningful by a 
special miracle of grace, are simply failing to recognise© that language, 
even religious language, is not a private code but is essentially public 
in nature# It does not require decoding as perhaps ‘Ball shoe eleihant 
stacp‘ or *6yre and gimble in the wabe‘| it is not so nonsensical that, 
our only recourse in rendering it meaningful is to claim that it refers 
to special inner experience# Religious language exhibits numerous major 
features in cmmon with ordinary linguistic expressions* MacIntyre once 
quoted Sir Edwyn Ho»kyn*s remark that since the language of the Bible is 
a familiar one, a special miracle of grace may be required to render 
Biblical assertions important, but it is not necessary to finding them 
meaningful#
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I believe we cm conclude that when theologians speaîc of religious 
utterances becoming •more deeply meaningful* or gaining moaning on a 
♦more fUndaiEotital level* they are actually speaking of the way in which 
an expression could be ♦acceptable* or * significant. ♦ And that when a 
position is advanced which pivots around the notion of esotericaHy 
meaningful language it can be rebutted on logical grounds*
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2R n
RELIGIOUS DISOOmSE AND POETIC LAmUAGB
ÂÎ Révélation and Inspiration
W© have already seen (Chapter VI, Part A) that those verbose 
u^ stloe # 0  in apparent self-oontradiotion ascribe ineffability to their 
visions actually mean that mystical reality cannot be exgpz^ essed except 
in poetic images or symbols* In order to supply an account of divine 
reality, appropriate images must be evoked by means of poetic mq^ res- 
sions* %e revelation received by these mystics is not incommunicable 
but it is not amenable to expression in ordinary terms either; poetic 
language must be employed which strains the limits of linguistic meaning 
almost to the point of rupture to convey a reality almost beyoM expres­
sion* Just as French and Spanish possess various refinements of tense 
which the English language does not contain and moods lAich it cannot 
convey, so the language of poetry is able to communicate certain fwms 
or aspects of existence wiiich cannot be crystallised in the pedantic, 
niggling language of proposition* If Hegel is correct in placing 
religion between art and philosophy in his system, we can understand 
even more dearly how vârnn rational eaqjression of divine truth Is 
discredited, poetic language may be elevated*
This is, in fact, another mode of characterising religious utter­
ances - in terms of poetic images, metaphor sy. bols, etc# And it is 
quite natural to do so as a pleasant alternative to a doctrine of 
ineffability. To some extent draWJOg parallels between religious
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language and poetic language has also been an emergency door for deoper- 
ate theologians who have witnessed the corpus of theology threatened by 
assaults on the epistemological basis of belief, the logical structure 
of apologetic argument, and the ultimata authority of Scripture. When 
pressed for a definitive and valid account of the logical nature of 
religious language, or %dien such an account cannot be cogently presented 
and theological language is taken to be meaningless, it Is an enormous 
temptation to explain one logically obscure, stratum of discourse in 
terms of another obscure stratum of discourse, particularly when the 
latter, poetic language, has a respectable standing#
Gon^rieons of religious discourse with strata of 3.anguage acknowl­
edged to be largely exmpt f%%>m rigorous logical scrutiny is particula*3y 
welcoae to the harrassed believer who has progressively witnessed Bibli- 
olatry ridiculed, the mechanical inspiration of Biblical writing rejected, 
and the infallibility of Scriptural authority abandoned under the attack 
of textual critics# To such individuals ; still bewildered even by the 
eulightement criticiaai of Haeckel and Voltaire, it must be a profoundÎ
relief to interpret the extraordinary language powers of Balaam*s ass 
and the arrested motion of Joshua‘s sun as poetic images. However, we 
must set our cynicim aside and admit that the analog was not stumbled 
upon as a desperate expedient any more than as an alternative to an 
ineffability doctrine# It arose primarily out of a perception of the 
obvious way in which poetry and religion are bed-fellows#
In a broad sense all of the sensuous elements of worship point up 
the close affinities %Aich exist between poetry and religion* Such 
items as organ music, incense, chants, candles, hymne, ceremonial robes.
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symbols, icons and the cathedral architecture itself unite In miaklng an 
almost Irresistablo aesthetic appeal to our senses* Furthermore (and 
more importantly for our purposes), one has only to cast a cursory 
glance at the language of Scripture to realise that the oomiands, 
historical accounts, paalas, prayero, prophecy, moral injunctions, etc* 
are presented in an aesthetically ornate, evocative style* The linguis­
tic texture of the Bible, its aesonanoo, metaphor, rhyme, grandiloquent 
tone and aublirae subject satisfy the essential requirements for poetry* 
The ICinè Jomes Bible in particular could bo favourably compared for 
artistic merit with the best of Milton and Dante# (A similar claim 
might well b@ made for the Bhagavadgita and the Koran as well#)
We might also add as a correlative that religious expression like 
poetic expression cannot bo understood on a strictly litoral level# 
Neither one is a set of propositions exclusively capable of rational 
comprehension or handlijig, but both employ language rich in associations 
beyond themselves* Therefore wa must judge both types of discourse in 
similar logical terns#
And before taking leave of this point m  might also mention that 
illuminating parallels can be witnessed in such linguistic aspects of 
both religion and poetry as miotive power, aesthetic appeal, internal 
inconsistencies^  (Wiich somehow do not damage the force of the message), 
solemn tone, a certain emotional enchantment (which Plato denounced as 
inducing mcritical acceptance), momentous subject matter, unconfima- 
bility, etc# All of these items persuade the theologian to affirm 
significant parallels, if not a logical identity between the structure 
of poetic language and the structure of religious language*
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Now by placing theological assertions in the category of purely 
poetic ex|V*essions, we certainly render tîie assertion ‘God wills X‘ 
exempt from moral judgment. Clearly to say that we must judge every­
thing that God wills to be good before obeying it, or in general to 
invoke the naturalistic fallacy, is totally inappropriate idien as an 
utterance without cognitive meaning expressions of God‘s will function 
to evoke rather than iîîform. We are here flogging a dead horse.
However, by the same token we cannot reach the moral conclusion that *X 
is good* tdien the proposition *God wills X* has a merely poetic meaning, 
unless we are prepared to say that this is an emotional res%)onse. We 
may question the impossibility of deriving evaluative conclusions from 
descriptive premises but we cannot claim that a moral conclusion can be 
derived from premises which have purely evocative meaning (unless, 
perhaps, we maintain an emotive theory of ethics).
Furthemore, it is fatal to give theological assertions the status 
of simple poetic expressions because this would make all of theology an 
intricate system of evocative utterances. This is not only a peculiarly 
difficult view to maintain, but it hardly serves as an adequate charac­
terisation of religion, to empty such central notions and revelation of
cognitive content. Theologians would leap to assert that theological
Ipropositions possess factual tru#; they would maintain that theological 
statements have an actual ref<u*enee and that theological propositions 
are pre-eminently informative. In the proposition under discussion, 
the theologian would not be content with the interpretation of *God 
wills X* as an emotive utterance designed, for example, to induce a 
feeling of security but would claim that a state of affairs is being
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asserted# And insistence upon cognitive meaning, upon denotation 
as well as connotation, throws us back into our difficulties in signif­
icantly differentiating (‘God vdlls X* from ‘DeGauHe wills X*. The 
examination of the accounts of the logical status of theologicalIdiscourse was begun it will be remembered in the hope of exposing a 
radical difference of such a nature as to render certain critioim 
Irrelevant or pointless^
This view idiat religion is mere poetry, l*e, onljr m  integrated
complex of emotive expressions is, in fact, almost exclusively mainWned
by mbeHevers idio are quite convinced that the claims of religion are
groundless# Such critics cannot deny that religious experience and
language do evoke basic emotions in human beings and has other alünitles
with poetry* However having allowed this much, they will not admit
that any truth-claiias can be ii-iferred. They quite validly hold that
‘demands of emotion* do not entail metaphysical conclusions any more
than * demands of reason* do, although both sorts of ‘demands* can lead
us to understand lAy, for example, monistic or thelstic notions are
held* However, rather than throwing out the baby with the bath water
(or vice versa), they desire to retain the poetic form of religious
2egression for Its aesthetic merits.
It has been argued, of course, that the poetic imagination itself 
or the evocative texture of poetry is fundamentally Intertwined i&th 
truth; that the philosophical distinction revered from Plato to 
Baumgarten between ‘Truth* and ‘Beauty* is a false dichotomy* Since 
poetry grasps and embodies truth, the question of the truth-value of 
creative, poetic eaqsressions does not arise* This point is usually
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pressed by affirming the identity of imagination or inspiration with 
revelation. An inspired poet, it is maintained, is one in receipt of 
divine revelation, his imaginative insight guaranteeing the truth of 
his nisua fomativus* Murry, for example, says that great poetry "Is 
the direct embodiment through symbols which are necessarily dark, of a 
pure comprehensiva and self-satisfying experience, which we may call, 
if we please, an limediate intuition Into the hidden imture of things."
3For Murry, as for M. D. Lewis, "art is itself a divine revelation,"
In these ciroumatances In idilch art is regarded as a mode of 
raligioua awareness it is perfectly legitimate to sanctify imaginative 
art as apprehended truth; poetry can safely bo treated as authoritative 
doctrine because the poet is in Farrer*© sense a prophet* If this view 
is taken then demythologiaing or the de-poeticising of Scripture is an 
isçjossible task, for to discard this aesthetic element of the Bible is 
to throw out inspirational truth as mil* This entire position is 
buttressed by common acknowledgements that the poet, through his 
heightened imagination and sensitivity, does perceive certain visions 
Wyond the reach of the apologist* We have returned to Underhill‘o 
point that the artist and poet are the "happy owners of unspoilt 
perceptions" who have attained communion with reality* In every 
religion It does seem that the Inslgits of a gifted spiritual leader 
furnish the stuff out of %^ ich dogma develops, H* D* Lewis says at one 
point that "the artist is, in the first instance, a peer, and his 
essential function, in his relation to others, is to make them see 
something to tdïich they are normally blind. This may be something in 
nature or in human life; it does not matter idilch. But m  must in some
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vray be made aware of objects and events In a fashion tdiieh Is llice
seeing them for the first time* The artist wests their secrete from
objects and makes them glow with a dlstinctivoness which escapes normal
consciousness of them. This Illumination of the world #lch almost
4amounts to a transformation is the essential feature of art*.."
This sharp affinity ‘^iilch is felt between religious and poetic 
ineight, or artistic inspiration and religlom revelation, has a 
dietlngulehed history* It originated in the Oreelc conception of a poet 
as, quite literally, a direct recipient of divine messages. Poets were 
regarded as divinely inspired oracles or seers in possession of 
infallible truths and as such occupied a high position in Greek society 
and culture. Itaer, for example, was not only valued as.a gifted poet 
but ^  iuso. an Inspired religious teacher - even the fount of all
Hmerous writers have maintained that It was because of this 
distasteful, unwarranted reverence for poets that Plato launched, his 
attack %on poetry and denied poets inclusion in his ideal state. His 
tirade against Homer in Book II, 379 G* ff#, and Book III, 306 A, ff* 
of the Republic* in which he criticises passages from the poets #ich 
have a corrupting Influence rather than being benelioial or true, is 
oftmi cited in evidenoe* Other commentators such as George Ainslie 
Right and Prof* Wllammdt» - Mollendorf using similar passages (e.g* 
Renpblio. Book X, 595A#, 603A - 6O0A| Gomlas. 50ÎB - 502B; Laws. Bode 
III, 6024, 700 - 701, etc.) conclude that Plato did not categorically 
denounce poetry but only that poetry which tended to incite undesirable 
emotions* This view has the outstanding merit of resolving the
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inconsistency between Plato‘s denunciation of poetry and the deliberate 
poetic style of the Dialogues, In any case Plato certainly opposed the 
conception of poetry in Athens which sanctified the Iliad and the 
Odyssey, aM ho would be unwilling to Identify Homer or any other poet 
as a philosopher - king or seer*
Howevm*, the decisive objection which I see to identifying great 
poetry with profound truth is si%>ly that the logically absurd situations 
would arise where mutually contradictory notions would have an equal 
truth-claim provided they were expressed by a gifted poet, "Die imagin­
ative fables of the Homeric %ons would stand on equal footing with the 
Gospel of St. Mark* It must be concluded that since this criterion for 
truth commits us to asserting the validity of incosspatlble notions, what 
is beautiful cannot be the measure of what is true. An act of rational 
discernment or Judgment is essential to differentiate between %Aat is 
aesthetically moving, and the sensuously expressed profundity - the 
appeals made to our senses alone from those Wiich offer truth insights* 
Santayana one© said in correcting the erroneous impression that 
Browning‘s poetry presented a coherent, rational meaning of life, that
"Awakening may be mistaken for enlightezment, and the galvaniaing of
5torpid eensationsi and impulses for wàsdcm*"
Another major objection is this: if the inspirational sources of 
great poetry and religious truth are identical, how is secular poetry 
to be accounted for? To say it is not ‘genuine* poetry will not be 
satisfactory if for no other reason than that Siakespeare, surely one 
of the greatest poets, was not a religious writer# It is equally 
insufficient to regard secular poetry as latently religious because
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critic s are in imanlmous agreement that in the works of numerous poets 
including Shakespeare, there is neither an explicit nor an implicit 
religious element* (Shakespeare, in fact, did not have a particular 
point of view in his sonnets or plays*) And #at is one to do with the 
Greek poets who were religiously oriented hut hardly in the Judao- 
Christian traditim* If ‘inspired* as a quasi-descriptlve, quasi- 
commendatory temi, is to be employed generically to include Christian 
and pagan poets such as Dante and Homer, then we cannot identify 
Christian revelation and poetic inspiration* And if it is applied to 
religious and secular poets such as Hilton and Shakespeare, then 
religious revelation and poetic inspiration cannot be equated.
However, I do not believe that Austin Farrer succeeds in separating 
inspiration and revelation by saying that the poet and prophet share the 
"technique of inspiration," that "both move an Incantation of images 
under a control," but "#e controls are not the same, and therefore the 
v^ jole nature and purpose of the two utterances go widely apart: the
I 6poet is a maker, the prophet is a mouthpiece*" Unless Farrer is 
willing to support a mechanical view of inspiration, he must allow for 
the moulding and shaping influence of the individual prophet‘s poetic 
genius, however much they «had their minds charged with the word of God,» 
Actually, I cannot believe that Farrer stg^ ports a statement such as this: 
"his (the prophet‘s) control tells him exactly what to say, for he is 
not responding to the quality of human life, he is responding to the
7dmands of eternal will on Israel**#," for this statement tends to 
contradict numerous previous ones* And the poet surely is not only a 
•maker* in the sense of an imaginative creator or manufacturer of images
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or notions, but in some sense the inspired bearer of profound truth as
I mvtM also reject Farrer‘s secon^ . distinction which he expresses 
as follows: pom expresses %diatever of the infinite aspects of
human existence it does express: #at it does not Express, it loaves 
unexpressed* One can never say ‘The poet ou^t to have been saying so 
and so, but he has Oïîly succeeded in saying this ' * There is nothing 
that he oia^ t to have been saying except Wiat he has said* All life is 
open to him* let him say what the Muse prompts him to say* Re may not Bsay much, or he m%r not say it well, but he cannot say the wrong thing*"
I should have thou^t that both the content of poetry and the 
content of proj^ eoy, that is the particular Ideas expressed, can both 
admit of rightness and wrongness by reference to determinate criterion, 
e#g*, an< evaluative, theological, or metaphysical system# Milton might 
wen be judged wrong ixi saying: «They also serve Wio only stand and
wait" just as the author of Exodus could be regarded as wrong in saying 
"Life for life, Bye for eye. Tooth for tooth, Rand for hand" etc* An 
evezi clearer case would be the erroneous statements of scientific facts 
#ich arc to be found in ancient poetry and ancient Scripture alike* 
Surely here we can judge the utterances of the poet as well as the 
prophet virong in a perfectly straightforward way# And it is equally 
appropriate to say that particular poets or prophets have not said much, 
or on aesthetic grounds, that they have expressed their thoughts quite 
badly*
In the following paragraph of hie book, Farrer goes a bit further 
and declares that what the prophet "has got to say Is determinate and
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particular. It is %vhat the Xiord God declares arid requires on the day on 
9which he speake»" If this is the acid test or touchstone for that 
whidi a writer is right in saying (and it must he observed that this is 
an astonishingly harsh interpretation of revelation), then the prompt­
ings of the Muse on a particular day would furnish equal proof against 
error# We cannot argue from the fact that a message was inspired either 
that it was intended to be ccmanurdcated on a particular day or that God 
raider than the Muse inspired it* I mi^t add that Farrer *s earlier
attempts to declare certain images "revealed images" since they are
10"authoritatively oommmicated," collapses by virtue of similar 
uns#ported suppositions*
We could carry the discussion concerning inspiration and revelation 
further, and summon strident philosophical voices declaring either the 
identity or dissimilarity between poetry and prophecy# However, having 
demonstrated the untenabillty of the argument Wiich attempts to legiti­
mate the poetic comeption of religious language by saying that in this 
way truth is automatically conveyed# I believe it is pointless to press 
the positive side of the controversy any further*
Before taking leave of this entire topic however# another essential 
point must be made*
This point has been somewhat repressed to give full-play to the 
notion of religious utterances as purely emotive# poetic expressions*
We have been speaking as if an Interpretation of religious language as 
logically akin to poetic language means a reduction to a purely emotive 
level of meaning# On tills reading I hope I have shown that the position 
is untenable* However# it is illegitimate to equate poetic ivith ‘motive*
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or »0vocatlvo* without remainder beoauao poetlo language alwajs contain» 
a oogrdtlire element* ï^ anguage, in fact, cannot evoke amotion without 
being some#at informative*  ^In this It ie unlike music which makes its 
affective appeal directly through the senses* It is a medium which, by 
its nature, must poseees and convey material for the understanding*
This is abundantly clear in the works of Byron, Shelley and Keats, but 
it can even be seen in poetj^  #ich hovers, on the fringe of painting
/ Iand music* As ’an emmple of this I would cite James Joyce whose liquid,
musical language in Ulvsses and Finneffan^ s Wake seems to envelope the
reader as a sympliony would* In tllvesea we read passages in which
language is terribly strained and distorted; «îfoodshadoxfs floated
silently by through the morning peac& frau the stairhead seaward tdier© ■
he gaaed* Inshore and farther out the mirror of imter wiiitened, spurned
Itby lightshod hurrying feet*" And in Finnegan * s Wake ..we discover
perhaps the farthest boundaries of language; "There*© where* First*
We pass throu# grass behush the bush to. IVhiskl A gull* Gulls. Far
' calls# Oomitig, far! End here# #  then* Finn, again! Talce*
Bussoftlliee, mememormee! TiH thousendsthee* bps* The key to. Given!
12A way a lone a last a loved a. long the."
It is quite .true that we are charmed by the musical cadence of
these line, the sonorous vocabulary and weaving rhythm of the prose, and 
that the language seems to tumble and sx-drl like music, however we would 
not receive even undifferentiated seneationa unless some cognitive 
impressions were conveyed* It is toüy fragmented and distorted like a 
dream yet the words themselves are not meaningless but on the contrary 
contain compressed meanings wliich expand to a wide range of references
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and connotations * A phrase like "wavewhltewedded words" may be difflotdt 
to mideratand, pexhaps even aonseneioal ae a composite whole, yet it 
creates an impression (a visual image) because of our understanding of 
the meaning of the individual terms* Wil^ out this we would have neither 
language nor words but a oWLlection of letters or phonetic sounds* 
Without Imgging question by building arbitrary and desirable charac­
teristics into #%o term < language s I believe we can conclude that 
language caimot be evocative mthout being informative*
If this position is a valid one, then religious discourse and even 
theological statements can be regarded as logically parallel to poetic 
language without fear of automatically extracting all cognitive content 
(and all truth claims). And for reasons mentioned earlier, the parallel 
can be considerably illuminating to religious discourse. However, with* 
out tracing every üiread of logical similarity vfeioh is of support or 
succour to the theologian, we can see that the principal problem Wiich 
this approach faces is that of differentiating the oognitive elements 
from the emotive elements* It transforms our basic problem into a 
consideration of whether 0od*e cmmands, as poetic exgcressions, possess 
sufficient Informativeness to be liable to oognitive oritioism*
I would answer this in the same way that a similar problem was 
handled in the section on Rudolf Otto (Chapter VI, Part B), concerning 
whether divine cmmands constituted concepts* Ood*s cocmands can be 
either principally emotive or principally informative depending upon the 
particular expression of the command* However, It is beyond all gen## 
inely valid objections or cavil to say that the preponderate group would 
contain commands which were either principally infomative or suffi­
ciently informative to qualify for cognitive scrutiny.
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One© m  have granted this, the concept |0f poetry i» no longer an 
impregnable citadel within Wiich religious language can gain asylum*
For on those terns religious language is not placed in a sufficiently 
unique position to render it immune from the type of cognitive criticism 
Wiich moral philosophers, for example, bring to bear* On this reading 
it is a t m  perfectly relevant to ask if that \diich God commands is in 
fact good.
In general, however, the logical cmparison between poetic discourse 
and religious discourse seme both illuminating and valid*
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Bî Mythe and
A position closely connected with the one described above does not 
award centrality^  to poetry in general but to the conception of wth#
The word *myth^  is understood in common speech as an imaginative story 
or fable, that is, as a fictitious but entertaining product of uncriti­
cal, primitive peoples# Even more sophisticated judgments have often 
held that myths make fascinating study for the anthropologist or 
sociologist concerned with primitive religion, but scarcely deserve 
inclusion among the verifiable propositions of science# However, in the 
1 9th Century, interest was revived among both secular scholars and 
theologians in the notion that xayths are an original and necessary means 
of meta#iysical esq^ ression, that mythological themes e#ress elements of 
religious awareness inexpressible in any other form* (On Ibis reading 
it is as exclusive as similar conceptions of religious expression in 
pdetic terms#) Berdyaev describes ayth as "the concrete recital of 
events and original ^ enomem of the spiritual life symbolised in the
natural world, which has engraved itself on the language, memory and
13creative energy of the people." This is the view Wiich has gained
considerable popularity recently.
Not only are "rational myths" such as Artemis of the Qdyssev or the
Homeric cmoeption of Zeus regarded as revealing images, but even the
irrational myths which Huiler calls "the silly, savage and senseless
element?* such as the metamorphoses of men or gods into animals, trees 
14or stars. Instead of attempting to separate unattractive or absurd
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from Christian narratives, by eaylng that the forner are heavily
diegulBcd and distorted historical aeooimts of men as Enemerue and 
15later Banier did, or to say that mythe were invented by legislator©
lé"to persuade the many and to be used in si%)port of law" as Aristotle 
did, the modern movement insists that all myth ie valuable insof^ as 
it is the essential form in whidi mn reconciles his relationship with 
nature and the universe. It is "an organic function of the culture 
>dthin which it occurs," "an original and spontaneous form of human 
understanding, valuable precisely as such*,.#.. It secures a practical 
harmny between m n  himself and an environment otherwise impenetrably 
mysterious and menacing."
IBSchelling produced a sminel work in the 19th Century which gave 
great force to what may be called the myth movment in theology. In 
his book Schelling fully explored the conception of myth on the assump­
tion that it was a necessary vehicle for expressing our most fundamental 
relationship with the universe. He m^ntained that through myths, 
nature, man and society were harmonised into an organic unity; that the 
animistic urges of human consciousness and basic primitive experiences 
miivereaBy common to man in his dealings with nature are here given 
adequate expression. Bdielling^ a 19th Century Romanticism (culminating 
in a transcendental idealism in which nature and spirit were joinod in 
a series of *devslopmmt$ * ), regarded nyth as "a necessary moment in the 
process of the self-unfolding or self-development of the Absolute," All
religioue myths, men the crudest po3yth#im of nature religions were
19necessary stages to an apprehension of ethical monotheim, Berdyaev 
also struck this note eng>hasisslng how the myths of the Fall and
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Prometheus symbolize central moral or spiritual events in man or In
20man*s relatlonehip with nature. These "basic life phenomena" are 
symbolized in a dynamic way, idilch is, perhaps, the only way of 
grasping them#
For every sympathetic writer on this subject myth is at the very 
least, valued for its psychological benefits. By irrationally stressing 
the harmony or identity between appearance and reality, rather than any 
essential dualism, it induces a feeling of knowledge and control over 
the universe# Everything is as it seems to be. In addition, the in­
dividual ceases to rely %on individu^ reason as the final determinant 
of truth in favour of the group beliefs* If one person perceives 
disharmony in the universe, for example, the force of the common mytho­
logical beliefs in its sympathy and unity aids in overcoming fears of 
threatening forces. Fÿth also provides reassurance by lifting super­
natural events out of an eternal flux and positioning them in time and 
space* The reports of these specific occurrences within physical and 
temporal dimensions brings the supernatural into comfortable perspective,
bike an icon or holy image, myth renders the eternal somewhat finite and 
21tangible.
Of course, in an attempt to sufficiently broaden the concept of 
myth, to lift it out of its resting place beside fable, fairy tale and 
old wive *8 tale, and grant it a respectable status by virtue of its 
expression of basic human longings for integration with the universe, 
theologians are tending to inflate i^ e notion out of all sensible 
proportions. The pendulum appears to have swung too far* Reardon, for 
example, argues that since myth*s inherent purpose is the articulation
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of "man#8 sonae of hl8 own oxlatenoo," religion "ae a projection of the
mythioaX oonsoloueneae, '* and philosophy as a "myth passed through the
aolvmt of reason," "oan claim to be neoeaeary for the authentifia22cation of man's being." In order to stretch myth to cover philosophy 
Reardon equates it with metaphysical aeeimptiona such aa those made by 
the logical poeitivlets concerning the "rational acceptability" of
"physicaliBffl" and the "unity of science," as well as various construe-
2 3tions of Kant and Hegel, To add further weight to his point, 
philosophy and myth are contrasted idth science whose method la "abstract 
and generalizi)3g, its standpoint morally neutral;" "science, which tends
2 4always to eliminate the particular and temporary as irreXovant*"
In the first place, inyth is not just any metaphyslea3, assumption 
but one of a particular kind# That la to say, although all mytiis may be 
metaphysical assuiqptionB, not all metapîiysical assumptions are myths*
The mtaphysics of :%rbhology are usually argumentim |ioaainem#
Iparticularly geared to psychological needs, and in that sense rational­
izations par excellence# whereas those of philosophy (even the absurdities 
of some systsm-builderp ) are pre-eminently ratioml attempts to analyze, 
interpret and/or explain certain aspects of experience. Even if this is 
denied (and I fail to see how it can be) it must be admitted that 
philosophy is not only or mainly an enterprise devoted to constructing 
metaphysical theories* The writer of this article is sufficiently aware 
of contemporary philosophy to appreciate this* And to label rational 
assumptions concerning the regularity of nature, the revealing character 
of language or the value of logical analysis as myths, on all fours with 
such myth tliemes as those concerning childbirth, death, destiny, puberty
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and the hereafter is to violate the entire concept* It is only when
myth and philosophy are defined in a strained and peculiar way that a^ y
similarity is possible between the two* In addition although myth and
religion can be regarded as concentrating upon 'the particular!, finding
the time and place of "this man" and "that woman" significant as Reardon
suggests, philosophy (outside of Existentialism) certainly bears a
closer resemblance to science in its method of generalization and
abstraction. If the scientific method is taken as diametrically
opposed to the myth*»oreating method (as it seems to be), then on this
distinction alone our case is won.
A principal variation of the above theological approach is that of
the ' image-theologian* # o  attempts a Biblical exegesis in terms of
certain key images. L* S. %omton and Austin farrer in particular have
26devoted several books to examining the nature of the major symbols and
27images present in the Bible, as Creuser did before them# numerous
typologists and image-theologians like Farrer have been thrown up who
regard Scripture as an intricate pattern of symbols and images, aston-
ishin#y interconnected and cohesive. The obvious, incidental metaphors
such as "my rock and my fortress" are not referred to, but the overall
configurative images such as the 'Suffering Servant*, «Son of î#n« and
28the «Throne of David*. These larger, more persistent Images are 
traced through the books of the Bible and are taken to be interpretative, 
archetypal images, revealing the relationship between humanity and deity. 
These images, which man has repeatedly returned to (or God has quite 
consistently revealed) are taken a© symbols of an underlying, fundamental 
truth# It is assumed that "Revelation recapitulates the same thematic
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material** in the religious history; that the unity or image-pattems 
which the typologist discovers is highly significant, especially in 
view of the vast historical and cultural differences which exist, for 
example, between the witings of Genesis and Revelation#
aeveral general criticisms of this position could be offered;
One danger in accepting this approach is that recurrent symbols 
and myths might persuade us of the reality or truth of unreal entities 
or false ideas# We cannot exclude this possibility by definition; the 
historical persistence of a religious myth or symbol is not an automatic 
guarantee of its fundamental metai^ yaioal roots but only of its satis­
faction of timeless human cravings* The coherence and integrating 
power of Scriptural images or the basic a^ ths of imnkind m y  tell us 
something about human beings; howéver, it is an unwarranted assumption
that ontological or metaphysical truth is being transmitted* Put<
differently, the psychologically beneficial myth, the organically 
developed or complex-patterned, tightly-integrated myth tamen usoue 
pecurret is not to be identified ^ ith the true, for #ese facts siap3y 
have not my apologetic implications#
I fail to see any validity in claims of this nature# To my mind, 
the following kind of statement is typical of the muddled thinking lAlch 
is mployed in justification of this approach* "#w the onus of proof 
lies on him who denies omnection between the 'structure' of our minds 
and the structure of reality - between our intellectual instincts and 
the data which our Intellects study, for thought and reality are not 
separate entities separated by a gdlf; subject and object are abstrac­
tions frpm a concrete #ole* We have, therefore, every right to regard
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our intèlleotuai «demand' for imity as far more than a demand - as
29being an insight*" This illogical reasoning is often oii^ loyed, 
lautati© mutandis* in establishing the oonnootion between the; unity or 
coherence of myths or images and reality# THHoh clearly recognised 
the absurdity of a "flotilla of symbols.**adrift| unplloted" without 
one direct proposition to validate the oblique language. (For Tillich 
the one proposition bein^  "God Is Being - itself*") This would sureiy 
provide an improved metaphysics for the image-th eologian*
Another objection is this: What is there in the nature of the 
persistence of an Image or myth which ought to induce our belief in it» 
relationship with divine reality? Whÿ should we accept and respect 
just those images tihich continually reappear? As H. D. lewis points 
out in criticizing Jung's view that we have an innate tendency to form 
certain ïclnds of images in certain situations, "dominant images, whether 
they arise from the course our experience takes or from some native 
propensity to forra them, do not, by the mere fact of Wing dominant or 
being made inevitable for us in some fundamental way, acquire a religiou» 
character# * •there Is nothing in the fact of being innate or very perva­
sive to establish a proper linkage of any of our images with* * .religious
e." 30 'insights."
It seems to mo quite plausible that a unique image could be the 
vehicle for divine revelation rather than recurrent ones* In fact, m  
argument grounded in the uniqueness of the message of Jesus (if not the 
image) has often been cR^ loyed to prove its divine origins* I camot 
see m  overwhelming argument in favour of uniqueness or recurrence, 
(however the "uniqueness approach" appears more persuasive). For the
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astonishing persistence of certain mythe or images is more likely to
have its origin in the strictly human situation, the oomnon position of
man in relation to the universe* And divine revelation is more likely
to itüpiïigë upon the hmmm omsciousness, producing a unique departure
from well-trodden thought grounded in human needs and desires. We have
more probably undergone external influence if the thoughts lAieh we
entertain are unrelated to internal demands than if they are intimately
connected with thm. It seems to me that revelation is a miraculous
intrusion into the regular order, whether of images or natural law, and
not an intensification of it* Gassirei* repeatedly emphaeizes that the
i%)act and apparent invasion of our minds by m  image is a better
31guarantee that it has a supernatural source*
A similar trap into which the image-theologian and myth^ himter fall 
is the assumption that the power of the myth or e^ rmbol in evoking and 
convincing guarantees the reality of its reference, just as the histori­
cal recurrenoe of a religious sjmibol does# Hov/ever, the valid sceptical 
option to both conclusion© is that the human constitution finds certain 
images congenial and certain emotional appeals convincing. Faeoiem 
ceitainly employs a wealth of evocative symbols to v&idh the Nletzschlan 
or libidinal desires in mm eagerly respond; the effective mployment 
of symbols is one of the primary propaganda devices * But we wuld not 
wish to claim that people are being made aware of a political paradise. 
Therefore, as we remarked earlier concerning poetic truth, the argument 
from the persuasive power or beauty of poetic images to the truth or 
goodness of a raetaphysiaal system is quit© untenable* Once theology 
abandons rational arguments and a degree of e%irlcal verification to
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win its case, it cannot successfully substitute the recossmendatlon of 
religious ideas througli poetiy. We might also recall our earlier remark 
that if we ascribe truth-valu© to everything of evocative, persuasive 
poetic value, we soon find ourselves with a mutually incompatible or 
inconsistent duster of ideas, each possessing equally»' valid aesthetic 
backing. On this reading Nirvana would have as great a claim upon our 
credibility as Heaven; Heraclitus's doctrine of mutability would have 
equal grounds of proof with the static-universe doctrine of Pamenides.
For the reasons listed above, I believe we can safely conclude 
that the attempt to conceive of religious language as myth or image 
collapses. Religious language vhloh is logically precluded from having 
metaphysical or ontological implications is hardly a theologically 
acceptable idea#
For our particular purposes it affords little help* For if we 
attempt to place God's commands in the category of myth then we are 
committed to the assumption that its significance lies in the wsy in 
which it harmonizes man's relationship with the universe* The way of 
escape from the dilmma of theological naturalisai which we have been 
examining stresses the uniqueness of God's ccismands; this position 
appears to show its kinship \dth numerous other myths Wiich attempt to 
reconcile man with his environment. In addition we have suggested that 
the persistence or recurrence of a myth seems to point to its human 
origin rather than its divine origin* If this Is true then the unique­
ness achieved by commands emanating from God would also be destroyed*
As far as the concept of image is concerned, we could conceive of 
divine ccmanands under a master image of 'Kingship* or something of that
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sort, however all of the above rmarks would be equally appropriate* 
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OHAPm VII
m  «LOGICAL FARALIELS» APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE
At ^gically Anomalistic lammste and AnaXoisty
The entire line of approach which attempts to discern significant 
logical parallels between religious discourse and other types of 
discourse, in order to illuminate the meaning of religious language, 
could be pursued at much greater length. The literature on this subject 
is quite voluminous and seems to be steadily increasing as more theolo­
gians are converted to this linguistic enterprise.
One splinter school within this general movement examines religious 
language as the language of paradox, logical anomaly and self-contradic­
tion, Wiich nevertheless remains meaningful. In t^is school we mi#t 
place individuals such as J* K. Crcmbie ("%e Possibility of Theological 
Statements" in Faith and Logic, ed. by Basil Mitchell), J* H. Thomas
(Subjectivity and Paradox). Ronald W* Hepburn (Christianity and 
1......Paradox). A. MacIntyre ("Ihe Logical Status of Religious Beliefs" in 
IMetaohyslcal Beliefs), and sHren Kierkegaard (Fear and Trembling).
This is by no means an exhaustive list but only a representative saB%)ling 
of individuals united by a somewhat similar conception of religious 
language.
Another splinter group seems greatly concerned with the doctrine 
of analogy in regard to theological discourse* The folloi&ng writers 
offer a particular analogical kind of analysis of the nature of analog­
ical thought and discourses E. L. Mascall (Existence and Analogy).
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iH* lytthene (The AnaXoiay Between Ood and thë ttoXd). Dem Pontifex (%e 
Keening of Exletenee). Austin Farrer (Finite and Infinite). and G, P. 
Klubertanz (St. Thomas Aatidnas on Analogy). A slightly different 
interpretation of analogy is offered by D, H# Bmet (ihe Nature of 
HetaThysioâl yhlnkto^ ). and J. Maritain and B* Gilson present a third 
interpretation* (This list eould also be greatly extended*)
However, I do not believe that we need examine these approaches or 
others of this nature. Our scrutiny of the concepts of ineffability, 
poetic language# myth and image are adequate for our purposes* For we 
can now arrive at the following conclusions;
(1 ) Religious discourse either cannot be successfully conceived 
as logically parallel to or as a species of certain other types of 
discourse, e.g., attempted eaqireasions of the ineffable; or (2) religious 
discourse in general can be illminated by comparisons with other types 
of discourse (e.g., poetic expressions), but the comparisons prove 
unhelpful in resolving our particular dilemma. (Myth and image concepts 
exhibit features of both categories and could be said to exeaplify a 
third type*) It seems to me that comparing religious discourse with any 
of the other types of discourse listed previously, would involve us in 
one or the other (or both) of these difficulties. Therefore, the 
'logical parallels' approach does not seem to improve our position on© 
jot*
I might add to tidy up point (2) that the justification for this 
category is listed at the end of Oh«^ ter VI, Fart A* Let me repeat it 
briefly; #en in comparing religious discourse to another mode of 
discourse we find that it possesses sufficient cognitive content to
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satisfy theological standards, (to render God's comands informative), 
thon it does not possess the uniqueness necessary to rendering moral 
judgments of God's commands inappropriate#
However before proceeding with the solution Wiich the writer 
endorses, let me offer a general criticism of this entire theologioal 
approach.
Î3S
I do not think that anyone muld doubt that if the God of the 
Hebraic-Christlan tradition exists, Re Is an extraordinary being 
indeed, and that nimeroue varieties of poetic language and logically 
'odd' language would be necessary indicate His nature, e.g., logical 
anomalies g Kierkogaardlan paradoxea, enigmas and antinomies, « category^  
transgressions*, 'qualified models*, etc* Theological utterances may net 
be meaningless because they employ what are considered 'idiosyncratic' 
expressions (as Positivists too reakily assert), howeVer they 
well be entity; they have a meaning just as «The first zebra on Mars' 
has a (unique) meai^ ng, however# there may not be a reference td,th 
ontological status.
It is not only a sis^ le task to coin extensions of meaning for 
familiar terms but it is even simpler to invent descriptive phrases or 
uniquely referring expressions (as above) vihlch do not answer to 
anything# For as Professor Ryle points out in his example about Mllaiy# 
**Meaniiigs and phrases are not New Zealand citizens; what is expressed 
by a particular English phrase# as well as by any paraphrase or 
translation of it# is not something with lungs# a surname# long legs 
and a sunburnt face. People are born and die and sometimes wear boots; 
meanings are not born and do not die and they never wear boots - or go 
barefoot either* The Queen does not decorate meanings# The phrase 
'the first man to stand on the tcp of Hoimt Everest' will not lose its
U 9
meaning vhen Hillary dies* Nor vm it meaningless before he reached 
3the summit*"
In the same way we ean stipulate fresh meanings to be appended to 
archaic religious expressions (fresh meanings gleaned from our logical 
parallels approach) and so long as we do not flagrantly violate logic 
or unduly strain conventional usage# do much to iaprove their meaning* 
However# we must not delude ourselves into thinking that we have shown 
that the object to idiich these new expressions refer is a real esdstent* 
Phrases like 'that tpjn which mn feels absolutely ds^ eadent' or the 
*Wiol3y other' would remain in possession of meaning even if there were 
not a being on we %mre absolutely dependent or who was vdiolly 
other# (We have come so far from EuaseH's 'Theory of Types' that we 
can even attempt to speak of meaningful nottsenseî)
This is# of course# a fuWmental motai^sical question# not one 
confined to the logical character of linguistic expressions or 
•universes of discourse** The above mentioned writers therefore cannot 
be condemned for failing to answer a question to which they did not 
address themselves; however# they could bo judged culpable in not 
dealing with this first order issue prior to the second order inquiry. 
"To demonstrate the existence of a logically odd language plays strai^t 
into the empiricist's hands; he only has to reply that it is not 
necessary to prove laboriously tJiat languages exist which are logically 
'oddji for he knows this by observation already; #ile further# it has 
not yet been shown that this language Is about anything# and he simply 
does not believe that it is about anything. Unless we prove the 
existence of God at the start# in such a way as to demonstrate the
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necessity for a logically 'odd' language, there is no answer to the
' 4modem philosopher#"
I do not wish to belabour this elementary point, however; since 
it is frequently overlooked I muld like to illustrate its force by a 
scmewhat proli% example# It will not make any difference to the point 
of the example if I temporarily blur the distinction between theology 
and cosmology.
Let us suppose that the Greeks took a page from their mythology 
and became convinced that the entire universe was actually resting on 
the shoulders of Atlas, (This hypothetical situation is not as extrav­
agant as it appears when remember that Braithwaite contends that 
religious assertions are given imaginative backing by their association 
with 'stories * logically equivalent to novels and other purely ficti­
tious narrative^, and MacIntyre alleges that religious assertions are 
'myths' althou# Berths which contain not only 'mythical' elements but 
factual assertions as well#) As a consequence of this 'bilk' certain 
expressions which referred to aid illuminated this metaphysical 'reality' 
would assume primary importance* One such stratum of discourse would 
be 'relational' terms and phrases such as 'under*, 'above', 'below*, 'on 
top of, 'beneath*, 'lower than', 'underneath', and what may be labelled 
'siqpport' terms such as 'understructure', 'substratum*, 'foundation*, 
•resting-place'# Another area of language which would be elevated would 
be terms referring to the physical size and power of Atlas - terms such 
as 'gigantic', 'mighty', 'unyielding*, 'colossal', 'inexhaustible', 
•massive* • Of course if the Greeks in this fictitious society were 
linguistically astute or eE^ irically erudite, these terms would then
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undergo re-dèflnltlon in order to shed their finite, literal# terres­
trial moaning© and assume grossly extended, stretched meanings more 
cogent and appropriate In relation to their metaphysical reference,
11ms self-contradictions such as 'the above# below Wiich there isn't 
anytîiing* might be considered admissible as more closely approaching
Atlas's sophisticated status, or Klerkegaardian paradoxes such as 'the
5eternally yet temporally positioned entity*; even logical 'nonsense' 
like 'the unsupported support' or 'the exhausted Inexhaustible' (tdien 
it is not equivalent to 'the perpetually fatigued' ) :d#t be judged as 
possessing the proper internal logic necessary to convey this transcen-i:* scheme*
With apologies to Ian Ramsey (whose account of the nature of 
religious language is praiseworthy on numerous counts), a metaphysician 
Bd#it wll appear to elucidate #%e methodological system by means of 
viilch à 'dlQcernment-ocsamltment ' situation might be evoked, e*g*, using 
'exhaustible' as a Model and 'in' as a Qualifier. An analogy between 
poetry, images, myths and symbols on the one hand, and religious lan­
guage on the other ailght be presented to Illuminate the logical meaning 
of language referring to the Atlas-stq)ported world, such that apparently 
absurd sentences were declared 'enigmatic by excess of meaning' or 
nonsensical in the same way as poetic expressions ore nonsensical*^
An esxBsperated segment of the believing ccmsnunlty might even be 
moved to reject all attea^ ts to characterize, confirm or examine the 
nature of the Atlas-siqpported universe# Some might adopt an approach 
similar to Rudolf Otto and claim that religious feelings engendered by 
the 'numinous* metaphysical understructure, are essentially nonrational
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7and cannot be theoXogica3JQr ooncoptualized# Otliers of this mental
bent would probably claim w3.th Mittgeneteln, that the religioue belief#
arising from an inexpressible, mystically perceived systea, cannot be
Ôformulated into theologioal questions much less given ansvmrs# And a
third group roi^ t utter with Barth the eplstemologicaX assertion that
the essence of the theological or cosmological structure is 'ungraspable*,
it cannot be rationally demonstrated by natural theology but can only be
gbestowed by an act of transcendent and divimc grace.
However lurking off-stage is the disquieting, recurrent doubt as to
whether the universe is so structured that Atlas ia bearing the world
upon his shoulders* This question remains the central, persistent one
ratWr than ancillary concerns such as %diethor it is consistent or
coherent for a system so constructed to posses# logically tortured
language or to lack rational formulation altogether. "A religion could
be quite consistent or coherent and yet entirely false. Any number of
systems of belief could bo constructed, given some imaginative ability,
%^ ioh would all pass the coherence test but wivloh could not all be 
10true#"
In an effort to avoid the appearance of censoriousness in regard 
to religious language, let me say that just as the meaningfulness of a 
stratwa of discourse does not ir^ ly the objective reality of its 
reference, so the meaninglessness of a 'universe of discourse* does not 
imply lhat the reality to which it points is an imaginative construct* 
Mascall once remarked that most of the tragedy of modem.philosophy 
lie# in the belief that having refuted the indefensible view# about 
certain fundamental notions, it assumes the destruction of the notions
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themselves* Thé most tliat critlolsma of this sort can do is to demon­
strate that a particular account of, say, the logical nature of reHglctis 
language Is untenable. This point is similar to a more traditional one 
that the inability to demonstrate God's existence doesn't demonstrate 
his non-existence#
11I would Ally inyself with Fr# Goploston in the position that the 
demonstration of the existence of a divine being (not necessarily by 
means of purely rationalistic system of syllogistic proofs) and Hie 
nature by reference to \d\ich a particular logical type of language is 
justified, holds logical and methodological priority to m  exposition 
of an 'odd' religious language# For it is hardly possible to be 
syïiçjathctlc towards or even to justly analyse the logical status of 
longUBge referring to God t^ dthout first being assured of His existence.
It must be remembered that those ivritere deal with the logical 
status of religious belief, in order to elucidate the my in which 
religious utterances mn be verified, are at best concerned with the 
meaningfulnesB of language (as conveyed by words, phrases or sentences) 
rather than the ontological status of its referent. Langmge can be 
understandable without referring to a real existent, however the ques­
tion of whether there is real referent should be asked of theological 
discourse. At worst these writers do not even attempt to supply the 
meaning of the key terms under discussion, but only describe the 
conditions undier tiiich these terms can be significant. To offer mmmts 
conoeming the use of language or the logical status or variegation of 
verbal, expressions, is a more sopliisticated, peripheral and needless to 
say different activity than giving the meaning of a term. To say that
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the phraee *on the right hand of God* is being used metaphorically does 
not give us its meaning* In addition, an analysis of the use of a term 
or phrase fails to ocaae to grips ivith the more fundamental question of 
whether it possesses a respectable logical status (e.g*, i^nformative* 
instead of or as well as *emotive*), just as suppl^ Lng the meaning of 
the term *God* hardly assures us of the objectivity of its referent# 
Quite obviously we cannot maintain that every word, noun, or even every 
grammatical subject of a sentence names or corresponds to an appropriate 
denotatum, for then we would have an overcrowded Platonic universe 
populated with trimagles, unicorns, varieties of conjunctions and 
articles, and all olaeses of real and imagined entities, as Russell and 
Wittgenstein have demonstrated# %le*e criticim of Husserl and Meinong 
is precisely that they confused the meaning of an eaqsression with its 
denotated entity - that they spoke as if the denisens of their Third 
Realm were Baaninge# However, there is little point in showing that 
theological assertions possess an odd nature or to lay bare the rules 
governing the use of theological expressions vdLthout being convinced 
that the deity characterised objectively exists. In a manner which 
would make Wittgenstein nod in approval, we can expose the role which a 
theological expression is esployed to perfom or provide a list of 
rules for translating religious assertions into a recognisable form, 
but we must also demonstrate that its subject matter corresponds to a 
real entity, that there is a Being corresponding to the idea of God#
To use Hyle*s distinction slightly ancxaalously to the way in which Ryle 
intended it, * knowing how* the rules controlling religious discourse 
function, or classifying the logically important forms which religious
14^
utterances can display# does not supply us tdth ♦knowledge that* deity 
exists * It seems to me a distinctive virtue of Ramsey *s book. Religious 
Language that it presents a system whereby one may move from k^nowing 
how* to «knowing that * $ the knowledge of a particular system or tech­
nique leads to an elicitation of a spiritual experience# the assurance 
of the divine character and reality. However# in the case of theologi­
cal assertions I would say that both he and Ryle are mistaken in 
supposing that «knowing how* is logically prior to «knowing that*. This 
is natural theology with a vengeance#
fhi& is a rather reactionary position prescribing that a question 
of the sort *^ %at is 1?* should be ansv/ered prior to a question such as 
«What is the logical status of terms referring to X?*# that ontological 
issues have priority over linguistic considerations. And the modern 
objection to this position is that the problem of meaning must be 
settled# prior to an inquiry ^ jito metaphysical issues# for only then 
can w© know what sort of entity it is that we are seeking. Before one 
can ascertain whether the adjectives «infinite*# «mnipotent*# or
t«eternal* fit anything or not# or before one can begin an investigation 
of the rational evidence for the existence of an entity possessing these 
attributes# one must know the correct meaning of these descriptive terns, 
It seems to m  that this position is only tenable if meaning is 
interpreted as something like «sufficiently clear meaning to define the 
dofiniens* and not necessarily *the precise meaning involved*. (It 
often seems that the objective intension of religious terms is being 
sou^t when knowledge of the principal characteristics involved in their 
conventional intension will suffice#) For example# if a question were
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posed such as «are there vmsabooa on the African contlnentt*, it would 
be absurd to criticise the priority of an inquiry into the meaning of 
the tern *%|pmabbb«'. However# it is equally preposterous to claim that 
the logical variegation of language referring to *\fusaboos« or the 
native*© ordinary usage of the term must be exhaustively analysed before 
a safari can begin to search for one# We are ae reprehensible in over­
preparing for our journey to the extent that we never actually embark 
upon it as we are for throwing ourselves into the jungle without m  
adequate idea of the quarry we are pursuing#
Moreover in theological discourse we are not dealing with comktely 
urteom terns like «vmsaboo* but with ordinary words which only require 
seme clarificatory analysis to render them meaningful# I fall to see 
tdiy a large bulk of disputation must occur over the logical status, 
meaning or application of religious terms in peripheral contexts when, 
by and large, What is needed for ontological or theological iiwestiga* 
tion is agrément over the mooning of these expressions in nuclear 
contexts. And this agreement is either present at the start or requiresIa fraction of the linguistic toil currently e%loyed to expose their 
logical strata or meaning# Obviously theological assertions need to 
satisfy more than the minimal roquirmont for a significant descriptive 
statement, i#e*, they need to show that they have cognitive meaning and 
are not pseudostatements compatible with every other conceivable 
descriptive statement | however, a detailed type-elassification hardly 
helps toward solving key theological issues#
It must bo admitted of course that understanding the concept- 
governing riïles of a conceptual systm is an important endeavor in
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Ideological discourse as oleeidiore. And what has been called «usage- 
reporting* is probably as worthWillo an enterprise as for example# an 
analysis of how symbols represent reality. %  oritiolsm is that we are 
given more lingnlstlo and analytic information thmi we need to know In 
order to attack theological Issues. Furthermore it is sometimes 
(erroneously) thought that linguistic scrutiny is not a vital imchanism 
of philosophy but Its telos smd that ontological questions are unreal.
How I certainly would not want to go as far as Gellner and say 
that ♦ mhibitioiMmalysis* I.e.# the exhibition of the logical rules 
governing concepts is trivial or irrelevant to any philosoplilcal 
question. Howver I am closer to Gellmr«e position than Wittgenstein* s 
when the latter regards getting a clear view of the rules of language 
(tlbersehen wollen) as the only legitimate enterprise of philosophy*
1 3And I am surely a considerable distance from A. J* Ayer and Rudolf 
14Oamap in their «Verbalism* (to use a phrase of Duncan-Jones) vhich 
maintains that aH philosophical problems disappear wîien the words or
1 5expressions e%%q»loyed in their formulation are rigorously clarified. 
Historical precedents for the view here supported can be glimpsed in St. 
%omas* It was necessary to St. Thomas*© theory of analogical predic­
tion to investigate the nature of the language used about God, to ask 
what «powerful* and «just* meant when attributed to deity, however, he 
examined the conventional usage of these words, not all similar words, 
and his aim was the solution of a metaphysical issue, not oxhauetive 
logical classification. And Aristotle surely examined the meaning and 
implications of ordinary moral judgmente, but he did so la order to 
create a synHietio moral system.
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CHAPTER VIII 
«QOD IS GOOD*) AH ANALYTICAL PROPOSITION
As The Essential Cbodnes© of God •
Another approach to this dilemma has logical features iti common with 
the «ontological proof* for the existence of God. When confronted with 
the dilemma, «Does God love an act because it is good or is an act good 
because God loves itT*, the religious person might respond by saying that 
this is a bogus question. It is not bogus because we are illegitimately 
demoting God to a human level, creating God in our own image as it were* 
or failing to recognise the unique logical status of deity# but because 
we are artificially constructing two mutually exclusive alternatives* 
where only one question mdsts* And this one question is perhaps worthy 
of the interrogatory character but not the puttling quality which the 
word carries with it* because it is immediately answerable#
The argument supporting this solution is simply this; that any act 
which God commands is, ipso facto, good# An act is neither made good by 
God*» commanding or loving it, nor loved or commanded by God on the basis 
of its objective valuej for «good action* and «action willed by God* are 
inseparably intertwined* The Interposition of a premise containing a 
moral assessment of God’s character or conduct is inappropriate and 
superfluous* The concept of goodness is an integral and intrinsic con­
stituent of the concept of God so that if we believe that God wills 
certain actions, it follows that these actions are necessarily good#
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It does not follow from the validity of the claim that «whatever God 
wills ia good* that «whatever ia good is willed by God** the latter 
proposition would only be true if the entire class of «good actions* whre 
co-extensive with the class of «actions willed by God«, That is to say, 
it would only hold true if there were not any good actions which were not 
also actions willed by God, (This would not imply that deity and the 
moral order were identical for God’s nature extends bey<md the sphere of 
morality, e,g* in His creating force and sustaining ppwer in the universe,)
The truth of the proposition «whatever is good is willed by God*
' ' ‘ ' would therefore depend upon the immanence, powei^ , scope, knoW%edge, love
and other indefectible qualities ©ustomariiy ascribed to God/ If God
were tender^indedly thought of as omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent,
etc*, then the converse of the proposition «whatever God wills is gopd«,
would be equally true* The word of God as revealed in Scripture has been
taken to establish these attributes, if we generalise from the particulw
instances and contexts in which His revelation is embedded# (If we do
not, we erroneously assume that God’s will, semi-codified in Biblical
ordinances, being appropriate only to dealings with the Romans, Greeks,
Philistines etc* of early history, does not pertain to problems peculiar
to Atomic Age man*) However, if theological systems place some important
limitations on God’s supposedly perfect nature, claiming Him finite in,
say, power or love or knowledge (as theories have claimed, for example, in
attempting to resolve the prohlem of evil), then some good actions be
said to spring from sources other than that of God’s will* Only some of
the class of good actions would be actions willed by God, and would
perhaps possess the added goodness engendered by God’s willing them* This
would make the moral order greater in scope than God«s will, but it
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wouldn’t mean that it would oocupy a motaphysieally auprame position. On 
this Heading, it still would not make sense to ask « Does God love an act
Ibecause it is good?* for this question presupposes that either God’s will 
is dependent upon moral goodness or that moral goodness is a function of 
God’s will; that God in His perfection always chooses to will that which 
is good, or that God’s willing an act somehow imbues it with goodness#
To continue in this old-fashioned, metaphysical manner, an important 
implication which this stand would have to allow, is that God’s will and 
the moral order would be independent strands, although crossing and fusing 
At the juncture of (most) r|ght actions* God’s will would overlap the 
moral order in its other realms of application (e.g# creation, divine 
intercession, etc#), and the moral order would overlap God’s will in sme 
moral situations# The two classes would be independent, with different 
limits and a common area at their core; neither would be supreme or 
subordinate in relation to the other# This is of course a much weaker 
position than two totally Independent provinces*
To the philosopher who reiterates the likely objection at this point, 
that in order to know that the commands of God are good we roust judge them 
by an independent moral standard, the religious roan will counter that a 
deliberative act of judgement is not logically necessary to the possession 
of the knowledge that G W  is good* Religion can and has achieved knowl­
edge (not in the ï^ntian sense) and cognisance (not in the Spencerian
sense) of this attribute by means of an immediate awareness of God’s
1’ ' ‘ predicates, virtually unroediated in its initial discovery by reflective
assessroent. This vital core of information (like knowledge of God’s
existence) did not proceed by some dialectical architectonic from a state
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of ignorance to the full réalisation of God’s being and nature* It 
became known to man through revelation in one form or another or 
’immediate intuition’. If we first came to believe that God is good 
from syllogistic reasoning rationally establishing %is ’fact’* it 
would be practically Wprecendented in theological history.
The rank and file Christian is made aware of this attribute of God 
and seldom attempts a self-satisfying rational demonstration of his 
beliefs* He may reflect or theorise in an unsystematic way about the 
nature of God* His relationship with humanity etc.* * but he does not norm­
ally attain knowledge of any important aspect of God’s being on the 
basis of* say* inductive analysis of certain configurations of experience. 
Those few religious men called theologians* who systematically apply 
themselves to this task, do so by way of post hoc justification or 
philosophical retrospection about that which they are well convinced is 
true* They do not engage in their task to validate or establish some 
theological conclusions. (In this respect the modern theologian 
resmbles his Mediaeval counterpwt with the important difference that 
revelation is not as inflexible to interprétation# and reason is viewed 
with greater regard in|t<mpering revelation* However, the question of 
what would count against a religious belief is still hammering at all 
doors* with slightly lesser insistence upon those of natural theologians.) 
In the case of most major, religions today, their common* indispensable 
core is the immediate experience of God* as dynamically reported by 
inspired mystics* messiahs* prophets or saints. It is such ’divine 
encounters’ which father and direct the subsequent erection of theolog­
ical structures* and provide content material for eulogising or carping
x m
philosophers# If numerous philosophers heceme discouraged * like Hume at
efforts to discover a rational argument* which would lead to deity,
* »perhaps they misunderstood the nature of their subject, and entertained 
erroneous expectations as to its lexical behaviour#
This view seems to be skirting dangerously close to the edge of the 
religious ’howler*, ’believe and then you will know’ - a prescription for 
an order of knowledge and a metaphysical priority which, if anything, 
ought to be reversed# However, the contention herein described would not 
be committed to this viewpoint and holds that knowledge and belief do not 
occur separately in any order, or even in a continuum, but simultaneously 
inundate the mind of the recipient as auditory and visual images jointly 
assail the senses in synaesthetic poetry#
It is an entirely different matter when we speak of judgements about 
God as contrasted with knowledge or belief of Him - and I use the propo­
sitions ’of’ and ’about’ advisedly# For here judgements about God are 
seen to succeed direct knowledge or belief of Him# Not that a tmporal 
factor is logically relevant here, for the human mind may arrive by an 
a posteriori argument a% the knowledge of an a^ priori relation; the order 
of discovery or knowledge (ordo quoad nos) must be distinguished from the
2order of being or reality (ordo per ae) * It is simply important to 
notice that knowledge and belief or ’knowledge-belief’ of God are of a 
different logical and epistewological nature than judgements about God/ 
Therefore, to the contention of Nielsen (and numerous others) that 
we must (logically) be supplied with the proposition that ’Whatever God 
wills is right’ before concluding ’X is right* from ’God wills X*, the 
theologian can reply that an assessment of God’s character or conduct is
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auperfloüs. It is not that we have an enthymeme here# the concealed 
premise of which need not he dredged to the surface# but that the 
argument or thought is already complete without this rational judgement* 
Neither is it the case that the major premise of the syllogism is spiri­
tually apprehended rather than the object of a moral judgment (f<n? this
\would merely alter the epistemological character or form of the major 
premise without challenging the necessity of the logical sequence), but 
that it is superfluous to the certainty of the conclusion*
For those repelled by the odious ring of metaphysics in the foregoing 
remarks, let me put the matter in respectable prepositional form. «God 
wills X* therefore «X is good* does not require the proposition «Every­
thing God wills is good «, because the concept of God already embraces the 
notion of absolute goodness. «God is good* is on this reading an analytic 
proposition; its truth or falsity is discoverable through an analysis of 
the subject «God* * The predicate is actually unnecessary to a real or 
theoretical intelligence possessing a thorough understanding of the 
subject. For the idea distinctly expressed in the predicate was implicit 
in the subject*., In the case of a proposition such as «The cat is 
friendly « # two independent ideas are being linked together. Since the 
cat « s attributes are established a posteriori , by Independent means, It
is «logically possible* in the full technical sense of the phrase, that
3««Tibbies” could be found to be anti-social* (In fact she usually is.) 
However, since the attribute of goodness is intrinsic to the concept of 
God, it would be grossly self-contradictory to declare that God is not 
good.
One major criticism which such an analysis could bring down upon its 
head is that propositions, the subject of which is «personal*, do not
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lend themselves to analytic formulation. «God is good* being a member 
of this class of propositions vihich would include 'Robert Graves is 
prolific', 'Martin likes mustard' and 'Hume is intelligent’ is, like 
them, a synthetic proposition which cannot be moulded by any linguistic 
manipulations into an analytic shape. Sentences of a logical* mathemat­
ical* relational and tautological kind furnish the stuff out of which 
analytical propositions are made* The truth or falsity of these types of
propositions depends solely upon the rules governing the correct use of
Iltheir symbols ; the'truth or. falsity of 'F' i$ a function of what 'S' 
symbolizes» The utterance 'An equilateral triangle is not equiangular'*
and the universal negative proposition 'All baby cats are not kittens'
Vare obviously self-contradictory in a way that 'Sylvia is not sensitive* 
is not self-contradictory - although it may not be true*
In the following,pages I intend to show that this criticism is
untenable - that analytic propositions can be constructed of sentences 
with personal subjects. ,
1S7
Bs Connotation and Denotation
the controversy as to the possibility of personal sentences ever
being analytic is intimately connected with the question of whether
proper names have connotation. Admittedly most proper names do denote
something in the real, or actual world, the exception being descriptive
5 6names such as 'Apollo* and 'Jean Valjean* which Boole and de Morgan
maintain have application in a particular mode or 'universe of discourse*»
very like Wittgenstein's 'area of discourse* for mnemonics. Bertrand
Russel is of course responsible for showing how 'definite descriptions*
which describe nothing (e.g. 'The Queen of Switzerland') can still be
significantly employed* However» the question with which we are here
concerned is whether 'Jane* or 'Nigel* have connotation as well as
denotation or 'extension*. Do these names serve no other function than
denoting as Mill presupposed when he labelled proper names 'unmeaning 
7marks * 7 Are proper names "the only names of objects which connote
nothing?"^
It will clarify qur problem if we bear in mind Dr* Keynes' classi­
fication of connotation into "Conventional intension .* * those attributes 
which constitute the meaning of a name; subjective intension * * * those 
(attributes) that are mentally associated with it» whether or not they 
are actually signified by it; objective intension or comprehension will 
include all the attributes possessed in common by all members of the
9class denoted by the name"* For with this analytic scheme in mind we 
can detect at least one type of intension or connotation in a proper 
name - the 'subjective intension* or psychological meaning of the word*
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Proper names do forcefully conjure up or evoke psychological meanings, 
images or associations in different people's minds* 'Mark*# \J* B* Shaw*, 
'Wellington* and *St, Francis of Assisi* are far from being sterile, 
disembodied labels ; when understood to be the marks of certain individ­
uals, we would want to say that they do possess connotation in at least 
a subjective sense* 'Ma^ k* calls to my mind intensity and misplaced 
dedication, 'Shaw*, wittiness and Nietssehian iconoclaem, 'Wellington*, 
tactical shrewdness and an aquiline nose, and 'St* Francis', gentleness 
of spirit. /Some of these characteristics may also be the comprehension 
of the above proper names, but that is getting ahead, of ourselves• From 
this analysis we can atJleast understand Eaton when he writes that "When 
logicians insist that proper names are connotative, they usually mean 
that they carry a subjective intension with them*
As far as objective intension is concerned, this is an unworkable 
concept in every context including that of proper names, because human 
beings in their finitude never know all the attributes possessed by an 
object* This category thus has some theoretical application, but it 
doesn't possess utilitarian value since the complete set of properties 
c<xnprising the objective intension can be infinite in number* NeitherI
historians"nor theologians would want to say that the objects of their 
studies have been exhaustively characterised, 'God* and 'Wales* are 
open-ended labels - both include qualities which haven't been discovered. 
Still, if most proper names (including 'God') were found to possess 
connotation at all (excluding the subjective intention sense) then God 
would in principle possess objective intension as well as conventional 
intension* I might add in passing that God, being the only entity in the
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universe to which mnisoience Is ascribed, would be the only entity with 
complete cognizance of the objective intension of the word 'God* - the 
only being with exhaustive self-knowledge#
Leaving 'subjective intension* and 'objective intension' in the 
wake of our inquiry# let us now turn to the logically important part of 
names* their 'conventional intension'* It is vital to the achievement of 
our ends to examine this notion# because we are now in a position to see 
that the question 'Do proper names have connotation?' is 'Do proper names 
have conventional intension?' Only if proper names possess connotation 
in this sense can they be formed into 'essential propositions*. And only 
if proper names In general (and 'God* in particular in Its usage as a 
member of this class) do possess conventional intension* can we regard 
some sentences with singular name subjects# 'is* of attribution copulas* 
and quality predicates* as analytic in form. For only then can the 
'quality* predicate be necessary to the 'personal* subject.
The Interpretation of connotation as conventional intension is 
certainly the one which Mill intended* when he claimed p1?oper names to be 
destitute of connotative meaning* Mill’s view is lucidly and succinctly 
put in the following passagess "Proper names are not connotative: they
denote the individuals* who are called by them; but thej^ do not Indicate 
or imply any attributes, as belonging to those individuals. When we name 
a child by the name Paul# or a dog by the name Caesar* these names are 
simply marks used to be made subjects of discourse* It may be said* 
indeed* that we must have had some fuason for giving them those names 
rather than any others; and this is true; but the name* once given, is 
independent of the reason* A man may have the name John* because that
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was the name of bis father; a town may have been named Dartmouth# because 
it is situated at the mouth of the Dart. But it is no part of the signi­
fication of the word John, that the father of the person so called bore 
the same name; nor even of the word Dartmouth, to be situated at the 
mouth of the Dart * * * Proper names are attached to the objects them­
selves, and are not dependent on the continuance of any attribute of the 
object
"Wlien we predicate of anything its proper name; when we say, 
pointing to a man, this is Brown or Smith, or pointing to a city, that is
York, we do not, merely by so doing, convey to the reader any information\‘
about them, except that those are names* By enabling him to identify the 
individuals, we may Connect them with information previously possessed 
by him; by saying, This Js York, we may tell him that it contains the 
Minster. But this is in virtue of what he has previoiisly heard concern­
ing York; not by anything implied in the name* It is otherwise when 
objects are spoken of by connotative names. When we say. The town is 
built of marble, we give the hearer what may be entirely new information, 
and this merely by the signification of the many-worded cpnnotative name, 
"built of marbles". Such names are not signs of the mere objects, 
invented because we have occasion to think and speak of these objects 
individually; but signs, which accompany an attribute? a kind of livery 
in which the attribute clothes all objects, which are recognised as 
possessing it# They are not mere marks, but more that is to say, signif­
icant marks; and the connotation is what constitutes their significance#^ ^
The view that there is no such thing as the connotation of a proper 
name, that proper names are "the only names of objects which connote
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nothing” is echoed by a number of eminent and responsible logicians*
For example Bain remarks* "As a mere mark* a name has no power beyond-V
simply denoting* or pointing out its object| Sirius suggests the star of 
that name; London has no other function than to make us think of the 
Object named." C* A. Mace in contrasting proper names with general 
names classifies proper names as being "devoid of connotation* and not 
capable of use in conjunction with applicatives. Arid Whateley states 
"A term which merely denotes an object without implying any attribute to 
that object is called "Absolute” or "Hon-connptative”; as "Paris"; and 
"Romulus". The last terms denote ... but do not ... connote (imply in
their signification) any attribute of those individuals"*^  ^ Fowler
contradicts himself about this issue * first denying that words like
Socrates are connotative* then affirming that of ^all words they are
"largest in connotation" and "smallest in denotation". Finally* Keynes
states categorically/ "A proper name is a name assigned as a mark to
distinguish an individual person or #ing from others * without implying
in its signification the possession by the individual in question of any
1?specific attributes."
. iSuch is the traditional view and thoseloglcians claiming that proper 
names do possess connotation must do so by means of a revolt or reaction 
against the status quo.
One weak mode of rescue for^  the revolutionists is to claim that every 
proper name is connotative by virtue of the fact that* by analytic neces­
sity* it implies individuality* and what is here important* the quality 
of being called by that name* Everything to which we assign a proper 
name* from dogs to dolls, must at least possess the connotation of being
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called by that name# Keynes outlines this position as follows: "If we
call a man John when he really passes by the name of James * we make a 
mistake; we attribute to him a quality which he does not possess - that 
of passing by the name of John." , >
In the first place it is important to notice that Quality* is being 
used in a strained sense so as to include 'being called by that name*
along with 'large** 'equilateral'» 'parent'» 'just'» etc. Ip this light
\it is highly doubtful whether 'being called by that name* is a quality 
of 'hydrogen sulphide* or 'John**
(ill
In general» however# we must reply with Keynes that it is "one
thing to say that the Identity of the object called by the name with
that to which the name has previously been assigned is a condition
essential to the correct use of a proper name# and another thing to say
that this ie connoted by a proper pame. If indeed by connotation we
mean the attributes by reason of the possession of which by any object
the name is applicable to that object# It seems a case of Pv‘T€f>Qt/ ^ f>6*repoz^
19to include in the connotation the property of being called by the name."
Another argument which we can thrust aside is that which demon­
strates the connotation of proper names by reference to expressions such 
asJa Caesar*» 'a Gulliyer*» 'a Goliath'» 'an Einstein*# etc. The infer­
ence here is that a certain type of individual is designated which 
(undeniably) posseseea a conventionally assigned set of attributes. This 
argument will not do for the simple reason that although the names retain 
the appearance of boin^  proper i.e. maintain their overt grammatical 
structure# they have in this context altered their logical character.
They have in fact become general names logically identical in this
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respect with 'rock'* 'governor*, and 'painting* (Prof* Bain notwithstand- 
20ing). The somewhat paradoxical appearance is unmasked when we consider 
«amphibian* terns like 'Quixotic*, 'Keynesian* and'Socratic* which appear 
to breathe the air of two realms # but logically belong in the land of 
adjectival general names.
It would be appropriate to mention at this point that the term 
♦God* as we are dealing with it, is not an Individualisation of the 
general term *god* which copld be equally designated by a demonstrative 
pronoun or a definite article (e.g. this god or the god), but is a sing­
ular name which refers to a unique corresponding object# Like other 
singular names it falls to meet a necessary criterion of general names - 
that 'all* or 'some* are potentially able to be meaningfully prefixed to 
it# However,^ vhereas most members of the class of singular names gain 
their uniqueness from a specific limitation in time and/or space, e.g. 
the equator, the mbon, etc#, God achieves this specifibity by virtue of 
his exemption from the limitations of time and space# This does not 
make the logical distinction between singular and general names inappli­
cable to 'God* # This term"is clearly within the singular name category 
but it gains its inclusion by virtue of another sort of uniqueness to 
the corresponding object - namely, freedom from terrestrial fetters of 
(among others) a spacio-temporal sort#
Conceiving the tern *God* as a singular name does not, of course, 
exclude it from conceivably possessing connotation# For if we follow 
Mill's tripartite classification of names, we see that some singular 
names, irrespective of their degree of individualization, are acknowl­
edged as being connotative* <
16H
To return to the main thread of our discussion» it can be seen that 
none of the answers put forward in this section will quite do. However, 
I believe that proper names legitimately can be said to connote for the 
reasons discussed in the next chapter*
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Footnotes
1, It is nmiécôssôry to quibble about whether human beings as finit©
creatures are precluded from gaining totally unroediated contact \
with God as ïî. D. Lewis (Our Experience of God» Op* Cit., Ch. 1 and 
p. 284) and othera have proclaimed, or whether God's transcendent 
nature somehow necessitates unmediated ’confrontation*. The iropor-V
tant eleroeht to notice is that reasonable judgement is never 
assigned to be thé;essential-or initiaM%pistemological channel to 
, God.
2* H» B» JevpD%%^mtire discussion on^ whether morality is based on 
religion or vice versa, by reference to which occurred first in the 
history of religions is vitiated by hia failure to tOke cognizance 
of this logical point. Cf. devons, ÎUB.» hn Introduction to the 
Study of Comparative Religion, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1908, 
pp. 211-39.
3. A less easily pigeon-holed sentence would be 'Gold is incapable of 
volatilization*, for the following reasons* If chemists discovered 
a metal which resembled gold in every respect, that is; was charac­
terized by its non-liability to rust, metallic lustre, yellow colour, 
high specific gravity, and great malleability and ductility, yet was 
capable of volatilization, would this metal deserve the name 'gold*? 
Those who would opt for its being 'gold*, with the additidn of a 
p^perty previously undiscovered, would i».vfact be interpreting 'Gold 
is incapable of volatilizâtioh/ as a synthetic proposition. On the 
other hand, those who declared that it was a new metal which bore a '
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Strikingly high degree of similarity to «gold*» would he interpre­
ting 'Gold is incapable of volatilization* ae an analytic proposi­
tion. Such cases are of a borderline nature and illuminate the 
imperfections of a strict analytic/synthetic duality. For they can 
be whipped in either direction depending upon the interpretation 
adopted. For further discussion concerning the fluid » dynamic 
nature of the analytic synthetic duality consult Bradley, F# H*»
lEÉH&iSË. 2È &S#S.' Oxford, 1922, Vol. 1, p. 172; Veiteh, J., 
Institutes of Logic# Edinburgh, Wm, Blackwood and Sons, 1885» p*237; 
Keynes, J* H., Formal Logic, London, Maoniillan and Co», 1906, pp, 
53-5; Joseph, H, W, B., An Introduction to Logic, Oxford, University■ »*,»»■ ,141,1 M "  II 'Hh*m «It»»»»
Press, 1946, pp, 207-15; Lotze, H,, Logic trans. by B# Bosanquet,
Oxford Univ. Press, 1887, pp. 84, 91.■ ■ 'v„
4* Dr* J, N. Keynes has suggested another type of analytic expression 
"formal propositions" such as "An animal Is an animal"; propositions 
, of this sort "are valid whatever..,may be the meaning of the term 
involved "their validity is determined by their bare form". 
Keynes, j; N., g^*, p. 52* Sigwart also discusses this tauto-
%^»giçal«’type of analytic proposition: Sigwart, C*, Logic trans* by 
H. Bendy, N* Y*, Macmillan and Co*, 1895, p* 86#
'5. Boole* Q*, Laws of Thought* London, Walton and Maberley, 1854, pp* 
46, 52, 176*
6. Be Morgan, , Formal Logic, ed. by A* E. Taylor, London, The Open- - %
Court Co.* 1926, pp. 41, 55,
7. For excellent discussions on the way in which proper names do and do 
not signify real objects see Braithwaite's article and Moore's
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article in "Imaginary Objects", Arist.» Soc# Suppl., Vol. XII, 1933, 
pp. 44-54, and $5-70, respectively 
8, Hill, J* S., A System of Logic* London $ Longmans, Green Reader &
Dyer# 1070, Vol. 1, p# 36#
9# Keynes, J# H», Formal Logic, Op. Cit., p. 27#
10# Eaton, R. H,# General Logic, N# Y., 0. Scribner’s and Sons, 1931, p.246*I. li. Ipi, .11,1-»** ^  * f *
11* Hills, J* S*s A Syctem of Logic, Op* Cit., pp. 33-34. I might insert
at this point that the reason for a name being given to an individual
or object is not the saine as the reason why a word became a name.
12. Ibid*, p. 37.
13* Bain, A#, Logic, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1870, Part I, p.49.
14, Mace, C* A*, The Principles of Lo i^c, London, Lpngmans, Green and Co#,
1933, p* 85,
15, Whateley, R#, Elements of Logic, London, John W. Parker, 1868, 9th 
Ed*, pp. 122-3.
16, Fowler, J*, Deductive Logic, Oxford Univ. Press, 1867, pp. 20-22*
17# Keynes, J* H,, 0^ , Cit.$ pp* 13-14*
18. Ibid., p* 47#
19. Keyws, J, M., SAl'' P' "*7'
20. Bain, A., IiOgio. Og,. git., ,pp. %8, 49.
168
CHAPTER IX 
THE CONNOTATION OF PROPER NAMES
A Î Proper Names and Descriptive Terms
We might begin this section by quoting Venn: "I find in a parish
register an entry of the burial of 'John Thistlewaite Barker# farrier’; 
what sort of information can we extract from this bare description?"
Venn goes on to answer that claiming from this "bare designation* any­
thing except that the individual referred to shoes horses "involves at 
most a violent presumption"*^
Now against this view it could be maintained that we can determine 
several attributes from this proper name» without even knowing the  ^
specific person to whom it refers* For one thing# we could be reason­
ably sure that the term refers to a male human being# The name John 
could be Applied to a bird, an autoi^ obile, a woman, or even a ship (if 
we chose to ignore maritime tradition), but all of these usages are 
strained extensions of that name normally given to male individuals*
When 'John* is applied to objects or female persons, an explanation in 
some form is appropriate to account for this unusual use of an ordinarily 
straightforward term* (A measure of the need for an explanation could 
be glimpsed in the surprise registered by an individual at learning the 
referent of the proper name*) That is, the need for an accompanying 
explanation would be in direct proportion to the departure from common 
usage, e#g*, when the name John was applied to a piece of broken #ss, a 
shaft of sunlight, an historical event* a book^ end* a cumulus cloud, etc*.
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an explanation of this peonliar usage is strongly demanded. To alleviate 
an uninitiated person’s mystification or misinterpretation we ought to 
supply a full verbal explanation such as ’We call that shaft of sunlight 
that filters through the French doors at ten o’clock on summer mornings 
’John’, because it arrives at the same time that he usually does’, or *I 
call that cumulus cloud ’John’ because it pictorially objectifies his 
buoyant, serene disposition*. However, it would still be appropriate to 
offer some explanation of our verbal behaviour when we use language in a 
less unconventional way such as in calling a ship ’John’, We might 
explain this ’rara avis in terris’ by reference to the fact that the 
owner of the vessel is a mysogynlst, or that he doesn’t believe In any 
exceptions to the grammatical rule of English that places or things are 
of neuter gender. In any case, since calling things other than male 
human beings by the name of ’John* is contrary to our expectations, an 
explanation of the extended usage is logically appropriate. In the 
absence of an explanation or some forewarning preparing those concerned 
for the oddity of language, it bears a high degree of probability that 
’John* designates a male human being.
Now it is quite obvious that linguistic usage cannot be legislated 
to ensure a uniform expectation* That is to say, we cannot demand that 
an explanation be provided at every extraordinary or unusual employment 
of a proper name in the interest of cognitive clarity* The above remarks 
are not intended to foster any such linguistic revolution* What I hope 
they have shown is that the measure of the ’unconventionality of meaning’ 
can be ascertained by the need for explanatory remarks to avert misinter­
pretation j and that the common, ordinary reference which we are entitled
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to expect of a proper name (because of its great frequency of occurrence) 
is that of a human being - a human being with certain consequent 
characteristics♦
I said ’with certain consequent characteristics * quite advisedly 
because from the fact that the label ’John* refers to a human being we 
can determine such things as his mental capabilities - e.g. that he Is 
capable of using language, abstract thinking, imagining, reflecting*
learning from experience (as contrasted with responding to conditioning),
» :
emphasixing, willing, etc*;, physical structure and skills - e.g. that he 
is an erect biped, capable of locomotion, with opposable thumb and fore­
finger, warm blood, complex cerebral cortex, etc.i and organic needs - 
e.g. that he inhale oxygen, nitrogen and,carbonic acid gas and exhale 
carbon dioxide, that h@^ maintain a certain nutritional balance between 
carbohydrates, protein, fat, minerals and vitamins, that he sleep a 
minimum of five hours in every twenty four, that he maintain a body 
temperature of close to ninety eight and four tenth degrees, etc.
from the fact that he is a male human being we can be assured that 
he exhibits further characteristics of a physiological, anatomical, and 
perhaps a dispositional sort (although cross-cultural studies leave this 
last category quite problematic). That is to say, we can establish his 
high proportion of muscular tissue, his glandular pattern and composition 
reproductive organs, skeletal structure, proportion of subcutaneous fktty 
tissue* and perhaps his propensity toward active rather than sedentary 
(passive) activities. (This last item is derived from the fact that làen
carry the bulk of their weight in the upper part of theirlorsos, unlike 
women who have the major concentration of weight in the lower half of 
their bodies.)
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In addition to our being reasonably certain that John Thistlewaite 
Barker is a ,human being, and* more specifically, a male human being, we 
are also justified in assuming that he is of English background, just as 
we might claim that ’Juan Fernandes’ is of Spanish stock, ’John Johnson’ 
is of Norwegian extraction and ’Yung Cheng’ is of Chinese descent. The 
current nationality of the above mentioned Individuals would be somewhat 
more indeterminable in an age when nationalities and indigeneous names 
are able to be discarded or assumed without Insuperable difficulty.
However, it is quite probable that Juan Fernandes is a Mediterranean type 
with such anatcftnical characteristics as short stature, large nasal index, 
slight build, dark skin, black eyes and hair, and narrow head Cdolichoce^  
phalous); that John Johnson is a.Nordic type withwhite skin, blonde hair, 
blue eyes, tall stature, small nasal index, bony frame, narrow head and 
curly hair (cyraotrichous); and that Yung Oheng is a Froto-Malay type with 
yellow skin, black hair and eyes, short stature, slight build, small 
nasal index, prominent cheekbones, flattened face and round head (brachy- 
cephalous)*
Finally, from their nationalities we would even be able to determine 
something about their character* For we must allow that their respective
i . . .characters were predominantly shaped by environmental influences within 
the framework of their national cultures* That is, the nations of which 
they are members have provided the possibilities of development among 
which they have unconsciously been fc^ed or consciously made their choice, 
They Jiave definitely been .unqonscioUsly influenced by numerous physical' 
factors such as their respective nation’s aisse, shape, outline, geograph­




distribution, male/female proportion, and principal vocation (i.e. 
whether pastoral, industrial or agricultural)* In addition, their 
characters have also been formed by acquiescence to (as well as reaction 
against) their respective nation’s family pattern, dress, concept of 
beauty, recreation, ornamentation, moral code, language, religion, class 
structure, political system, literature, law, education, etc* If as 
great a heterogeneity of beliefs, temperament, outlook, disposition, 
opinions etc# existed within, say, Spain as exists bet ween China and 
Spain, then there would not be a phenomenon such as national character 
which proceeds from all of the above elements peculiar to a given country* 
The character of the individual as a microcosm of the national character 
will certainly vary but within specifiable limits; it will vary in the 
seme way as individual figures vary within the confines of statistical 
averages* It is in recognition of this fact that Will James speaks of 
living or dead options* ”A living option is one in which both hypotheses 
are live ones* If I say to you; ’Be a theosophist or be a Mohamtedan’, 
it is probably a dead option, because for you neither hypothesis is 
likely to be alive* But if I say; ’Be an agnostic or be a Christian’, 
it is otherwise; trained as you are, each hypothesis makes some appeal, 
however small, to your belief*”^
The cultural and physical environment of a nation therefore provides 
the limits within which the mental attitudes, beliefs and ideas of 
individual characters develop* Ruth Benedict’s famous bpok Patterns of 
Culture makes the trenchant point that various peoples have made 
different selections out of the multitudinous array of ways of living, 
and have woven them together into integrated patterns of culture* Hiss
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Benedict may have gone astray in allowing a greater degree of eonscioue 
choice and free-will exercised by a society in this process than is 
actually involved, however it remains true that the particular selections 
which are made, and the relative importance which Is attached to differ­
ent ways of life, give the group its characteristic pattern and serve to 
differentiate its members from those of other cultures* "Ho man ever
looks at the world with pristine eyes* He sees it edited by a definite* \
set of customs and institutions and ways of thinking * #. The life 
history of the individual is first arid foremost an accommodation to thet
patterns and standards traditionally handed down in his community. From 
the moment of his birth the customs into which he is bom shape his 
experience and behaviour» By the time he can talk, he is the little 
creature of his culture, and by the time he is grown and able to take 
part in its activities, its habits are his habits, Its beliefs his 
beliefs, its impossibilities his impossibilities. Every child that is 
born into his group will share them'with him, and no child bom into one 
on the opposite side of the globe can ever achieve the thousandth part*"^  
The Implications of this theory espoused by Ruth Benedict, Margaret 
Head, Gregory Bateson, Julian Blackburn, Otto Klineberg and others, is 
that the cultural pattern will in most cases be the predominating force 
in moulding the individual over any innate, congenital differences which 
he possesses.
' Insofar as every individual is bom into a nationality and will 
speak the native language (cognitively assimilating its conceptual frames 
work), wear the expected clothes, and have a propensity toward emulating 
the group virtues (or reacting against them), etc., etc», his character
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is determinable* A generalisation or a stereotype of different charac­
teristics of different nations is more than likely to be influenced by 
personal bias and prejudice# i*e* the stereotyped attitudes which regard 
the Irish as bellicose# witty and prone to alcoholism, the Jews as shrewd, 
mercenary and clannish# the English as sophisticated# conventional andk
sportsmanlike, the Negroes as superstitious, indolent and carefree, the 
Chinese as sly# industrious and religious, the Germans as scientific, 
stolid and authoritarian, etc,, etc, However^ the scientific and histor­
ical study of a national culture can lead us to certain safe conclusions 
about the individuals within that community. In Venn’s example of ’John 
Thistlewaite Barker’ we can at least expect with a high degree of proba­
bility that he will revere honesty more than treachery tunlike the Dobu 
Islanders), worship Christ sooner than Buddha, formulate and express his 
thoughts in English not Swahili, wear trousers not a loin cloth# favour 
monogamy over polygamy, love his mother more than his uncle, prefer 
democracy to fascism or timocracy# think belching is impolite rather 
than complimentary, exalt the virtues of football over those of baseball, 
regard white ski%as lovelier than yellow skin, etc* At some points we 
would be able to ascertain his preferences (and ultimately his character 
which proceeds from his thoughts and actions) with a high degree of 
probability; at others# only the range within which his predilections 
will vary.
As a postscript I might add that we could even reasonably assume the 
specific organised religion of which ’John Thistlewaite Barker’, ’Juan 
Fernandes’, ’Johu'Johnson’ and ’Yung Cheng’ are members# Since the estab­
lished and heavily predominant churches in England and Spain are the
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Church of England and the Rowan Catholic church respectively, John Barker 
is most probably Protestant and Juan Fernandes is even more likely to he
Roman Catholici John Johnson is almost undoubtedly a hutheran Protestant\
- a member of the Established Church of Sweden like 99% of his compa­
triots# and Yung Chen is either a Buddhist or a Confucian*
Let us now recapitulate our thesis* We have sââd that from the bare 
designation ’John thistlewaite Barker* we are able to determinecertain 
factors without even knowing the denotation of the proper name. We can 
safely assume that this label refers to a human being# of the male sex* 
and of English nationality* From the fact of his being a human being we 
know that he possesses certain mental capabilities# a specifiable physical 
structure and groups of skills# some innate organic needs# etc. From the 
facts that he is a male human being we can be assured that he exhibits 
appropriate physiological# anatomical and perhaps dispositional charac­
teristics, And finally# from his English nationality we can determine . 
his race group and perhaps something about his character/^
I have further maintained that with a knowledge of each of these 
characteristics# certain other attributes can be seen to follow* e.g. 
his ability to use language# his warm bloodedness# his need for sleep* 
etc* which are consequent upon his being human; his proportion of muscular 
tissue* his knee structure etc, which necessarily follow from his being 
a male member of the species; his having white skin# narrow head, etc, 
and his predilection for wearing trousers# expressing himself in English 
etc,* all of which are relative to his being of English nationality*
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Bï Proper Haines and General Meaning
Critics of the preceding argument would probably want to put 
forward one or more of the following objections; Whereas ’Tung Cheng* 
can indicate an Oxford punt* or a female chimeny sweep# or a Nordic 
Englishman who doesn’t care a straw for either Buddha or Confucius# 
general concrete names like ’tree*# ’chair*# ’ship’ and ’man’ designate 
attributes which are fixed and universally common to those objects which 
they denote. We know that when the word ’tree’ is written or uttered 
that it connotes a woody# perennial plant with self-supporting stem or 
trunk# etc,# we are able to circumscribe a class of flora by virtue of 
these distinguishing attributes. In other words# whereas general 
concrete names like’tree’# ’ship’. etc, and even attributive terms like 
’short’* ’conscientious* and ’sickly* have a fixed general meaning# 
proper names like ’John Barker* have not; although we have knowledge of 
the characteristics which any object legitimately labelled a tree will 
possess by virtue of the very meaning of the term ’tree’# proper names 
can logically be applied to a variety of objects each with widely 
divergent attributes. Therefore proper names do not possess connotations.
Now if we maintained a position such as this, that because proper 
names do not have a fixed general meaning they are not connotative# on 
what presuppositions would this be founded? To my mind there is just 
one principal assumptioni
We would be assuming that ’fixed general meaning’ is an essential 
attribute of ’connotation*# such that any term which does not possess it 
is ipso facto excluded from the extensional class of connotative terras.
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In this case we would be making ’All connotative terms have a fixed 
general meaning’ a true analytic proposition - claiming that the charac­
teristic of general meaning necessarily requires inclusion in the list 
of characteristics of’connotation’ (in the connotation of ’connotation’). 
Now it is impossible to rely upon the designative meaning which 
’connotation’ has in accepted usage to determine whether a fixed general 
meaning ought necessarily to be included in its conventional intension.
This is the procedure adopted in constructing most analytic definitions 
- e,g, in a proposed analytic definition of the term ’tool* it would be 
a serious departure from accepted usage if we excluded the quality of 
utility or the extensional referent of a hammer. Unfortunately » our task 
is not as simple because there is a hesitation or doubt in common usage, 
which permits inclusion or exclusion of ’fixed general meaning’ in the 
analytic definition of ’connotation*, ’Fixed general meaning’ stands in 
relationship to the attributive term ’connotation’ as the extinct species 
Jamoytius stands to the general concrete name ’vertebrates* or virus 
stands to the general concrete name ’organic matter’, In the latter case# 
for example, the issue is in doubt because viruses assume perfect 
crystalline structures like other inorganic particles yet remain able to 
assume a condition in which division and multiplication is accomplished 
like living organisms. In the same way there is a doubt as to whether 
a fixed general meaning should be included or excluded from the definition
\of ’connotation*. And this doubt is present because of the existence of 
proper names which exhibit several significant characteristics of conno­
tative terms# i.e. that numerous attributes are implied by the names# yet 
do not seem to possess a fixed general meaning.
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’All connotative terms have a fixed general meaning* might there­
fore be considered a borderline proposition capable of being considered 
true or false depending upon the meaning attatched to the key term 
’connotation* - a term which unfortunately fails to display a precise 
meaning in relation to the predicate.
However it seems to.me that the inexactitude does not merely leave 
the issue in an agnostic state of indecision# but is itself the deciding 
factor in concluding that ’fixed general meaning* is not essential to 
the term ’connotation*,» It is only when the subject term# upon analysis 
reveals a precise meaning in relation to the predicate# that we are 
justified inf declaring that the predicate attribute is necessary to it. 
In addition# just as the imprecise usage of ’connotation* does not 
allow us to declare that the analytic proposition ’All connotative terms 
have a fixed general meaning* is true, this same imprecision does not 
justify our declaring that this proposition is even analytic!
If we could legitimately declare that it is a true, analytic propo­
sition that ’All connotative tarais have a fixed general meaning*, Ive, 
one in which the connection between the subject and the predicate
contained within is "cogitated through identity" to use Kant’s phrase,
. ' \ then proper names which lack the predicate attribute oould not be
included in the extensive meaning of *connotation*, However, if the
predicate ’fixed general meaning’ is not found to be a necessary
constituent of the subject term, then it is not a false analytic proposl*
tion, but a false synthetic one# And the synthetic proposition being
false would mean that proper names are not excluded from the extensional
meaning of ’connotation’because they lack the predicate attribute.
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lïï the latter case we can determine that the proposition is a 
synthetic one, at the same moment that we discover that a fixed general 
meaning is not an essential attribute of ’connotation’. For when a 
predicate term is found not to be essential to the subject, then the 
proposition in which it is contained is not a false analytic proposition 
but not an analytic proposition at all. Furthermore, we can determine 
that it is a"false synthetic proposition at the same moment that we 
conclude it is not an analytic one, because we reached this conclusion by 
virtue of an examination of the common meaning of ’connotation’; we 
should have to adopt the same procedure in deciding upon its truth or 
falsity as a synthetic p^position» For the term ’connotation* is 
neither a concrete general term nor an attributive term which has a 
strong empirical grounding like ’horse* or ’polite*, such that we could 
conduct a scientific investigation or empirical examination to determine 
whether certain characteristics are in fact common to the designated 
objects or qualities# ’Connotation* is rather an epiphenomenal term (if 
you will), like ’synonym’, ’category* or *senten>ce)filfwhich serves to 
classify language from a particular direction* It is expressive of a 
formal scheme which can be laid over linguistic expression in the 
interest of grammatical and logical illumination* It endeavours to do 
justice to a aegment of the structure and complexities of language - to 
provide a useful tool by the manipulation of which order and insight may 
be gained* As a word of this nature, the ordinary verbal employment of 
’connotation* must be examined in determining its logical structure, This 
is, in fact, the procedure which we employed when we considered it as the 
subject term of the supposedly analytic propositbn ’All connotative terms
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have a fixed general meaning V, and found that general meaning was not 
essential to its definitive meaning* (I might add somewhat paradoxi­
cally, that the general meaning of ’connotation’ is not deficient for 
lack of ’general meaning’ either*) Therefore it will serve as a basis 
for the conclusion that this proposition is false when considered as 
synthetic in nature*
For the above reasons I believe that connotation cannot be withheld 
or denied to proper names on the basis of the allegedly essentail con­
nection which fixed general meaning bears to connotaticm,
. i ' \  > 1 ‘r. . ' '
Having discussed and refuted this major criticism, let us turn to
several minor criticisms directed against a term possessing connotation
without possessing general meaning*
A seemingly fundamental qriticism which arises out of the foregoing
remarks is that once you have extracted from connotation the qualities
of being fixed and generalixable the concept ceases to have meaning* In
other words, if we define connotation in the way that Keynes does, "the
attributes by reason of the possession of which by any object the name
ais applicable to that object" we are forced to allow that the meaning 
attached to a name enables the name to be generally applied to all objects 
of which the meaning is true. If we deny the latter then we make noqsenae 
of the former.
There are two replies to this* One is to ,point out that the sort of 
definition of connotation which Keynes and numerous others put forward has 
the concept of fixed general meaning already built into it. Connotation 
implies generalisability by definitions of this sort* However it need 
not do so and as I have argued it should not do so. An example of a
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definition of connotation in which the concept of general meaning is
excluded would be "the meaning which the name implies, in contrast with
(denotation) considered as the whole range of individual objects or
7instances to which the name applies". ’All connotative terms possess 
attributes’ is a valid analytic proposition, whereas ’All connotative 
terms possess fixed general meaning’ is not, By following the former 
analytic definition of connotation rather than the non-essential latter 
one, we can see that proper names are clearly admissible and that the
concept of connotation is not drained of meaning.
However if this solution is unacceptable, perhaps because it is
regWded as arbitrary and not in full accord with common usage or a
lexical definitiüü, or the reader suspects that the procedure employed 
to demonstrate that fixed general meaning is not necessary to connotation 
is a dubious one, then perhaps the following solution to our difficulties 
will prove more acceptable?
If it were, in fact, true that all connotative terms were applicable 
to more than one object by virtue of their intensional meaning, this still 
would not exclude proper nmes from being connotative. For if our analy­
sis is correct, whereby we showed that numerous attributes are implied by 
proper names, then these attributes might alsp/b# regarded as ’general- 
itable’; they would be the attributes by reason of the possession of 
which by any object the name is appropriate to that object. Schiller 
states "it is a peculiarity of proper names that when they are thus 
transferred from one individual to another thei^ Lmeaning changes totally,
A similar transfer of a common term hardly seems to affect its meaning 
at all. When ’man’ is transferred from Tom to Dick, a solid nucleus of
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6of common ’humanity’ in both seems to survive the change.” However# we 
have seen that when ’Juan Fernandez’ is transferred from bne object to 
another we can expect both objects to be male human beings# of Mediter­
ranean race type# etc. It would be an inappropriate violation of the 
meaning involved# a serious departure from common usage# although not
logically unsound to apply this proper name to a Nordic Englishman. As
\ '» »we mentioned previously# in order to prevent misunderstanding of meaning# 
this employment of the word ought to be avoided. And there is a sense in 
which the name is applied to an object by virtue of the attributes which 
it possesses; a way in which the proper name has fixed general meaning.
As we have seen# proper names do convey characteristics and are not 
purely arbitrary labels about jwhich this could not be stated* .In this 
respect they differ from prison or army numbers from which no information 
can be ascertained* Proper names are words which have a certain latitude 
of meaning # which sets them a few degrees apart from straightforward 
descriptive terms; however# they also possess a descriptive content which 
limits their application# . For ; proper names are not simply a jumble of 
letters in a social vacuum# but a meaningful arrangement of vowels and 
consonants firmly rooted in a social context* It is this social context 
which substitutes its descriptive foundation and limits the range of 
objects to which the proper name can be appropriately applied*
In fact# although,we argued at great length that proper names could 
be connotative without possessing fixed general meaning# a strong case 
could be drawn up for saying that proper names do possess fixed general 
meaning* For proper names do embody the descriptive elements previously 
mentioned and hence do have limits to their application; they are not so 
vague as to be precluded from possessing fixed general meaning.
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Of course one of the principal differences which marks-off 
descriptive terms from proper names is that certain sentences containing 
descriptive terras can be self-contradictory, whereas sentences containing 
proper names (as subjects or objects) can never be called self-contradic­
tory, For example, ’Some fathers do not have children* is patently 
absurd, whereas *Yung Cheng is Caucasian* is logically possible* However, 
the descriptive framework underlying the proper name *Yung Cheng* would 
make the term inapplicable (in the sense of misleading and hence logi­
cally inappropriate) to a Caucasian. Precisely insofar as proper names 
possess descriptive meaning, springing from their social roots, they are 
applicable or inapplicable to a class of objects*
I doubt whether anyone would seriously maintain that only those 
words which could be mployed in a self-contradictory manner possess 
general meaning; We might well declare terms which have sufficient 
descriptive meaning to admit of inappropriate employment, terms which 
have fixed general meaning as well*
Another criticism often made against the connotation of proper names 
centres about the vagueness which proper names exhibit* Although it is 
sometimes admitted that proper names do have a connotative range, this 
range is regarded as too wide and with too indefinite limits for inclu­
sion in the connotative category*
Max Black’s article "Vagueness; An Exercise in Logical Analysis", 
takes the concrete noun chair and demonstrates its vagueness by virtue of 
the situations in which its application is "doubtful" or *111-defined"*
He quotes the remarks of H* G# Wells on the extraordinary variety of 
objects to which the word ’chair* is applied - arm chairs, thrones.
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dentist’s chairs, opera stalls, kitchen chairs etc# Then he remarks»
"The vagueness of the term chair is typical of all terms whose applica­
tion involves the use of the senses* In all such cases, ’borderline 
cases* or ’doubtful objects* are easily found to which we are unable to
Qsay either that the class name does or does not apply." We would want
to push this idea even further and declare as Bertrand Russel did in his
10article on vagueness» that "all language is more or less vague"# The 
fact that proper names have vague limits doesn’t militate against their 
possessing connotation# We run a risk of error in the case of proper 
names and in the case of ordinary descriptive terms, particularly when 
either are employed in a strained sense, e.g# when ’chair’ is used to 
cover throne and ’John Johnson’ is used to refer to an African Negro# It 
may be argued that proper names intrinsically possess a propensity 
towards unhealthy elasticity and that extended uses occur more frequently 
among them# Howéver, this is a difference in degree' and not in kind*
And we certainly cannot deny connotation to proper names because ojd
usage does occur to stretch the normal meaning# The fact of vagueness♦
seems totally irrelevant to the question of whether or not proper names 
possess connotation# - . ^
Following thiË point on vagueness it might be appropriate to add a 
note on ambiguity# I believe that the charge that proper names are so
ambiguous that they cannot be regarded aq connotative can be met on the\basis of arguments listed in our discussion of fixed general meaning# 
However there is another approach which tries to prove that proper names 
possess connotation by reference to a concept of ambiguity* I do not 
believe that this procedure leads to a valid conclusion*
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A person endorsing this approach would formulate his argument in 
this way: The view that proper names are devoid of connotation turns 
upon the assumption that proper names are logically applicable to 
different objects, each with different characteristics# However isn’t 
this a case of ambiguity - ambiguity to which descriptive terms (Which 
possess connotation) arc also prone? We would not wish to drum words 
like ’foot’s ’bar* and ’bank* out of the corps of cohtîbtàtlve terms 
because they are equivocal* It is, in fact, totally•irrelevant to a 
term’s possession of connotation, whether it has a dozen referents* All 
that is necessary in these circumstances is to learn each of the general 
meanings connoted fey the term and, subsequently, the range of denoted 
Objacts
As indicated above, this approach does not attempt to abolish 
ambiguity in the interest:; of clarity but recognizes that it is a salient, 
necessary feature of language* It is recognized that common usage cannot 
be altered.by legislation and that it would be inadvisable to do so; the 
limited number of words in a given language cannot be multiplied to cover 
an almost infinite number of referents without rendering the language 
entirely too cumbersome:and unwieldy* Equivocation, therefore, is 
reoognized as an intritisic and beneficial element of language, enriching 
its poetry, facilitating its handling and decreasing its logical clarity*
However advocates of this approach then attempt td explain the 
extreme number of referents for each proper name by labelling thmi 
homonyms » i,e* words having the same form yet a different sense* ÇThe 
Greek word f d a r n e d  is homonuwon, which adds weight to 
this analysis*) By this move, however» I do not see that anything is
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gained# Homonym is substituted for extreme ambiguity but it doesn’t 
lessen the difficulties engendered by the attempt to illustrate that 
proper names are simply ambiguous* It still remains to be shown that the 
apparent difference in kind is actually a difference in degree,
I might insert at this point that when one is confronted with the 
difficulties engendered by the denotation/connotation distinction there 
is a disturbingly strong temptation to simply jettison the concepts alto­
gether as an encumbrance* For similar rWasons Collingwood and Oakeshott
12advise abandonment of the concept of causation in historical contexts*
P* H# Bradley says, for example, that we ought to "dismiss forever the
13term ’connotation’ and try to keep clear of the errors it beacons", 
Bradley would say that we ought to do this because denotation and conno­
tation "serve no useful purpose in logic# They are unnecessary and 
objectionable"* In the light of our study we might find grounds for 
dispensing with connotation because it is too narrow to account for the 
fullness and variety of languagei it might be said to create more diffi­
culties than it eliminates by forcing us to cram ill-fitting terms into
rigid conceptual moulds*
However, we would have a great deal of difficulty in purging logic 
of this general distinction (if we wished to do so) because the distinc­
tion indicated sèems crucial to the logical natdre of language* And we 
cannot eliminate these terms because as Joseph points out "the jingle of 
the antithesis" and Mill’s authority have combined to make these terms 
cownonly acceptable# Also as Mill himself pointed out there is a certain
grammatical mobility about the terms which enables us to use forms like
’to denote’ and ’to connote*, or ’connoting* and ’denoting* which we are
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not able to do in the oaee of extension and intention. We would have
far greater difficulty in dismissing the conceptual division altogether
because it does touch the essence of language at some vital points# In
any case the distinction between connotation and denotation does not
seem to justify the extravagant claims which have been made for it:
that it is "the most valuable distinction for purposes of intellectual
14profit to be found within the field of common logic", or "one of those
Î s/distinctions/ which go deepest into the nature of language", but it 
does seem a useful analytic tool to retain#
bet us now return to our positive point. As we have shown prev­
iously proper names do possess characteristics and are not purely 
arbitrary labels about which this could not be said. It may help our 
position to compare proper names with numbers which can function in a 
similar way* ^
If it so happened that all Dartmoor Prison inmates convicted of 
larceny had the digit *25’ prefixed to their prison numbers, all those 
convicted of arson *28’, all those convicted of murder *27*, etc*, then 
this numerical system would begin to function in the same way as general 
names do* It would be self-contradictory to say that the person or object 
denoted by the number 278532 was not a murderer beeèuse this number was 
assigned by virtue of the fact that the individual designated was a 
murderer. The connotation of the number determined its denotation# If 
the prisoner answeri;^ to the number 278532 had not been convicted of 
murder then we were wrong in prefixing *27* to his number*
Now let us suppose that the above procedure was generally followed 
in Dartmoor but that one could net be more than reasonably sure that those
188
prisoners with 27 prefixed to their nimtbers were murderers* The reason 
for this elasticity was that the warden was capricious and exercized a 
certain degree of arbitraryness in assigning his numbers * Therefore it 
wouldn’t always be true that prisoners with the digits *27’ prefixed to 
their numbers were murderers. To unsettle matters still further, let us 
assume that convicts transferred from other prisons where this general 
numerical scheme was not operative seldom had their numbers changed* The 
presence of these ’immigrants’ would also make it impossible to maintain
V f
that all ’27’ prisoners were murderers; 278S32 might well be a petty 
thief. As a final touch let’s assume that a prison mascot (a dog or 
bird, for example) as referred to affectionately as. 258024 because this 
pet had stolen food‘or had, to someone’s mind, the grasping look of a 
thief.
We could carry this hypothetical situation further, however, I think 
that one can already see that the numbers in this second prison system 
are functioning similarly to proper names. If a logician in analyzing 
this schema said that the numbers did not have fixed general meaning and 
hence did not have connotation, or more specifically, that 258024 did not 
necessarily imply any attributes and therefore did not have connotation 
we would be justified in rejecting his analysis, We should have to say 
that because *258024 is not a thief* is not self«contradictory this does 
not mean that 258024 is a purely arbitrary label or does not possess 
connotation* Although we must agree that there is a degree of arbitrari­
ness about the system and that foreign elements disrupt the unity, 
extending the usage beyond the rigid limits imposed by the first numerical 
system, still we cannot ignore the fact that these numbers are systematized
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by referenoe to a certain descriptive framework, i.e. the crimes 
committed by the bearer of the number.
In the same way there is a class of characteristics connoted by 
proper names and when the proper names are used without this descriptive 
meaning they are being inappropriately applied* And it is precisely 
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CHAPTER K 
THE CONCEPT OP GOD
I believe that I have demonstrated by the preceding argument that 
proper names do possess connotation» Therefore* theprincipal argument 
denying that goodness is essential to God on the basis of the impossi­
bility of proper names (like ’God*) possessing connotation is untenable* 
If ’God* is employed as a descriptive term, (as I believe it usually is), 
then the entire problem of course doesn’t arise; the logical ejections 
previously described will not be relevant.
Now that this logical objection is overcome let me reiterate the 
original argument which it seems to me has considerable merit* Please 
bear in mind that I am describing this argument and displaying its 
logical relevance to the naturalistic fallacy, although I am not neces­
sarily committed to it* I believe that the theologian who adopts this 
position can successfully combat Hume’s objections, however a consider­
able theological structure would have to be assumed in advance. It is 
not within the scope of this book to examine this surrounding framework.
The argument previously mentioned runs as follows: Any act
commanded by God is ipso facto good# An act is neither made good by 
God’s willing it* nor willed by God on the basis of its objective value# 
Rather the concept of goodness is an integral apd intrinsic constituent 
of the concept of God, so that if we believe that God wills certain 
actions it follows that these actions are necessarily good*
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To the philosopher who contends that we must be supplied with the 
proposition ’Whatever God wills is good’ before concluding *X is right* 
from ’God wills X% the theologian can reply that a moral assessment of 
God’s character or conduct is inappropriate and superfluous. The notion
of God contains the notion of goodness.
It is not that we are confronted with an enthÿmeme, the concealed 
premise of which need not be dredged to the surface, but that the argu­
ment is already complete without this judgment# Neither is it the case 
that the major premise of the syllogism is spiritually apprehended 
rather than the object of a moral judgment (for this would merely alter 
the epistemological character or form of the major premise without chal­
lenging the necessity of the logical sequence), but that it is superfluous 
to the certainty of the conclusion#
Let me put the same point in more modem linguistic forms The 
proposition ’Whatever God wills is good* is not required because goodness
is essential to God by definition# ’God is good’ is on this reading an
analytic proposition; its truth or falsity is discoverable through an 
analysis of the subject term. The predicate is actually unnecessary to 
a real or theoretical intelligence possessing a comprehensive under­
standing of the subject; the idea distinctly expressed in the predicate 
was implicit in the subject# It would be grossly self-contradictory to 
declare that God is not good#
In concluding I would like to examine two additional objections to 
the above conclusion and attempt to refute them*
i m
A; COMPARATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF DEITY
A student of anthropology or sociology might well challenge the 
notion that ’God Is not good* la a self-contradictory assertion, He 
would point out that other gods» particularly those of unoivili»ed 
peoples» have occasionally been envisioned and haltingly conceived as 
malevolent* irascible beings* whom mankind must assuage and propitiate 
through sacrifice, prayers * offerings and complex ritual, or try to 
manipulate through magical charms* spells and incantations. To such 
cultures as the Maori, the Fijians, the Santal of India, the Koksoagmiut 
Eskimos, the Coroados of Brazil, and the Gold Coast tribes^ It would be 
true that ’the gods* were quite categorically evil in nature* They upset 
canoes, destroy the crops through pestilence and storm, frighten game 
away before the hunter* cause women to be barren, and bring diêèasa and 
death to the tribe for no apparent reason.
Even the gods of a higher civilization such as that of ancient
i' IGreece were not good or just deities in the full moral sense of these 
terms, although they might be regarded as bénéficiant beings. For they 
conferred blessings on those who by worship, power, bribes, or a display 
of Homeric virtues* secured their good will, but took swift revenge on 
those who neglected them or even committed offences against them acci­
dentally, (It was, in fact, as a reaction against this doctrine that 
later Christian theology declared evil to lie in the intention or 
contemplation of an action, rather than the unwitting perpetration of 
it*) In many cases, as a result of petty jealousies, promiscuous 
intrigues, or sheer egotistical envy, they actually displayed malevolent
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conduct by seducing men into sin or inflicting unjust harm upon them.
The Olympian life of the gods certainly could not excite moral admiration 
even in the Greek mind when Zeus himself ’’breathed against his enemies 
a destructive wrath” when they committed trivial sins against his person.
It must be said, of course, that the conventional opinion about the 
Olympian deities was not shared by the intellectual leaders. For example, 
Plato never regarded Zeus as deficient in moral fibre. His apparent 
malevolence was actually the administration of just punishment to the 
wicked. Euripides affirmed that "none of the gods Is bad”, and that "if 
the gods do aught that is base, they are not gods”. And Plutarch strongly 
asserts that God is certainly not wanting in justice and love, ”the most 
beautiful of virtues and the bast befitting the Godhead"* In general, 
however* the Greek deities like the Greek heroes were powerful figures 
not necessarily just ones* .
Now to reduce-the force of this objection-let me point out that al­
though the history"of religion does occasionally reveal a primitive belief 
in an evil God, this is perfectly natural* It is to be expected because 
savage man constructed his gods largely out of the fabric of his omi 
character and his experience of the overwhelming powers of nature. That 
is, just as he was led to believe in the existence of a beneficent God 
by attributing his o%m good conduct and the favourable occurrences of 
nature to the will of a supreme deity, so he fancied a malicious demon 
as the source of his evil passions and the destructive natural happenings, 
(We still commit what has been termed the ’pathetic fallacy* on occasions 
when we speak of the ’cruel mountains the ’friendly river* or the ’good 
earth*. This language is harmless as modern poetic metaphor but in the 
primitive mind it was the outgrowth of animism, totemism, or the belief
196
In gods with corresponding characteristics.) It is adtümlly quite 
surprising that nature-religion (and the totemism which according to 
devons» preceded it) did not lead to a more widespread belief in the 
malevolence of deity or to a dualistio system of good and evil gods*
For the maleficent iPorces of nature seen to balance or outweigh the 
beneficent. However, this kind of dualism appears comparatively rarely, 
the Hasdeism of Persia being the conspicuous example* (It must be 
remembered in this connection that any deity to which prayers for aid 
are directed must possess some degree of mercy, compassion or benevo­
lence in his nature for otherwise the prayers would be pointless,)
All of this, of course, is by the way* The real refutation of this 
anthropological point can take either one of two formss
First we might indicate that in primitive and national religion it 
is only the minor deities which are sometimes regarded as malevolent * 
Famell points out it is a fact of great significance that the 
history of religions nowhere presents us with the phenomenon of a High
God conceived as malevolent and definitely accepted by the worshipper as 
2such**," This conclusion is reiterated by Schmidt and Reset "As 
regards morality, the primitive Supreme Being is without exception unal­
terably righteous & his only connexion with anything morally bad is to 
abhor and punish it. The true source of this deeply moral character of 
the Supreme Being is the fact that he is the first and highest, the giver 
of the moral law, and consequently its origin;*** For the very reason 
that all evil is kept far from the Supreme Being, those peoples which 
lay especially great emphasis on his moral character oppose to him 
another being who is representative of evil, who meets all his endeavours 
for good with protests and hindrances. We cannot properly call this
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dualism, for the good Supreme Being is represented as far the stronger 
and more important; but the origin and continuance of the evil being la 
often shrouded in a dim twilight which our present knowledge doesn’t 
allow us to brighten*"^
This general notion, however, that a malevolent "H:^h God" simply 
doesn’t appear in primitive religion is somewhat problmatiCë In the 
light of this uncertainty a second refutation of the anthropological 
point seems more forceful.
The modern theologian might well wish to restrict the term ’God* to 
the being conceptualized in the Hebraic - Christian tradition# That is 
to say, he might well claim that he is not concerned with the general 
name ’God’ referring to the deity which has been worshipped anthropcmor- 
phically, animistically, polytheistically, etc, in primitive religions, 
but rather the singular tern as it refers to the being who is the object 
of monotheistic belief#
He would argue that although sophisticated religions like Christian­
ity cannot be severed from rudimentary ritual and belief, some of which 
did, perhaps, believe in a malevolent High God, or a polytheistic system 
in which some deities were regarded as evil, even the most hardened 
sceptic will allow that a higher development of religious thought has 
occurred in present conceptions of the Godhead* Christians could justi­
fiably assert that the God whom they worship, this conception which has 
evolved from the gropings of primitive mentality, bears precious little 
similarity to crude objects of belief such as these# The Christian 
would further maintain that definite conceptual progress has been 
achieved; that the stutterings of man in his infancy were more cogently
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and correctly articulated in the utterances of later thought —  utter­
ances which, among other theological notions attested to the essential 
goodness of the one God#
From a linguistic viewpoint we could say that for the Hebraic - 
Christian group of language users ’God’ is most assuredly applied to an 
omni-good deity# The notion of goodness Is regarded as essential to the 
concept of deity within this tradition, although goodness may not be 
contained in the definition of other gods#
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Bi ANALYTIC PROPOSITIONSî REAL OR VERBAL
Another disquieting objection to my argument states that all that 
has been demonstrated is that ’God is good* is logicaliy and verbally 
an analytic proposition* No ontological implications can be said to 
follow from this and my account stands criticized in the same way that 
1 criticized other accounts of the logical behaviour of religious lan­
guage. (Cf. "Meaning and Truth" Chapter VII, B*) In order to attempt 
to refute this objection I shall have to indicate rather briefly the 
more comprehensive question involved, namely, th^ question concerning 
the nature of analytic propositions*
There is, in fact, a well knoim philosophical dispute concerning 
analytic propositions* On the one hand it is asserted that analytic 
propositions are logically and metaphysically ngcessary statements 
about the essential features of reality. They concern such things as 
universals, space, time, numbers, abstract objects etc. However a 
number of recent writers have maintained that analytic propositions 
gain their necessity by being descriptions of veîrbal conventions. ’All 
fathers have children’, for example tells us less about the universe 
than about the way that the term father is employed in English usage. 
Wisdom has written, "Logically necessary statements are checked by the
qactual usage of language and to this extent may be true or false," 
Ayer’s relevant statement concerning analytic propositions is that
"they simply record our determinations to use words in a certain
sfashion," and at another point that "they call attention to linguistic
6usages," Other writers have added similar testimonies which in effect
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declare that analytic propositions are thinly disguised synthetic ones; 
they merely state a fact about general linguistic usage —  they are 
translatable into contingent, empirical propositions concerning the 
usage rules for terms.
How it seems obvious to me that there is a class of analytic 
propositions to which the above remarks are not legitimately applicable* 
Surely a number of analytic propositions are not of a purely verbal 
kind, e,g* ’I cannot be in Chelsea and Kensington at the same time.*
’The square of the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal to the 
square of the other two sides,’ ’A surface cannot be both red and white 
all over,* etc. In other words there do seem to be a number of logi­
cally analytic propositions which cannot be construed as necessarily 
true according to certain linguistic rules* Rather they are true 
analytic propositions In a metaphysical sense,
However3 having gààd this, it must be admitted that there also 
exists a body of analytic statements whose truth is relative to a 
given linguistic context• For example# ’Stealing is blameworthy* is 
a true analytic proposition in Western civilization but not a necessary 
proposition at all among the Dobu Islanders. ’All intelligent people 
have high vepbal ability’ is a true analytic proposition in the United 
States and England today, however, if concern over I*Q. testing tech­
niques continues to grow among professional psychologists, this propo­
sition could be rejected shortly and anothër analytic proposition 
substituted.
It seems to me that ’God is good* as treated in this thesis and 
as it appears in the Christian theological framework cannot be treated
■I
201
on a purely verbal and logical level# Hot all theologians would want 
to regard this proposition as an analytic one, however, if it is 
treated in this way it must be regarded as a ’real* analytic proposi­
tion rather than a verbal one. à necessary and metaphysical truth is 
being asserted about the universe.
However, once again the first rejoinder may not seem philosophi­
cally persuasive; perhaps a second will prove more telling.
In Chapter VII, Section B» I argued for the establishment of the 
metaphysical reality of the referent of ’God’ prior to an explanation 
of the logical behaviour of theological discourse. However, I have 
not offered a full-blown account of the way in which the theological 
stratum of language functions* Rather I hav# asserted a comparatively 
modest claim concerning one proposition, ’God is good’# which I regard 
as pivotal in deciding whether theological naturalism commits the 
naturalistic fallacy* Surely a prior ontological discussion is not 
required under these circumstances; a logical treatment should be 
regarded as sufficient. To argue otherwise would be like demanding the 
establishment of a metaphysical underatructure on every occasion in 
which an aspect of empirical discourse is examined.
In the light of this consideration it’.cannot be thought that I 
have contradicted myself in analyzing ’God is good’ without first 
establishing the ontological status of God,
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FOOTNOTES
1# The Enllghtment thinkers, eager for emancipation of the human 
spirit from convention and prejudice, claimed that religion was 
nothing more than this sort of anthropomorphic fantasy. They 
argued quite persuasively\that God did not possess ontological 
status as was traditionally believed, but was a constructed image 
of our characters - a reification of our self-images raised to 
superlative conditions of character. Our goodness became infinite
goodness when ascribed to God; our love, unending love; our power,
omnipotence, etc.
2. Famell, h* R*, The Attributes of God, Oxford University Press, 
19.?5, p. 165.
3. Schmidt, M« ahd Rose,’H . J., The Origin and Growth of Religion,
London, Methuen 6 Co., Ltd., 1931, pp. 271-272.
q. Wisdom, J* "Metaphysics and Verification,” Hind, Vol. XLVII, Ho* 
188, Oct. 1938, p. H63n.
5. Ayer, A. d* Language Truth and Logic, p. 114.
6. Ibid, p* 105*
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APPENDIX? AN ANALYSIS OF THE KEY TERMS INVOLVED
In the preceding writings, the reader doubtless noticed that the 
linked terras ’fact/value,’ ’is/ought* and ’descriptive/normative* were 
used interchangeably. This procedure may strike some as illegitimate 
owing to the subtle yet vital differences felt to exist between the 
groups and members Involved, They will argue that ’description* is not 
equivalent to ’fact*, any more than ’norm* is synonymous with ’value*; 
that *is/ought’ is not equal to ’descriptive/norraative*; that ’fact* Is 
not to ’is’ as ’value* is to 'ought', etc*
Since I substituted each set of terras for the other throughout 
these pages# on the assumption that they did admit of mutual substitu­
tion# it seems necessary as a post-script to jiistify this claim*
fLet us therefore first examine the relationship between ’fact * * 
’is* and ’description* for the purpose of d^ t^Termining'whether or not 
they can be identically equated* and if not# whether the similarity 
which they bear to each other is Of such a nature that# for our present 
purposes# we were justified in using them interchangeably# .. .
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Aî 'IS*, ’FACT’ AND ’DESCRIPTION’
At first glance # perhaps due to the Imprecise manner in which 
these terms are employed in popular communication, a strong resemblance 
will immediately be felt between them* To use ’fact’ for what ’is’ and 
what ’is* for ’description’, does not jangle as discordantly upon our 
mind’s verbal attunement as, for example, using ’lemon’ for ’orange* 
and/or ’orange’ for ’lime’*
For although we vaguely grasp the generic root, the common denom­
inator appropriate to these latter terms, we would feel exceedingly 
disinclined to employ them interchangeably « except in specialized 
circumstances (e*g., we could properly offer the orange, the lime or 
the lemon when asked for an example of a citrus fruit). The reason for 
our unwillingness springs from our clearer perception of the nature of 
the differences and similarities which exist between these fruits * All 
benefits of empirical differentiation aside, we know that each fruit 
resembles the others in that it belongs to the same class of edible 
vegetable product# They are all, in fact, examples of the type of 
natural object which as been formally classified by botanists into the 
genus of citrus fruits. Thus it is that although occasions may arise 
when an orange or a lemon may be physically or verbally offered for 
each other as instances of their common class, there is an adequate 
awareness of their relationship to place them in proper perspective, 
thereby avoiding any of the cognitive errors often engendered by such 
linguistic confusions. To put this in more technical jargon, the class 
of citrus fruits is seen to exceed and include the class of oranges and
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lemons just as the class of oranges is easily viewed as not being 
co-extensive with the class of lemons*
To take a second example# at the other end of the scale, linguists 
and trl-lingual persons would feel little if any hesitation at pronounc­
ing ’book', ’libro* and 'livre* to be synonyms. For, assuming that 
inter-language synonyms are possible even if perhaps exact intra-language 
synonyms are notthese words have the same extensional meaning; i.e., 
a word-for-word correspondence exists between the three languages at 
this point, in so far as cultural variations in the denotative applica­
tion of nomenclature will permit* If a simple "ostensive definition" 
experiment were conducted among men already conversant with the idea of 
symbolixation, such#at a Frenchman and a Spaniard were brought into 
the presence of the object which we have labelled 'book', and asked to 
name it, they would immediately reply 'livre* and 'libro* respectively* 
The question then confronting us is whether 'is*, 'fact* and 'des­
cription * fall more into the category of the former example, that is, 
possess a generic similarity, the non-perception of which has allowed to 
flourish our mistaken propensity to regard thm as identical in meaning 
with each other; or whether they are in fact identical in extension in 
the sense in which 'book', 'livre* and 'libro* are synonyxxwus, (Not 
that these two possibilities are mutually exclusive answers to our 
problem; they merely comprise a 'contextual disjunct* which I have posed 
as a possibly fruitful toehold for our speculation.) In pursuit of this 
identification and categorization let us first look at the various 
meanings of the word 'is*, in an attwRpt to indicate the sense intended 
when it is used in place of 'description* or 'fact*
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Thé word *is* is fairly fraught with ambiguity and has provided a 
fertile ground of exploration for logicians and semantloists alike 
(particularly general semanticists of the Koraybski school).^ It is 
usually accorded three main and distinct meanings; the ’is* of identity 
('God is the ruler of the universe*), meaning 'is identical with'; the 
'is* of predication ('God is good*), meaning, God has the chax*acteristic 
of goodness; and the 'is' of existence ('God is'), meaning. He has 
ontological statiis.^
Bertrand Russell, however, ig fond of speakingcf a timeless 'is*, 
"like the 'la' in '4 is twice 2'", as opposed to its syntactical use, 
denoting the present tense (although both of these could be subsumed
under one or the other of the above meanings, being merely the gramma-
6tical —  or non-grammatical — * aspects of them)# Bennett and Baylis
7have described four additional senses of 'is'# First they divide the
'is* of identity ij?to that of equality and equivalence, symbolized by
an equal sign («) and a tilde (~) respectively# They also point out
the meaning of 'is* as "implies # . * as in the pessimistic statement
'Living is suffering'" (although I strongly suspect this is really a
class-inclusIon statement of the sort, 'any case of living Is a case of
suffering')# The use of 'is' in the plural as indicating "a relation of
inclusion between classes of objects, as in such expressions as 'All
prime numbers are natural numbers'"; and the assertional significance of
'is' as conveying that "the writer or speaker believes or asserts what
3he has just stated#"
'Fact* likewise has several, if more closely allied meanings, which 
have been presented in various ways; e*g# "Actual individual occurrence^
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An indubitable truth of autuality# A brute event# Syn# with actual
event#”  ^ "1# State of affairs CSaohverhalt)? an object having
categorical —  syntactical structure. 2# (a) that which simply is, as
contrasted with that which is necessaryCb) that which is actual as
contrasted with that which is merely possible; (c) that which is,
11regardless of its value*" "Perpetration of act, occurrence of event;
thing certainly known to have occurred or be true, datum of experience,
12e.g. 'the fact that fire burns’". "An objective datum of experience 
<D* Such expressions as the ’universe’ or ’world*, or ’thing of fact’ 
all emphasize . # . contrast with spheres of desire, value, discourse, 
eta#, which Implicate attitudes or constructions on the part of the 
observer*
Other writers have reached very different conclusions about ’fact* 
than the above# Whitehead for example deposes ’fact* from its empirical 
anchorage and places it in a dependent position when he says, "In the 
Universe the status of the World of Fact 1» that of an abstraction
1 itrequiring for its concrete reality, Value and Purpose , # Russell
also chips away at the usual image of ’fact*, by attacking its conception 
as being empirically verified, in his notion of ’unobserved facts* by 
virtue of which sentences are true; that "Facts are wider (at least
15possibly) than experience#" Both of these are, of course, unusual 
approaches, the logical consequences and peripheral ramifications of 
specific philosophical systems.
Perhaps the most widely discussed or disputed senses of ’fact* 
concern whether ’fact’ should be applied to objects in the universe, such 
as bicycles, Mr# Churchill and kangaroos, or whether this terra should be
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reserved, for thé properties of these objeots» their relationships or 
their existential status* G. E* Moore, for example, tacitly supports 
the latter view when he uses the name fact to stand for the "constitu­
ents of the universe which correspond to true beliefs." He adds 
however, probably to forestall criticism, "I don’t mean to say that 
this is the only sense in which the word ’facts* is commonly used# 
Philosophers, at all events, certainly sometimes use it In a wider 
sense? they will say for instance not merely that the existence of
1 elions is a fact, but that a lion itself is a fact*" Bertrand Russell
also supports this interpretation of fact# "When I speak of à ’fact*,
I do not mean one of the simple things' in the world; I mean that a
certain thing has a certain quality, or that certain things have a
certain relation. Thus, for example, I should not call Napoleon a fact,
but I should call it a fact that he was ambitious or that he married 
17Josephine*" (These two philosophers later part company over the 
relation of facts to propositions, Moore claiming that a true proposition 
is a 'fact* or *a reality* and Russell thoroughly separating facts from 
propositions.)
Returning now to our main point, obviously the *is* of identity as
iin *God is the ruler of the Universe*, cannot be equateli with ’fact* as 
a ’brute event*, any more than the ’is’ of predication as in ’God is 
good* can be said to even roughly correspond to ’fact* as it is epistemo-
logically interpreted, e.g. "**#* thing certainly knotm to have occurred«
or be true*#,," or "an actuality as contrasted with a possibility, a 
necessity#*,»" etc# However, the ’is’ of existence can, I believe, be 
substituted ÿfith impunity for ’fact’ interpreted is, *’Àn objective datwn
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of experiencet" or "an actual event"; or fact interpreted either as a 
simple existent thing itself, like 'The fact of fire’, or as a charac­
teristic relation# etc., of an existent object# like "’The fact that 
fire burns.*"
This is in no way an odd or unusual interpretation of the term# 
picked out of some remote comer to suit our needs. It is the tradi­
tional interpretation of fact; the one that was presupposed by 19th 
Century Subjective or Epistemologlcal Idealism (18th Century Aoosmism)# 
and Realism# in their dispute over whether the world of 'fact* has any 
existence or reality apart from the relation of being perceived or 
thought (whether facts are 'noetic* objects). It is the interpretation 
of 'fact* which is generally differentiated from interpretation in that 
basic and highly important distinction in the theory of knowledge between 
what a man senses and whathe perceives.
In short# the 'is* denoting an existent thing or realm and the 'fact' 
denoting an existent thing or realm can for all intensive purposes be 
treated as equal (grammatical noun and verb differences notwithstanding), 
and it is this meaning of the respective terms which is ii%tended or 
assumed when substitution occurs in the succeeding pages.
The examination of the term 'descriptive* or# to us a more easily
handled form# 'description*# is much less difficult since it really has
only one philosophical meaning. This single meaning is adequately put by
Professor R, Adamson as follows; "The statement of the distinctive marks
of an object# the marks being of such kind as can be presented in direct
.18perceptive experience.
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The objection which immediately springs to mind against equating
descriptiont so defined*, to 'is* and 'factMs that a statement of the 
distinctive marks of an object is not the same thing as a word or phrase 
designating an existential object or state of affairs. That is to say# 
description is a more ’collective' term which stands for a more or less 
orderly listing of facts (or things that simply 'arc*)# which usually 
serves to characterize the object in question. Existential faets^ /Çom-
fprise a description and description^ are more than one set of facts#
That ice is relatively hard Is a fact; but that it is hard# has the 
chemical composition of M^O# is a greyish-white In colour# and melts at 
above 32*>F., Is a partial description. (A description of the object 'ice'# 
that is# as differentiated from a definition of the word#)
Yet when philosophers speak of 'the descriptive* as contrasted with 
'the normative', they do not entertain any thoughts of grammatical number 
which would induce them to reflect upon whether description should be 
singular or plural* This consideration is at best irrelevant for their 
purposes and at worst badly misleading* For the philosophical usage of 
'description* supersedes these grammatical conventions# since it refers 
to a broad stratum of the universe; the sphere of existent things. This 
sphere can be referred to just as well by speaking of 'the category of 
the actual'# 'the world of fact', 'the existential realm', 'the descrip­
tive element' or a number of other words and phrases* To say something 
of the nature of 'facts not fact is equal to description' is to fail to 
comprehend the sense in which 'description* is being used*
Once this objection is set aside and the meaning of 'description' 
made clear in the process, X believe it becomes apparent# without my having 
begged the question, that 'description* can be used interchangeably with 
'is* and 'fact* as previously defined*
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Having now diaeusaed the several meanings appropriate to each of the 
terms under examination, designated the meaning which they hold in 
common and affirmed their interchangeability by virtue of this matching 
meaning, it now remains to explain the sense in which we are justified 
in freely substituting any one term for either of the other two.
It would be blatantly incorrect to assert that 'is', 'fact' and 
'description* are all identical in the same way that the inter-language 
synonyms 'livre*, 'libro* and 'book* are 'identical*. Our terias obviously 
do not bear that much similarity. Neither can we justify equating 'is*, 
'fact* and 'description* by refe%#nce to their being particular instances 
of some more inclusive category, as the aforementioned 'lime', 'orange* 
and 'lemon* are instance of citrus fruits. Our terns bear a different 
and much closer relationship than that of being members of a common class#
Then in what sensé is it legitimate to regard these words as mutually 
substitutional? Simply by virtue of their having a meaning in common 
which is so very similar, bears so close a correspondence, that saying the 
one is tantamount to saying either of the others; that saying the one 
virtually'âaiounts to the same thing * as saying either of the others. Or . 
put in another way, the differences between the respective meanings are 
So'ûéïight 'aè"'tO' be negligible for our intents and purposes.
Leibniz claims that objects are identical when they possess the same 
19properties* Perhaps the criterion for words should read that words 
correspond exactly, when they pbesess the same meaning# If so, 'is', 
'fact* and 'description*, as herein treated, bear a high degree of 
correepondence* It is this correspondence which supplies us with our 
warrant to use the words interchangeably*
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Bî 'OUGHT'# 'VALUE* AND ’NORMATIVE»
The terms 'ought'# 'value' and 'normative' are enjoying extreme 
popularity in present-day moral philosophy* This situation both helps 
and hinders our cause* By not having a tiwe^ouldad# traditional or 
standard group of meanings to which we can refer# our task is consider­
ably complicated; yet by the same token# the fresh diversity and number 
of interpretations present us with bountiful sources from which to draw# 
However# the briefer treatment which these terms will be assigned# 
as compared with that given to the previous set# is not due to either of
these factors* It is due to the fact that our previous discussion has/
already cleared considerable debris from our path, so that we can proceed
directly to the heart of the matter with few, if any# digressions for
rendering an explanation# justification or reservation* Let us begin then 
with the term 'ought'.
This term is commonly employed by philosophers and theologians as a 
verb expressing duty or obligation of a moral sort* (As a noun it is 
that which is denoted by the verb ought, i,e* duty or obligation*) An 
example (of the verb) would be 'We ought to love our neighbours » *
'Ought* is also used without any obligatory content to stand for a 
state of affairs the existence of which would be a good thing; e.g. 'Our 
team ought to win this match' can be translated into 'It would be a good 
thing if our team won this match'* This sense of 'pught*, however# is
not a moral one since the term 'good* in 'it would be a good thing *##'
only expresses my personal preference for one sort of outcome rather than 
another. I would be pleased if our team won the match.
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There le another sense of 'ought*, which expresses that some humanly 
controllable fact ought or ought not to be or to have been* An example 
of an 'ought not* of this nature would be 'There ought not to be any 
natural evil in the world*» This use of 'ought* can be considered as 
indicating a lapse in moral duty on the part of God or some cosmic force 
capable of altering this state of affairs# or it may be nothing more than 
a non-condemnatory# empty wish that the present conditions didn't exist»
'Ought* is also used to indicate shortcoming as in 'You ought to know
better'; in place of advisable as in 'You ought to take more exercise';
Soto denote what is "befitting# proper or naturally expected»" as in 'One 
ought to wear high-heeled shoes to a cocktail party*; and in order to 
express expectation based upon a strong degree of probability# as in 'The 
train ought to arrive shortly*»
It is important to stop for.a moment at this point and note the above 
non-moral senses of 'ought*» It is clear that whether one should wear a 
certain type of shoe on a formal occasion is a matter for etiquette# not 
oethics# to decide; and in saying that the train ought to arrive shortly# 
we do not intend to level any moral blame if it is late* We learn from 
the first# something about the customs or mores of western cultu%%# and
21from the seccmd# what time or how soon we can expect the train to arrive.
So many discussions about the 'naturalistic fallacy* (Hume's version) have 
been vitiated by the failure to distinguish between the moral and the non- 
moral senses of ought* Since we dealt with the 'naturalistic fallacy*#It 
is well to mark this major division*
I do not believe that we need examine the numerous philosophical 
treatments of 'ought* which have filled the pages of philosophers from
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Aristotle and Kant to Ross# Broad and Hare. Neither do we need to judge 
whether 'ought* entails imperatives# implies can* or should have a
22deontological (formalistic)* teleological or 'logical* application*
Hot that these issues are not themselves interesting and important# but 
for our present purposes becoming embroiled in such examinâtionV would 
oonsdtute a digression or departure from the main stream of thought* We 
can adopt# as a basis for comparison# the alarmingly simple interpretation 
of 'ought* as expressing moral duty or obligation, without going any 
further into the matter in any direction* When we say# a man ought to 
aid the poor# we mean that it is his moral duty to do so or that he is 
under moral obligation to do so.
The term ’normative* seems far more difficult to characterize*
Numerous philosophers have used the term# yet comparatively few have 
bothered to explicitly define it* As a result one encounters it springing 
full grown out of the middle of some paragraph or roughly defined# more 
or less in passing# in another* Thus usually one must infer from the use 
of the word in context# just what meaning it is being given* Witness the 
following extracts;-
"Among most contemporary philosophers it now passes for an obvious truth 
that ethic*s * * * task# being normative# is to deal not with 'what is* 
but with 'what ought to be.'"^^
Karl Popper in speaking of the difference between "natural laws" and 
^normative laws’* speaks of "normative laws# or standards# or norms# i.e. 
rules that forbid or demand certain modes of conduct# or certain procedures;
1 ..
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exemples are the laws of the Athenian Constitution# or the rules pertain-
2Uing to the election of Members of Parliament $ or the Ten Commandments."
"Ideally a normative 'theory* conaiata of a set of general principles
25analogous to the axioms of a geometric system."
"By a 'normative sentence* I mean such sentences as 'I ought to go*, 'It
would be a good thing if Iowa lost this game* # 'The right thing to do is
to keep your promise*. They can perhaps be described as sentences which 
state that some fact ought to be Cor have been)» Usually, but not 
n:ac#s#ily, this fact in a fact of human behaviour. I would wish to 
call 'There ought to be no earthquakes or other natural disasters* a 
normative sentence. On the other hand# I would like to exclude merely 
casual sentences. I do not wish to call such a sentence as 'You ought 
to install new points* (where this is elliptical for# 'To get more 
regular firing of your engine# you ought to install new points') a 
normative sentence."
"* * * nomatives (i.e. sentences containing 'ought* as an auxiliary 
verb) . .
"Norm is . ♦ 4 The principle# whether truth or mode of reality» which
controls action# thought# and emotion# if these are to realise their
appropriate ends; ». . . The norm of thinking is truth; of emotion# the 
beautiful; of volition# the good. These principles (and their corres­
ponding philosophic disciplines) are hence termed normative. The three 
normative sciences are thus logic# aesthetics# and ethics."
(This is of course an unusual# teleological interpretation).
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moral prinolplaa (or what are called normative laws) . # • function 
* . # to guide our choice between alternative courses of action which 
result in our taking a decision*
John Hokensie speaks of ethics as a "Normative Science" by virtue of the
3ofact that it "is concerned with an end or ideal or standard,"
R* B* Brandt calls questions like "'What kinds of things are desirable 
or worthwhile?* and 'Which kinds of acts are morally wrong?* and 'Do men 
possess any inalienable rights?*"# the "normative problems of ethics#"®^
Finally# there is a group of philosophers who are concerned with 
whether or not a normative use of a word has imperative or mandatory 
force# and they centre their definition of normative around this issue* 
Nowell-Smith puts it this ways-
"‘It is sometimes said that 'you ought* (normative) sentences are dis­
guised imperatives and since one of the most frequent uses of the
32imperative mood is to issue orders# that they are disguised commands,"
Raphael# for example# says# "A 'normative* use of a word connotes , * * 
a stimulus to action; it has an evocative or imperative force , « , The 
imperative force is a 'demandcf reason'# i*e. a prescription of universal 
application « , « Normative judgements depend upon 'commands' that a m  
universally legislative , • # A command is often limited to a particular 
occasion# expressing a short-lived desire and referring to an individual 
action. Normative words express a general policy to be followed in. all 
situations of a similar kind,"
John Laird flatly states that "All normative sciences contain and have to
Ando with imperatives,"
21?
While Everett Hall makes the contradiotory assertion# "I do not believe 
they are in all cases simply weak or polite imperatives » . * There is 
properly no imperative in the past tense# but there are normatives in 
this tense,
In mulling over the gist of these quotations it seems to me that 
'ought* and 'normative* are quite similar in meaning# If we use 'ought* 
in the oapaolty of a verb# its usual part of speech# it appears that all 
moral and certainmn-moral senses of the verb 'ought* provide the medium 
for the expression of normative principles* 'You ought to love your 
neighbour* and 'You ought to use a napkin* are both practical utterances 
of normative principles; 'The team ought to win* and 'The train ought to 
arrive' are not normative expressions# except in a highly strained sense*
If we wanted to begin our comparison between 'ought* and 'normative' 
at this point # with a view toward establishing the relationship between 
them# we would reach the following conclusions? That every case of a 
sentence containing a 'moral ought' as the verb# is a case of a normative 
principle being expressed; and every case involving the expression of 
a normative principle is one in which ought can occur* (This seems to be 
by virtue of the regulative or controlling nature of both 'normative* and 
'ought* which renders the former amenable to expression in terms of the 
latter*)
However# we are principally interested in the relationship between 
'ought* and 'normative' when they are (i) used only in their moral senses 
and (ii) cut loose from their grammatical bindings and placed on an equal 
footing* For this is the manner in which they have appeared throughout 
the previous discussion and hence the way in which they should be judged
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now. And judged on those grounds# a different and much closer relation­
ship can be discerned to exist between them*
'Normative'-sentences and 'ought'-sentences# or 'normativeness' and 
'oughtness* (to use an agreeable# old-fashioned form)# can then be spoken 
of interchangeably. We can ask whether a particular value entails 
'Qughtness' or bomativeness ' # with either one of the terms being redun­
dant and superfluous in relation to the other. We can speak equally well 
about whether 'ought’-sentences or 'normative’-sentences should be given 
a deontological# teleological or logical application; or debate whether 
'normative’-sentences and 'ought’-sentences have imperative force; or 
affirm that ’normatives,’ and 'oughts’ imply ’can’, the absence of either 
terra# ’ought' or ’normative’» neither adds nor subtracts from the full 
meaning of these issues; and the presence of both terras does not pose any 
different question or elicit any different sort of reply than that 
presented or provoked by one. In short» neither a quantitative nor a 
qualitative disparity is present.
In trying to analyse the reason for the interchangeability of our 
terms In the above context » it seems to be by virtue of the morally 
obligatory which they share. And this obligatory or ’duty charging’ 
nature is the dominant note or essential characteristic pervading each* 
Thus we are not aeserting their interchangeability according to some 
trivial# supporting attribute which they happen to share# but in 
consequence of their common core#
However# there is a larger sense in which these terras coincide in 
meaning which will become clear once we examine the word 'value*#
V^alue^  Is a terrn which has recently been placed in a highly Impor­
tant position in ethical discourse. It possesses the advantage of being 
roughly equivalent to certain moral terms, plus the benefit of having 
comparative freedom from the psychological and philosophical associations 
which history has woven around these terms.
Although the careful examination of *value* is of great importance 
to moral philosophy and theology in general* as it has been said of some 
of our previously examined terms* for our purposes we need not delve too 
deeply into its nature. We will use a very general sense of ‘value* as 
equivalent to ‘worth** ’goodness* or ‘rightness*.
Thus we are using it as an abstract noun designating the property 
of value or of being valuable* rather than <i) as @ concrete noun refer^ 
ring to things which possess this property of value* or (ii) in a fom 
which includes evil or badness* which are spoken of as ’disvalue*,
Now it appears far more difficult than any of our tasks before * to 
try to equate ‘value* so defined with ’normative*^ and almost impossible 
to equate it with ’ought*. The reader may immediately feel that the 
question of whether value is obligatory in nature, whether ’-Ought belongs 
to the essence of value” is highly relevant here, and* since it has been 
decided negatively in most cases* that this serves as a sufficient 
impasse to deter our efforts*
I do not propose to attempt relating these terms by coming down on 
the positive side of the fence in.this issue (although an excellent case
âfican be* and has been* made to support siich a, view). Rather* according 
to the broad interpretation of ’value* which I have been using throughout 
this treatise* such issues are not legitimate considerations» This issue
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and similar issues are only relevant to a narrow use of ’value*. As 
Frantkena puts it* "’Value* is (here) used more narrowly* being contrasted 
with rightness. Here the distinction intended is within the ’ought* as 
opposed to the *is* and is between the ‘good* and the ’right’, with 
’value’ taken as equivalent to ’goodness** Then the main problem goneems 
the relation of value and obligation.” (My underscoring»)
My broader use of, value, the one which was employed throughout these 
pages, contrasts value "with ’fact* or ’existence*. Here the contrast 
intended is that of the ’ought’ versus the ’is’ and the term ’value* is 
used to cover not only the various kinds of goodness, but also beauty and
rightness. And the main problem is that of the relation of value and
38existence," (My underscoring.)
This is the interpretation of value which was used and the one which 
as the above sentences indicate is related to ’normative* and ’ought*.
Thus we can speak of "the nature and status of value in a world of
39sclentifie fact and force," Or we can speak of ’normative* in these
terms; "Reference to a norm may be roughly taken to discriminate the
philosophic from the natural sciences* The latter aim simply to describe
phenomena and explain them in terms of laws or principles. The explaining
principles are moreover, mechanical, having to do with conditions of
manifestation in time* In the philosophic sciences* facts are interpreted
with reference to their meaning, or value ^  their significance from the
position occupied, or part played by them in the total make-up of experi- 
liOenee." Or, as quoted before, "The ’ought* is distinguished from the ’is 
as the ideal from the actual . «
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Numerous other examples and quotations could be cited; however, I 
believe these few will convey my meaning sufficiently, With ‘value* used 
narrowly, it is almost as distinct from ’ought* and ’normative* as it is 
from ’fact*. But once granted a broad interpretation, these terms are 
seen to belong to the same, tight ethical grouping.
It is according to this broad view of all of the six terns which we 
have examined that W. K, Frankena can speak of the naturalistic fallacy 
as being connected "with the notion of a bifurcation between the ’ought* 




Richard Robinson in his excellent book Definition, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1950, p. 9S, has taken the notion that "thera are no synonyms" 
in the same languie to mean that the synonym method of defining a 
word "can rarely be practised alone without misleading the learner 
to a considerable extent." t would carry the view a bit further and 
say that a synonym, in the first, precise sense offered by the 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, that of ".#* a word having the 
same sense as a n o t h e r i s  an impossibility among most, if not all 
words if the full meaning of the terms is considered the full 
meaning which endorsees both their denotation and their connotation 
which includes subjective intention* Two or more words can be iden* 
tieal in reference, in that they denote the same object, area of 
experience, state of affairs, etc; yet I seriously doubt whether two 
or more words can possess identical flavourings or associations, the 
'psychological* meaning or subjective intension of the terms involved. 
To be loquacious is not the same as to be talkative; a diary is not 
a journal; a sei^ent is not a snake; to swoon is not to faint; and 
even something parallel is not collateral. In fact I fail to see 
how any words could be said to fall within the category of synonyms, 
if an exact interpretation and a stringent definition of ’synonym* 
is applied. It'is only when connotation is ignored or taken only in 
a logical sense as meaning the implication of all or some attributes, 
or when ‘synonymous* is more loosely interpreted as, perhaps, ‘being
3» tevi, A. W, and Frye, A. M», Rational Belief» part 1, New York, Harcourt Brace & Co*, 19U1, p# 82,
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of the seme general sense yet having different shades of meaning’, 
that the class of s3monyms is anything but empty. Obviously as the 
connotation (in its psyohological sense) of words approach zero, as 
in two-language situations, the appropriateness of applying the 
label ’synonyms* to them increases, For everything else being equal, 
the degrees of connotation is inversely proportional to the correct^ 
ness of attributing synonymity to two or more words.
Any modem philosopher will immediately ask at this point whether I 
intend to show how these words should be used or how they are in fact 
used or how I intend to use them. The answer is that I will designate, 
among the major senses in which each term is used, the sense which I 
will be using.
See Cooley, John C,, A Frimer of Formal Wgid, N* Y,, the MacMillan 
Go,, 1949, pp, 120-127 ahd bee, Irving, d#, language Habits in Hvaian 
Affaire, H* Y., Harper $ Bros,, 1941# pp. 225-S9,
For epeeialized purposes, a perfectly legitimate distinction can be 
drawn between an ontological *is* and an existential *is*# but for 
our present interests this neat distinction need not be observed. 
Russell, B., An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, London, Allen and 
Unwin, Ltd., 1940, p. 209»
Bennett, A. A. and Baylis* C. A», Formal Logic, H, Y., Frentice-Hall# 
Inc., 1950 (first ed* 1939), pp, 42-43.
Parmenides is perhaps the first unwitting perpetrator of an ’is* 
ambiguity when he said that there could be only one thing in the 
world, and that this thing could have no special qualities * St. 
Anselm’s ‘Ontological Argument *, however, contains the most classic
mfailure to differentiate between an *ie* of existence and that of 
predication, as Gaunilo, and later Kant, cmshingly demonstrated*
9# Frankena, N* K$, fiigtionary of Philosophy, ed* Runes, D# D*, H» Y*,
The Philosophical Library, 1942, p# 107*
10* I believe the distinction here is one succinctly formulated by
Leibniz when he spoke of ’necessary truths’ as differentiated from 
’mere matter of fact’»
11* Cairns, D., Dictionary of Philosophy, op cit*,-\p# 107*
12* The Concise Oxford Dictionary, ed* H* N* and P* G* Fowler, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1958 (4th ed»), p* 424.
13* Baldwin, j* #*, "Fact” in Bictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 
ed. J* N* Baldwin, London, MacMillan Co., 1901, Vol. 1, p* 368,
14* Whitehead, A, N*, Essays in Science and Philosophy, London, Rider 
$ Co*, 1948, pp* 62 6 70,
15* Russell, B., An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, London, Allen 5
Unwin, Ltd., 1940, pp. 246 & 305,
16* Passmore, J*, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, London, Gerard Duckworth
6 Co., 1957, p. 209,
17. Russell, B *5 Our Knowledge of the External World, London, Allen 5 
Unwin, Ltd*, 1926, p* 60.
18* Adamson, R., "Description" in Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology; 
ed# Baldwin, op. cit.. Vol* I, p* 271. (I assume Adamson would admit 
to his definition microscopic objects for which require ’extra%eurml’ 
instruments are required.>
19. The Principlesof Leibniz or the P. L, abbreviation in the annotation 
of logical proofs.
225
20, The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, ed. W. Little, H. H. Fowler,
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